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The Department of Defense (DoD) has tens of thousands of contracts physically 
completed but not formally closed-out.  At issue are potentially millions of dollars that 
are obligated on those contracts which could be deobligated, thus making them available 
for use by DoD.  At the request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A) Acquisition Management)), our 
team was formed to chart the current contract closeout process and to recommend ways 
to improve and transform the process while reducing the current backlog of physically 
completed contracts. 
This report identifies the steps necessary to affect contract closeout once a 
contract becomes physically complete.  Utilizing data from available DoD and non-DoD 
sources and interviews from personnel managing and working within the contract 
closeout process, our team (1) identifies the major causes preventing contracts from 
closing in a timely manner, (2) provides recommended actions to reduce the size of the 
overaged inventory of physically completed contracts, and (3) recommends modification 
to the existing closeout process to include pre-award and administration period actions in 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) has tens of thousands of contracts physically 
completed but not formally closed-out.  At issue are potentially millions of dollars that 
are obligated on those contracts, making the funds unavailable for use by DoD.  At the 
request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition (ASN (RD&A) Acquisition Management)), our team was formed to 
recommend ways to improve and transform the contract closeout process and reduce the 
Navy’s inventory of physically completed contracts administered by the Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA).  While the focus of the research effort was on 
Navy contracts administered by DCMA in the Mechanization of Contract Administration 
Services (MOCAS) system, findings, recommendations, and conclusions can apply to 
any contract management office involved in contract closeout.  
Utilizing data from available DoD sources and interviews from personnel 
managing and working within the contract closeout process, this report (1) identifies the 
steps necessary to administratively close a contract once it becomes physically complete 
(2) identifies the major causes preventing contracts from closing in a timely manner, (3) 
provides recommendations to reduce the size of the inventory of physically completed 
contracts, and (4) recommends modifications to the existing closeout process, including 
pre-award and post-award actions to expedite contract closeout.  Recommendations are 
grouped in such a manner as to suggest changes that can be made in the near-term and 
thus do not require regulatory changes, intermediary actions that will require some 
changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or other regulatory and policy 
guidance, and transformational changes that will require significant modification to 
existing regulations and may also require statutory relief or changes.  Our research 
centered on the elimination of the backlog of overaged contracts and methods to affect 
timely closeout in order to focus on the primary reasons for affecting closeout.   
Many key issues impacting contract closeout were discovered during our 
research.  The first is the reasoning behind closing contracts which include: (1) reducing 




property, and (3) returning obligated funding to the Services as quickly as possible with a 
goal of being able to reutilize that funding for other obligations and expenditures.  A 
second significant issue is the failure of DoD agencies and Services to adequately 
communicate with each other and contractors.  As such, each organization is optimized to 
accomplish their desired management goals, yet they have caused unintended impacts on 
other commands.  The result is sub-optimization of each of the contract closeout actions 
rather than an optimization of the entire process.  Contributing factors to this 
phenomenon are: (1) the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s (DCAA) audit scheduling 
practice which causes unintended delays in the timely closeout of many DoD contracts; 
(2) the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s (DFAS) policy of paying invoices 
through a prorated method which is creating havoc among buying activities and 
administration activities in determining an accurate status of obligations and expenditures 
on a contract; and (3) the buying command’s comptroller policies that require a multitude 
of accounting lines on contracts to provide additional clarity in obligations, thus creating 
tremendous complexity in administration and paying invoices.  In addition, we identified 
that many of the policies and procedures adopted in the FAR over the last several years to 
improve contract closeout are either ineffective, too narrow, or are not being 
accomplished. 
Although this report covers many of the issues regarding contract closeout, it does 
not delve into issues other than those determined to be of greatest value to this report and 
our research sponsor.  Specifically, this report does not address property administration, 
legal hold on contracts, special reconciliation issues, patent or copyright delays, or the 
plant clearance process.  Additionally, review of statistical data and interviews with DoD 
acquisition professionals led the team to center on the two most populous types of 
contracts that appear in the physically completed but not closed category; Cost-Plus- 
Fixed-Fee and Firm-Fixed-Price contracts.  Many other types of contracts did not receive 
significant attention due to their less significant role in the existing backlog. 
In addressing the many issues that came to light during our research, we propose a 
number of recommendations that can have an impact on reducing the backlog and others 




meaningful recommendations, we feel DoD must immediately embark on an improved 
training regimen that encourages cross-organizational contacts and more of an IPT-
approach to contracting.  Up-front involvement prior to contract award from the paying 
office and the office that will administer a contract could pay tremendous dividends 
during administration and closeout.  Furthermore, we conclude that permanent 
organizational resources should be employed on contract closeout if it is indeed a 
priority.  Additionally, the DoD should adopt a method of processing multiple contracts 
for administrative closure through a proposed batching process.  Another significant 
recommendation involves the reduction of requirements for auditing contracts and a form 
of “self-audit” by a licensed accounting firm that already audits a company’s financial 
statements.  Further recommendations push for the expanded use of quick-closeout terms 




























I. THE CURRENT STATE OF CONTRACT CLOSEOUT 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has tens of thousands of contracts that are 
physically completed but not formally closed.  Of concern are the millions of dollars 
obligated on these contracts, making the funds unavailable for use.  Delays in the 
closeout process can result in the loss of current year funds as appropriations obligated on 
these physically completed contracts close.  This is clearly an inefficient use of DoD 
resources.  Within the Navy alone, it is estimated that over $2,000,000,000 are obligated 
on over 47,000 physically completed contracts.1   
Recognizing that the DoD is losing millions of dollars annually on physically 
complete contracts not administratively closed,2 and realizing that DoD is inefficiently 
utilizing scarce resources, Secretary Rumsfeld’s Business Initiative Council (BIC) 
declared transformation of the contract closeout process a top ten BIC initiative.  
Afterward, personnel within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) identified a significant backlog 
of physically complete Navy contracts administered within the Mechanization of 
Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) system.  MOCAS was initially developed in 
the 1960s as a contract administration tool, although both the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
have modified it significantly and it is now used for both administration and payment 
functions.3  All contracts being administered by DCMA are managed in MOCAS, which 
is divided into several Contract Administration Report (CAR) sections that indicate the 
status of contracts. 
                                                 
1 Data taken from the February 2002 – February 2003 MOCAS download of Navy contracts.  The 
information is found in the obligated amount column, referring to funding that was obligated on each of the 
contracts but has not yet been expended.  As the funding expires, it will no longer be available for DoD 
uses of any kind.  This topic will be covered in greater detail in Chapter IV - Batch Processing. 
2 Nearly $50,000,000 was identified for replacement funding for the Navy alone in FY2002. 




There is renewed urgency to resolve this enormous backlog of physically 
completed but not closed contracts due to increased interest in more effective 
management of DoD’s limited resources and moves to ease the transition from MOCAS 
to its proposed replacement system.4  These physically completed contracts appear in 
MOCAS CAR Section 2 and are defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) as 
being physically completed once the contractor has completed and the Government has 
inspected and accepted the supplies or services, when all provisions have expired, or if 
termination action has commenced.5  Due to a lack of emphasis or management priority 
on closing physically completed contracts, the overall DoD backlog of overaged 
contracts, defined as those contracts that have exceeded the time allotted by the FAR for 
timely closeout, has reached over 19,000 contracts,6 with millions of dollars of 
unexpended obligated funds tied to them.  There are several reasons that contract closeout 
has become a priority within DoD, although the most pressing appears to be the concerns 
to effectively expend DoD funding prior to appropriations being closed, to eliminate 
potential liabilities that may be incurred on contracts prior to administrative closeout and 
fund closure, and to ensure proper disposition of Government property, materials, and 
funding.7  
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD 
(AT&L)) has recently applied pressure on Service acquisition officials to reduce the 
potential pecuniary liability as well as to release funding currently obligated on 
physically completed contracts.  As such, ASN (RD&A) is placing emphasis on closing 
out physically completed contracts, reutilizing deobligated funds when appropriate, and 
removing potential liabilities that could impact current year funding authority.  Since 
current year funding must be used to pay for previous fiscal year liabilities when the 
                                                 
4 GAO Report D-2002-027, 19 December 2001. 
5 FAR 4.804-4. 
6 MOCAS OPR Matrix, March 2003 Reporting of Closeout “Buckets” of Responsibility. 




particular appropriation is closed or insufficient,8 significant impacts on current 
procurement programs can occur if contracts are not closed, including injecting 
uncertainty into DoD acquisition programs in the form of decreased funding lines. 
As previously stated, MOCAS CAR Section 2 has approximately 47,700 contracts 
that originated within the Navy, with over $2,400,000,000 in unexpended funds tied to 
those physically completed contracts.9  The fact that so much money is tied to physically 
completed contracts gains in importance when considering the large sum of that funding 
that resides on overaged contracts, defined as those contracts that have exceeded Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) required timelines for closeout.10  Table 1 demonstrates 
the FAR standards for timely contract closeout. 
 
Contract Type     Time Period to Close     
Contracts Using Simplified Acquisition Evidence of Receipt and Final Payment 
   Procedures              
All other Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) 
Contracts 6 Months       
Cost-Reimbursement 
Contracts   36 Months       
All Other Contract 
Types   20 Months       
Source:  GAO Report D-2002-027, 19 December 2001 and FAR 4.804 
 
Table 1. Time Standards for Contract Closeout. 
 
Some of the overaged contracts date back to the early-1980s and involve funding 
that has long-since closed.  Reconciliation of such aged contracts may require current 
year funding to pay for unliquidated obligations and increases the complexity of final 
determination due to difficulties in assembling an accurate picture of what occurred on a 
30-year old contract.  Of the 47,700 Navy contracts listed in MOCAS as physically 
complete, over 11,000 or 23.4% of them, are overaged.11  With this in mind, the ASN 
                                                 
8 General Accounting Office, “Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Second Edition” of July 
1997. 
9 Taken from the DFAS MOCAS download for February 2003. 
10 FAR 42.804. 




(RD&A) requested that the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) examine the contract 
closeout process and make recommendations to reduce the number of physically 
completed contracts within MOCAS and prevent current and future contracts from 
becoming overaged.  
B. THE ISSUE WITH CONTRACT CLOSEOUT 
Due to the very nature of contract closeout, there will always be a fairly large 
number of contracts that reside in MOCAS CAR Section 2 as physically completed but 
not administratively closed.  A management technique to estimate the level of expected 
inventory is addressed in Chapter II.  Within MOCAS CAR Section 2, each contract is 
assigned a reason code by the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) to indicate the 
reason the contract is not yet closed.  Reason codes range from “A: Contractor has not 
submitted final invoice/voucher,” through “Z+6: Awaiting Removal from Excess Funds,” 
with every conceivable reason in between.12  The majority of contracts are closed on time 
and do not become overaged,13 although they will appear in MOCAS until all closeout 
actions have been completed and final reconciliation and closeout actions have been 
posted by DCMA and DFAS.  The FAR stipulates a minimum of 15 administrative 
closeout procedures that must be accomplished for a contract to be closed, although there 
are multiple sub-steps that have been identified during reviews of activity closeout 
manuals and other guidance.  Table 2 lists the fifteen administrative closeout procedures 
mentioned in the FAR.  A detailed representation of the current closeout process is 
available in Appendix A of this report, which contains a step-by-step process chart 
delineating the various activities responsible for closeout actions in accordance with 
applicable FAR provisions and other DoD directives. 
The DoD has made strides reducing the number of overaged contracts in MOCAS 
CAR Section 2, as evidenced by the reduction of approximately 3,500 contracts in the 
                                                 
12 DFAS Tasking Memo 02-196, “R2 Overaged Reason Codes”. 
13 Data from the USD (AT&L) Bucket Plan Matrix from January through March 2003 shows that 
number of contracts entering the MOCAS CAR Section 2 is nearly constant, yet the number of contracts 
reaching overaged status is decreasing.  This demonstrates that the majority of contracts are closing within 





period covering February 2002 to February 2003, although they have had somewhat 
limited success in eliminating this backlog in a timely manner.  The General Accounting 
Office (GAO) estimates it will likely take at least six years to eliminate the current 
inventory of physically completed contracts unless significant improvements are made in 
the oversight applied or the resources allocated to closeout.14   
 
          (1) Disposition of classified material is completed   
          (2) Final patent report is cleared       
          (3) Final royalty report is cleared       
          (4) There is no outstanding value engineering change proposal 
          (5) Plant clearance report is received     
          (6) Property clearance is received       
          (7) All interim or disallowed costs are settled     
          (8) Price revision is completed       
          (9) Subcontracts are settled by the prime contractor   
          (10) Prior year indirect cost rates are settled     
          (11) Termination docket is completed     
          (12) Contract audit is completed       
          (13) Contractor's closing statement is completed   
          (14) Contractor's final invoice has been submitted   
          (15) Contract funds review is completed and excess funds deobligated 
Source: FAR 4.804-5       
 
Table 2. Administrative Closeout Procedures. 
 
In response, USD (AT&L) developed a “Bucket Plan” metric in which overaged 
contracts were placed in various batches based on reason codes in MOCAS and were 
assigned to those Agencies with cognizance over that particular reason code.  The 
agencies include: the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), DCMA, the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), defense contractors, and the individual military 
Services.  Assuming that the MOCAS reason codes reflect accurate status, DCAA has 
responsibility for closeout actions on 15.56% of the contracts in MOCAS CAR Section 2, 
DCMA for 16.32%, DFAS for 28.42%, Industry for 36.22%, and the Services are 
responsible for the remaining 3.48%.15  The most interesting conclusion to draw from 
                                                 
14 GAO Report D-2002-027, 19 December 2001, p. 3. 




this information is that the Services, who actually own the unexpended funding that 
resides on the physically completed contracts, are only able to impact less than five 
percent of the actions required to close the contracts listed in MOCAS CAR Section 2.  In 
fact, of the major stakeholders, only the Services have a direct incentive to deobligate as 
much of the unexpended funding as possible.  A complete stakeholder analysis is 
included in Appendix B of this report and illustrates the incentives, priorities, and 
interests for all of the major activities that play a role in contract closeout. 
C. SOURCES OF DATA 
MOCAS was originally conceived as a contract management tool, although it has 
evolved into an all-encompassing system that incorporates the contract administrative 
function as well as the payment and status functions.  Our team conducted a statistical 
analysis of the Navy data in the MOCAS CAR Section 2 database for the period of 
February 2002 through February 2003.  Within MOCAS CAR Section 2, nearly 50% of 
the contracts are missing reason codes.  Although reason codes are technically not 
required until a contract becomes overaged, management of the process now relies 
significantly on an accurate status throughout the closeout process and therefore the 
codes should be utilized once a contract enters MOCAS CAR Section 2.  Furthermore, a 
spot verification of the reason codes provided in the MOCAS database by one Naval 
Systems Command yielded an error rate nearing 90%, indicating that some ACOs are not 
updating the status of contracts in MOCAS as the reason codes change throughout the 
closure process.  Simply improving the accuracy of the MOCAS database will not, in 
itself, improve the contract closeout process, but it will give improved visibility and 
reliability to management in formulating methods to best deal with the backlog. 
Analysis revealed cost-type contracts for services as the most likely to become 
overaged.  As such, the majority of recommendations within this report to improve the 
contract closeout process involve this type of contract.  Detailed summaries of findings 
within the MOCAS database are presented in the following sections, with detailed 




Data and process information were also derived from a review of GAO reports, 
Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) findings, previous thesis 
recommendations, and various agency publications and online sources.  A summary of 
many of these resources is included in Appendix D.  However, one of the most valuable 
sources of information came from individual DoD employees working within the 
closeout process.  The closeout team conducted over 40 interviews at twenty activities to 
obtain the expert opinions of those most familiar with the issues involved in contract 
closeout.  A detailed listing of the interviews conducted is located within this report’s 
bibliography. 
D. FINDINGS 
Our research indicates that over 40% of all contracts that enter MOCAS CAR 
Section 2 will become overaged,16 with the most likely reasons presented in the 
following summary statistics section.  This report focuses on those issues that were 
indicated as primary reasons for delay by both MOCAS statistics and by those involved 
in contract closeout process at various field activities.  It became evident that on many 
contracts, the process itself was not overly burdensome, but the organizational structure 
and some of the externally imposed factors contribute to the backlog.  As stated, our team 
attempted to focus on ways of tackling the existing backlog while also seeking long-term 
solutions to the root causes that result in contracts migrating to an overaged status. 
During our research, several issues were discovered.  The first is the lack of 
organizational alignment.  We suggest several recommendations that would better align 
the organizations to affect contract closeout in Chapter II.  The second issue is that there 
must be a means of reducing the backlog without resorting to one-by-one processing.  We 
present a method of batch processing contracts with the goal of reaching negotiated 
settlement of numerous overaged contracts simultaneously in Chapter IV.  The third 
major issue revolves around payment issues ranging from the method of payment through 
                                                 
16 Derived from February 2002 through February 2003 MOCAS downloads.  The average probability 
of a contract under reason code M (negotiation of overhead rates pending) becoming overaged was 
determined to be 34% and for reason code A (contractor has not submitted final invoice/voucher) to have a 




reconciliation.  Recommendations seek to change the way DoD approaches payment both 
through up-front actions as well as in processing payments in Chapter V.  A fourth issue 
involves final rate determination and we suggest several methods of tackling the delays 
under the current process in Chapter VI.  Due to the limited duration and scope of this 
initial report, a section was added to Chapter VII to point out findings that merit further 
review by follow-on project teams.  These are issues that were either not identified as 
primary causes of the backlog or were beyond the capability of our project team to 
adequately address in this report.   
E. COST MODEL 
Our team initially developed a cost model that could be used as a tool for both 
estimating the cost of closing a contract as well as estimate the costs associated with each 
type of contract.  A cost model does not currently exist in this specific format that 
ascertains the amount of labor required to close a contract, although DFAS, DCMA, and 
DCAA all track the agency-wide costs that are meaningful to each of their organizations.  
The data obtained at this Agency-wide level were of limited value since our research 
determined that each used different criteria to assign “closeout” costs vice 
“administration” costs and the two areas frequently overlap, and some Agencies did not 
associate their costs to close contracts at all.  In many cases, estimates were used to 
populate the various workload-tracking systems since tracking specific actions to 
closeout appeared to be an administratively intensive process.17  Due to tremendous 
differences in organizational measures for contract closeout, differing organization goals 
for the stakeholders, and huge differences in contract complexities, the model quickly lost 
any significance due to the enormous range of estimations it produced in a Monte Carlo 
simulation.  As a replacement, the team set out to obtain two new cost models, (1) a top-
level aggregate cost of closeout for each of the key stakeholders to the extent it is tracked, 
and (2) a detailed listing of tasks involved in the closeout process.  In this manner, the 
top-level cost model would estimate the overall cost of contract closeout for each fiscal 
year.  Immediately, the same issues arose at the organizational level, where no two 
                                                 




organizations possessed the data necessary to pull costs into a single process known as 
contract closeout.  For example, DCMA tracks various process in its workload system, 
but all of the tasks are not included,18 and DCAA has no metric to measure contract 
closeout itself since its routine cost-incurred audits fulfills roles other than that of a 
closeout audit.    
Interviews with personnel intimately familiar with the closeout process at several 
DCMA, buying command, DCAA, and DFAS offices yielded information to create a first 
rendition of a task-oriented model to capture the major tasks and sub-tasks associated 
with contract closeout.  Once all of the tasks are identified, which is the basis of the work 
conducted by our team, follow-on studies can examine the specific costs associated with 
each of those tasks.  Tasks can then be translated into cost elements by assigning 
approximate times-to-complete figures, pay-level of personnel to assign those tasks, and 
potential queues or decision points that also may exist in pooling all of the direct and 
indirect costs associated with contract closeout.   
The cost models are attached as a CD-ROM, with summary data and hard-copy 
format of the models included in Appendix E.  Again, the complete model will have to be 
assembled by a follow-on study due to the complex nature and the time required to 
accomplish such an endeavor.  Copies of the CD-ROM can be obtained from the Naval 
Postgraduate School Library, listed within the initial distribution list at the end of this 
report. 
F. THE EXISTING PROCESS 
The FAR presents fifteen procedures, listed in Table 2, required to accomplish 
contract closeout, however upon closer examination, there are myriad sub-steps and sub-
processes that must also be completed to reach final closeout in MOCAS.  A process flow 
diagram was created to include process steps taken from multiple agency closeout 
process charts and interviews with personnel intimately familiar with the process.  Once 
created, the diagram was validated during multiple interviews with personnel working 
                                                 
18 Per the DCMA HQ PLAS Manager, PLAS Code 181 tracks “Closeout Actions,” although there are 
other codes that also apply, such as 141-property clearance or plant clearance.  As such, it is not possible to 




within the process at buying commands, DCMA offices, DFAS payment centers, 
contractor personnel, and DCAA local offices. 
The attached CD-ROM, contains the web-enabled process charts written in 
hypertext markup language (HTML) code using Microsoft FrontPage® as the editor.  
Each process block contains links to source documentation and references and is a useful 
tool in interpreting the tasks and responsible agencies involved in completing contract 
closeout.  Ideally, the process chart can be posted on the web and used as a reference and 
training tool for personnel assigned contract closeout duties. 
G. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The general purpose for conducting analysis of data pulled from the MOCAS 
system was to examine whether the presumptions about underlying causes of the backlog 
in the Contract Closeout (CCO) process were valid.  Initial interviews with those familiar 
with and working within the CCO process indicated that nearly everyone has their own 
reasoning as to why contracts do not close in a timely manner, and why they remain in a 
queue awaiting further action.  Some personnel pointed to overhead rates as the most 
significant problem, while others mentioned Government-furnished property or classified 
material as the key issues affecting closeout.  To provide insight into the causes, 
however, analysis of the MOCAS database was necessary. 
In order to best deal with the huge amount of data in MOCAS CAR Section 2, we 
stratified the records into meaningful categories.  We initially examined the overall data 
and then limited the data to the contract types that represent significant portions of the 
backlog or high dollar values.  After we sorted the data, we created tables that illustrate 
our findings that could be useful to understand the nature of the backlog.  Those tables 
are presented in their entirety in Appendix C of this report.  This section highlights the 
results of our statistical review of the MOCAS CAR Section 2 data.  The issues brought 
up in this section will be discussed in detail in further chapters. 
1. Data 
The data used in creating the tables in Appendix C are the Navy monthly MOCAS 




physically completed but not closed out.  Since DoD agencies have minimal direct 
influence over contracts from MOCAS CAR Sections 3 and 4,19 our analysis focused 
only on those records found in MOCAS CAR Section 2.  This section contains the 
contracts that form the source of the backlog that USD (AT&L) has pressured the 
Services to reduce.  Monthly MOCAS downloads span the period from February 2002 
through February 2003. 
Once summary reviews of all contracts listed in MOCAS CAR Section 2 were 
examined, the overaged contracts as of 28 February 2003 were reviewed.  In the 
discussions below, unless specified otherwise, all results are proportionally similar for 
both overaged and overall contracts.  In this section, the phrase “overall contracts” 
identifies both overaged contracts and the contracts within the appropriate closeout 
timeframes addressed by the FAR. 
2. Gaps in the Analysis 
There are two significant concerns that must be addressed in this statistical 
analysis.  It is critical to understand the nature of these concerns in order to determine the 
significance of the results of the analyses.  The first concern observed within the data was 
blank entry cells in the reports.  On average, nearly 41% of the contracts in MOCAS 
CAR Section 2 do not have a reason code; this ratio has been increasing since February 
2002 when it was 36% compared to 45% in February 2003.  These are significantly high 
ratios since trends and conclusions depend on analyses conducted on only about half of 
the contracts in the section.  Moreover, if users of the MOCAS system leave the reason 
code cells blank for the contracts with a specific characteristic, the potential significance 
of our findings could be even smaller. 
For overaged contracts, the “no reason code ratio” is lower and it dramatically 
decreases in more recent reports.  For example, where 27% of overaged contracts do not 
have a reason code assigned in the February 2002 report, the ratio decreases to 10% for 
                                                 
19 Each monthly report has approximately 50,000 contracts.  Total number of MOCAS CAR Sections 
3 and 4 contracts are only 4%.  Sections 3 and 4 contracts wait for litigation and reconciliation, 
respectively.  Reconciliation in Section 2 (reason code P) and Section 4 are different. Section 2 
reconciliation is part of the normal closeout process whereas a contract goes into Section 4 only if it is 




February 2003.  As such, our analyses conducted on overaged contracts appear to be 
significantly more reliable with more recent data.  This also indicates that agencies tend 
to be far more aggressive in entering reason codes for a contract in MOCAS CAR 
Section 2 as it matures and becomes overaged.  Another potential cause of the missing 
reason codes may reside in a misunderstanding amongst ACOs who indicated that they 
perceived reason codes applying only to overaged contracts, as indicated by the very 
name of the codes themselves “Overaged Reason Codes.”20  This is a significant problem 
since every major organization tracking MOCAS CAR Section 2 contracts must be aware 
that the codes may only be inputted once a contract becomes overaged; a fact reinforced 
by the data that shows a higher percentage of overaged contracts containing reason codes 
compared to the contracts that have yet to become overaged.  However, since many 
overaged contracts continue to reside in MOCAS CAR Section 2 without a reason code 
assigned, any analysis of the data will not give totally accurate results. 
The second concern about the data is its overall accuracy.  During our interviews, 
we discovered that reason codes in the MOCAS reports do not always reflect the true 
status of the contract; that users of the system tend to enter the reason code which 
generally causes the contracts to remain open, e.g. reason codes M - Negotiation of 
Overhead Rates Pending, and A - Contractor has not Submitted Final Invoice/Voucher.  
While examining the following results and the tables in Appendix C, it is critical to 
remember these aforementioned issues with the data.  
3. Assumptions 
x Users of the MOCAS system randomly leave the reason code blank while 
entering data into the system.  They do not tend to leave reason code blank 
for a contract with specific characteristics.  For example, if the users tend 
to leave the reason code blank especially for service contracts this will 
dramatically decrease the accuracy of our findings. 
x The type and kind of contracts entering MOCAS CAR Section 2 are of the 
same make-up of the contracts held in MOCAS CAR Section 1 active 
contracts. 
 
                                                 





4. Highlights from Summary Statistics 
a. Reason Code Trends Table 
Our purpose in creating the trend table, shown in Appendix C, Table 8 is 
to determine the most common reason codes and to determine whether any trends or 
cycles are evident.  We calculated the number of contracts in each reason code for the 
monthly reports we obtained.  Within the reports, the reason codes listed below are the 
top six reason codes21 for contracts in the backlog.  The ratios represent the average 
percentage of that reason code in the entire pool of contracts within the Navy portion of 
MOCAS CAR Section 2.  For example, 26% of the approximately 47,700 contracts in 
each of the monthly reports are assigned reason code M as their most recent status. 
 
M Negotiation of overhead rates pending (26%) 
A Contractor has not submitted final invoice/voucher (16%) 
H Final audit in process (5%) 
Y Awaiting notice of final payment (3%) 
P Reconciliation with paying office and contractor being accomplished (1%) 
N Additional funds requested but not yet received (1%) 
Other reason codes have ratios of less than 1%. 
 
For further discussions in this section as well as in the following chapters, 
our analysis will focus only on these six most recurring reason codes.  Since more 
detailed information, such as causes or recommendations, regarding these reason codes 
will be discussed in those following chapters, detailed findings will not be discussed here. 
Analyzing the trends in Table 8 of Appendix C, it can be observed that the 
total number of contracts in the backlog is steadily decreasing.  There are 47,786 
                                                 
21 There are 33 reason codes identified in MOCAS system found in the DCMA MOCAS Trusted 




contracts in the February 2003 report, whereas this number was 52,541 one year ago in 
the February 2002 report.  Reason codes M and A are also decreasing as the number of 
contracts decrease, which is illustrated on the graph in Appendix C, Table 9.  Not 
ignoring a minor increase in reason code H, we can state that the other four reason codes 
are almost steady since changes are insignificant with regard to the total number of 
contracts in the backlog.   
The graph for the overaged contracts, found in Appendix C, Table 10 is 
very similar to the overall contracts graph discussed.  The only difference noted was a 
sharper decrease in the number of M and A reason coded contracts. Examining this table, 
it can be seen that all the reports have quite similar reason code breakdowns in terms of 
portions in the overall backlog.  In this case, considering the February 2003 report as 
reflecting the most current situation, we used that report as our data resource for the 
following analyses. 
 
b. General Overview of the February 2003 MOCAS Data 
There are 47,786 Navy contracts in the February 2003 report of MOCAS 
CAR Section 2, with 11,673 of those contracts in an overaged status.  The breakdown of 
these contracts by DCMA district is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. 
Examining these figures, DCMA EAST has the majority of the contracts 
in the backlog.  This is not surprising since DCMA EAST controls the largest total 
number of active contracts, which are found in MOCAS CAR Section 1.22  However, the 
DCMA EAST ratio for MOCAS CAR Section 1 contracts is only 69% whereas it is 84% 
for MOCAS CAR Section 2 and 88% for overaged MOCAS CAR Section 2 contracts.  
Therefore, there may be closeout problems with the contracts managed by DCMA EAST 
since they seem to have a larger percentage of overaged contracts than aggregate DCMA 
numbers.  However, it should be noted that these results are greatly impacted by the 
complexity, nature, and type of the contracts that are being managed at each activity.   
 
                                                 











    Source:  Developed by the authors from the February 2003 MOCAS download. 








    Source:  Developed by the authors from the February 2003 MOCAS download. 
Figure 2.   Overaged Navy Contracts by DCMA Districts. 
 
c. Reason Code Breakdown for February 2003 MOCAS Download 
The purpose of preparing the tables in Appendix C Tables 11 and 12 is to 
determine the type, kind, and range of dollar values of the contracts with a specific reason 




While examining the ratios below, one should keep in mind that those 
ratios do not necessarily reflect a problem.  For example, Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) 
contracts may have the highest ratio in the backlog, thus reflecting a possible problem in 
the contract closeout process of CPFF contracts.  However, if most of the active contracts 
are CPFF, their higher ratio in the backlog is to be expected.  Therefore, active contracts 
(MOCAS CAR Section 1) ratios must also be tracked to ensure consistency in the data 
and to identify trends.23 
(1) Contract Type.  For reason codes M, A, H, Y, and N, more 
than half (between 50% and 70%) of the contracts are CPFF contracts. For reason codes 
P and W, 45% of the contracts are Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) and 30% of the contracts are 
CPFF.  Time and Materials contracts follow with a ratio ranging from 8% to 22%. 
Of the contracts in February 2003 report, 62% are CPFF, 16% are 
Time and Materials (T&M), and 14% are FFP.  Other contract types only have a ratio of 
less than 2%.  Of the overaged contracts, 58% are CPFF, 19% are FFP, and 15% are 
T&M contracts.  Similarly, other contracts are less than 2% of the total.  As such, the 
recommendations forwarded in this report center on issues relating to CPFF and FFP 
contracts since they make up the vast majority of the overall contracts in MOCAS CAR 
Section 2. 
(2) Contract Kind/Contract Nature.  For all of the reason codes, 
more than half of the contracts (almost 83% for M, A, H, and Y) are for services.24  
Supply Contracts and Price Orders follow service contracts for nearly every type.  
Examining all the contracts in MOCAS CAR Section 2, 73% are for services, 11% are 
Supply Contracts and Price Orders, and 9% of them are Research and Development 
(R&D) contracts.  The fact that 73% of the contracts in MOCAS CAR Section 2 are for 
services, yet just over half of all DoD contracts are for services,25 leads one to the 
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and 6% are Time and Materials contracts. 
24 Of the active contracts, only 34% are for services.  Therefore, below high ratios for services 
indicates a problem for the service contracts. 
25 GAO Report 03-574T, 19 March 2003, “Sourcing and Acquisition: Challenges Facing the 




assumption that it is more likely that a services contract will become overaged than 
contracts for supplies or R&D.    
(3) Dollar Value.  Almost 55% of the contracts in the backlog 
are less than $100,000, and nearly 75% of the contracts are than $500,000 of total 
obligation amount.  This ratio is approximately the same for all reason codes and also for 
overaged contracts.  The purpose of creating Tables 13, 14 and 15 in Appendix C is to 
examine the kinds and dollar values of CPFF and FFP contracts, and the types and dollar 
values of service contracts.    
d. Details of CPFF, FFP and Service Contracts in the February 
2003 Report 
(1) CPFF Contracts.  As previously mentioned, CPFF contracts 
account for 62% of all contracts in the February 2003 report, making up 58% of the total 
of overaged contracts.  Of these CPFF contracts, 84% are for services and 13% are for 
R&D.  In terms of total obligation amount, 51% of these CPFF contracts are below 
$100,000, 82% of them are below $500,000 and 90% of them are below $1,000,000.  
This ratio gains importance when considering there are quick-closeout procedures that 
apply to cost-type contracts with less than $1,000,000 of unsettled indirect costs that 
might have been used to close some of these contracts.  The situation is similar for the 
overaged contracts; 87% of the overaged CPFF contracts in the February 2003 report 
have total obligation amount of less than $1,000,000.  These statistics may indicate that 
the quick-closeout procedures, discussed in-depth in Chapter VI, are not being used when 
required. 
(2) FFP Contracts.  Of all contracts in the February 2003 
report, 14% are FFP, also making up 19% of the total contracts considered overaged.  Of 
these FFP contracts, 62% are Supply Contracts and Price Orders, although that ratio 
shrinks to 57% when considering overaged contracts.  Surprisingly, 72% of FFP contracts 
(66% for overaged FFP) have a total obligation amount of less than $100,000 and 87% of 
them (80% for overaged FFP) have a total obligation amount of less than $500,000.  
Reason codes for overaged FFP contracts are listed below, with the top three being 





P Reconciliation with paying office and contractor being accomplished 
(54%) 
 
A Contractor has not submitted final invoice/voucher (27%) 
V Disposition of Government property pending (19%) 
 
Among FFP contracts, 54% of them indicate reason code P, 
awaiting reconciliation, which is discussed in Chapter V as a potentially time intensive 
process.  Since 66% of the overaged FFP contracts are less than $100,000, we may have 
stumbled upon proof that DoD frequently spends more money than it saves in the 
contract closeout process. 
The expectations are that FFP contracts less than $100,000 should 
be considered closed once evidence of final payment is received.26  Since 66% of all 
overaged FFP contracts are worth less than $100,000, expectations are that the provisions 
already specified in the FAR would permit the administrative closure of a significant 
number of contracts.  According to our research, 1,464 overaged FFP contracts fall into 
this category.27  However, the reason codes that preclude the rapid closure of this large 
group of contracts are property terms, reconciliation issues, or delays in receipt of the 
final voucher.  In addition, reason code V (disposition of Government property pending) 
was identified as a major delay in closeout only in regard to awaiting disposition 
instructions from buying organizations, not in the actual completion of property 
reviews.28  This kind of delay, or queuing problem, is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter II.  Interviews indicated that the review itself took less than one day, in most 
cases, but required periods of up to six months to receive disposition instructions from 
the buying activity. 
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27 Appendix C. 
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(3) Service Contracts.  Of the overall contracts in the February 
2003 report, 73% are for services.  Of these service contracts, 70% are CPFF and 20% 
are Time and Material contracts.  In terms of total obligation amount on service contracts, 
55% are worth less than $100,000 and nearly 85% are worth less than $500,000. 
e. Contracts with the Total Obligation Amount of $100,000,000 or 
More  
The summary statistics for this segment can be found in Appendix C, 
Table 16.  These contracts have a total contract value of $100,000,000 or more.  Only 
0.3% of the contracts in the February 2003 report have this characteristic, but they are 
important to review due to their high dollar value.  
The data demonstrate that 53% of these contracts are overaged compared 
to 24% of all overaged contracts in the February 2003 report.  If we accept 24% as a 
norm, then 53% is an extremely high figure for these large contracts.  Such a finding 
increases in importance due to the high dollar value associated with these contracts and 
the potential for closure of the obligated appropriations.  Failure to remove potential 
Government liability on these particular contracts could have a significant negative 
impact on the Navy’s future funding allocations.   
As Table 16 illustrates, 32% are CPFF and 29% are FFP.  However, 
within the group of overaged contracts, 47% are FFP.  Half of these FFP contracts show 
reason code P (Reconciliation with paying office and contractor being accomplished) as 
the status and 20% of these contracts have reason code V (Disposition of Government 
property pending).  For the CPFF contracts, the top reason code is A (Contractor has not 
submitted final invoice/voucher).  Considering all contracts, P, A and V are the top three 
reason codes annotated on this population of contracts.  
Of these high dollar value contracts, 30% are for major system 
acquisitions, 25% are Supply Contracts and Price Orders, and 22% are for services.  For 




Another important issue regarding high dollar value contracts is the large 
number of contracts in MOCAS CAR Section 2 that appear without a reason code.  Of 
such contracts, 21% do not have a reason code, whereas the ratio is only 10% for all 
overaged contracts, again indicating the lack of clarity of the data as a contract progresses 
to an overaged status.  Considering the dollar value of these contracts, 21% seems quite 
high since the importance given to fulfill the MOCAS requirements for this kind of 
contract is expected to be more. 
f. Contracts with the Unliquidated Obligation Amount of 
$1,000,000 or More 
The statistical summary table of these contracts is found in Appendix C, 
Table 17.  These contracts have unexpended balances of $1,000,000 or more. This 
situation is considered extremely important because of the high likelihood that these 
funds will be closed in the very near future or have already closed.  For the Navy to 
utilize these funds, a determination as to their most effective and efficient use must be 
made soon to preclude their loss.  The determination should be centered on the two 
options of expending the funds on the contracts in which they are currently obligated, or 
recouping the money and expending it for other pressing needs where allowed.   
Of these contracts, 43% are overaged.  As mentioned before, our norm 
ratio was 24%, indicating that this type of contract is far more likely to become overaged 
than most other contract types.  Continuing with the review, 37% of the contracts are 
CPFF and 29% are FFP.  However, in this overaged population, 44% are FFP. 
Of these “high-unliquidated obligation amount contracts,” 37% are for 
services and 27% are Supply Contracts and Price Orders.  Within this overaged 
population of contracts, 44% are Supply Contracts and Price Orders.  The top three 
reason codes for these contracts are P, A and W (Contract modification).  These reason 
codes are the same for overaged contracts.  A complete listing of all of the Overaged 
Reason Codes is located in Table 18 of Appendix C. 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
In accordance with our initial purposes for conducting these analyses of MOCAS 




analyses, we generally observed that most of the presumptions about the contracts within 
the backlog were correct, such as most of the contracts in the backlog are CPFF contracts.  
We observed some surprising results as well, such as half of the overaged contracts with 
high dollar value are FFP.  These analyses become important since they reflect the true 
nature of the backlog and make further analyses and recommendations about the contract 
closeout process more reliable, since they are based on actual data vice many of the 
prevailing presumptions that have led much of the previous efforts to reform or modify 
the process. 
We did not discuss all of the issues of this section in detail since the most 
compelling explanations and suggested solutions are discussed in later chapters.  
However, the data summaries contained in this chapter aided our team by focusing our 
research on topics we determined as having the greatest potential impact.  These topics 
include the issues affecting CPFF contracts for services and large dollar value FFP 
contracts where reasons for delaying the closeout process include payment reconciliation 
issues and final rate determination delays.  These topics are discussed in greater detail in 






























II. IDENTIFYING ROOT CAUSES AND LONG-TERM 
SOLUTIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the root causes that created the current 
unacceptable backlog of overaged physically completed contracts residing in MOCAS 
CAR Section 2 and to find fundamental solutions to solve the problem.  This chapter is 
organized into two sections.  The first section describes the concept of Little’s Law, how 
it can be applied to understand inventory levels, and how we used simulations of 
variability on the Little’s Law equation to arrive at the conclusion that variability in the 
turnaround time queue is the root cause of the current backlog.  The second section 
describes system archetypes and organization systems models and how we used these 
concepts to arrive at a recommended course of action of devoting permanent 
organizational resources to prevent future backlogs of overaged contracts.  
A. ROOT CAUSE –THE EFFECTS OF VARIABILITY ON INVENTORY 
LEVELS 
1. Little’s Law  
The concept known as “Little’s Law” describes the variables that affect inventory 
levels.  It is often expressed using the following equation:   
 
Little’s Law: Inventory (I) = Arrival Rate (R) x Turnaround Time (T), or I=RT.29 (2.1) 
 
The word “Inventory” is often associated with supply and logistics systems, 
however, an inventory can be any measurable unit within a system.30  In the contract 
closeout system, the “inventory” is the number of physically completed contracts 
available for closeout.  “Arrival Rate” is the measurable in-flow of units into the system.  
It is often expressed in units per time.31  In the contract closeout system, the arrival rate 
can be expressed as the amount of contracts that become physically complete per unit of 
                                                 






time.  For contracts managed in MOCAS, the arrival rate is the number of contracts 
transferred to MOCAS CAR Section 2 per unit of time.  The “Turnaround Time” (TAT) 
is the time it takes to process a transaction or to service a customer.32  Applied to contract 
closeout, turnaround time is the process time it takes to close the contract after physical 
completion.     
Little’s Law is best illustrated using an example.  The FAR33 states that the time 
standard for closing cost-type contracts is 36 months.  This time standard will be used as 
the turnaround time in a hypothetical calculation to determine the expected inventory of 
cost-type contracts available for closeout at a typical contracting activity.  For ease of 
calculation, an arrival rate of 100 contracts per month will be used.  In other words, 100 
contracts become physically complete per month, and it takes 36 months to process them 
through the closeout procedure.  With these two variables defined, Little’s Law reveals 
that the expected inventory of physically completed contracts available for closeout is 
3,600.  
   
Inventory Calculation: Inventory = 100 contracts/month x 36 months = 3,600 contracts (2.2) 
 
Little’s Law demonstrates that there is a linear relationship between inventory 
levels and arrival rate and turnaround time.  An increase or decrease in either, or both, 
results in a corresponding change in the inventory.  Therefore, in the example, if the 
command wanted to reduce their inventory of physically completed contracts, they would 
either have to reduce the arrival rate or decrease the turnaround time.  
The formula and the hypothetical example both exhibit a static state with no 
variability.  In reality, the contract closeout process is dynamic.  There is variability in 
both the number of contracts that become physically complete per month and variability 
in the amount of time it takes to close contracts.  Ignoring this variability, or using only 
average arrival rates and turnaround times when calculating inventory levels may result 
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in inaccurate inventory forecasts and therefore poor estimating of required resources.  
Given the fact that there are turnaround standards stated in the FAR based on contract 
type, there will always be an inventory of physically complete contracts that will change 
based on changes in the arrival rate and changes in the turnaround time.  The only way to 
completely eliminate the inventory is to reduce either the arrival rate or TAT to zero.  
Arrival rates and turnaround times will be discussed in detail in the following sections.   
The affects of variability on inventory levels can be illustrated by running a 
Monte Carlo Simulation on Little’s Law equation using Crystal Ball© software.  The 
results of six simulations are discussed below.  The first three simulation results show the 
affects of: (1) variability in arrival rate, (2) variability in turnaround time, and (3) 
variability in both arrival rate and turnaround time.  To simplify the simulation, a triangle 
distribution was used to describe the affects of variability on the inventory calculation.  A 
triangle distribution accounts for variability by establishing the minimum, maximum, and 
most likely figures.  The first simulation shows the affects of 20% variability in the 
arrival rate while holding the turnaround time constant.  Using the triangle distribution, 
the Little’s Law independent variables become: 
 
Variability in Arrival Rate: R = min: 80, max: 120, most likely: 100 contracts per month; T = 36 months (2.3) 
 
Figure 3 shows the results of the simulation of 10,000 trials.  As the figure 
illustrates, the average inventory level remains at 3,600 contracts.  However, the 
inventory level is now shown to range between 3,105 to 4,094 contracts with a 90% 
certainty level.  If these conditions existed in the hypothetical situation, planning for this 
inventory range would be more accurate than planning for the calculated inventory level 
of 3,600 contracts using only average figures.  
Figure 4 shows the effects of 20% variability in turnaround time while holding 
arrival rate constant.  As can be expected of a linear relationship, the inventory level is 
approximately the same as above, between 3,105 to 4,092 contracts with a 90% certainty 







R = min: 80, max: 120, most likely: 100 contracts/month 
T= 36 months 
Source:  Developed by the authors 
Figure 3.   Twenty Percent Variance in Arrival Rate. 
 
 
R= 100 contracts per month;  
T= min: 28.8, max: 43.2, most likely: 36 months 
Source:  Developed by the authors 
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Figure 5 shows the effects of 20% variability in both arrival rate and turnaround 
time.  This is the most realistic simulation for the contract closeout system due to the high 
degree of variability noted in the data.  Appendix C brings to light a great deal of the 
variability present in the system, ranging from 30 overaged status codes to multiple 
contract types of various complexity and age.  Notice that the variance in the inventory 
increases for a 20% “dual variability.”  The inventory level is now calculated to range 
from 2,968 to 4,363 with a 90% confidence level.  
 
 
R= min: 80, max 120, most likely: 100 contracts/month 
T= min: 28.8; max: 43.2, most likely: 36 months 
Source:  Developed by the authors 
Figure 5.   Twenty Percent Variance in Arrival Rate and Turnaround Time. 
 
Reducing the variability is one way to reduce the inventory level in a dynamic 
system.  Another way is to reduce the mean of the independent variables.  The remaining 
three simulations show the effects of reducing both variability and the mean.   
Within the contract closeout system, there is probably little that be done to affect 
the arrival rate, an assumption we have made in this analysis.  It would be nearly 
impossible and undesirable to slow down the rate at which contracts became physically 
complete, short of awarding fewer contracts or instituting administrative controls to more 
evenly spread physically completed arrivals over each fiscal year.  Even then, it would be 
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difficult to spread the workload evenly due to the varying nature of contract complexity.  
Therefore, the remaining simulations hold the arrival rate constant at the hypothetical rate 
of 100 contracts per month.  Holding this variable constant displays the effect of only 
changing the turnaround time.  This is important to illustrate because this is a variable 
that can be controlled.  Figure 6 illustrates the effects of using a mean turnaround time of 
36 months and reducing the variability from 20% to 10%.  Figure 7 illustrates the effects 
of reducing the mean turnaround time by 10% but using the 20% variability factor.  
Figure 8 illustrates the effects on inventory by reducing turnaround time mean and 
variability by 10%. 
 
 
R= 100 contracts/month 
T= min: 32.4; max: 39.6, most likely:  36 months 
Source:  Developed by the authors 
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R = 100 contracts/month 
T = min: 25.92, max/; 38.88 most likely: 32.4 months 
Source: Developed by the authors 
Figure 7.   Reduce Mean 10%/Variability = 20%. 
 
 
R = 100 contracts/month 
T = min: 29.16, max: 35.4, most likely: 32.4 months 
Source:  Developed by the authors 
Figure 8.   Reduce Mean 10%/Variability = 10%. 
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Figure 6 (reducing the variability) shows the inventory level between 3,361 and 
3,854 with a 90% certainty level while Figure 7 (reducing the mean) shows the inventory 
level between 2,791 and 3,683 contracts with a 90% certainty.  A comparison of Figures 
6 and 7 shows how a reduction in the mean turnaround time results in a greater decrease 
in the overall inventory level compared to reducing variability (given the inputted 
variables), however the variance remains approximately the same.  Figure 8 demonstrates 
that the largest reduction in both inventory levels and variance occurs when the 
turnaround time variability and mean are reduced simultaneously.  It is important to note 
that the variance is reduced as well as the inventory level because a lower variance leads 
to better forecasts and therefore to improved ability to plan and to allocate resources.     
a. Queue Variability in the Contract Closeout System 
The previous sub-section described how to calculate expected inventory 
levels and how variability in the system adversely impacts inventory levels.  As Figure 4 
illustrates, the largest inventory level occurs when both the arrival rate and turnaround 
time are dynamic, a state that exists in the contract closeout system.  As previously 
mentioned, DoD has limited control over the arrival rate of contracts into a physically 
complete status.  However, DoD does have control over the turnaround time; the time it 
takes to close a contract.  
Our analysis concludes that variability in the turnaround time created the 
undesirable inventory level of physically completed contracts available for closeout.  
Within the contract closeout system there are two sources of turnaround time variability: 
process variability and queue variability.  Process variability occurs because of the large 
amount of steps that must be accomplished to close a contract and the fact that each 
contract is unique.  Queue variability exists because contract closeout is not a continuous 
process.  A contract has the potential to wait in a closeout queue before and during each 
step in the closeout process.  The queue introduces a high level of system variability, 




being actively closed for the majority of contracts in the current closeout system.34  
Therefore, it is our assessment that queue variability is the more significant root cause of 
the current inventory problem, not the process variability we have previously discussed.  
Minimizing the amount of time inventory spends in queues will have the greatest and 
most immediate impact on reducing the inventory backlog of overaged contracts. 
Closeout process queues are caused by two factors: (1) the authority to 
accomplish all the closeout steps does not lie with one person, or even with one 
organization, and (2) contract closeout is usually not the stakeholders’ sole responsibility.  
Arguably, contract closeout is very low on their priority list compared to other 
contractual actions, given limited time and resources.35  The contract closeout process 
has multiple steps and multiple stakeholders responsible for the different steps.  The 
different players may include the ACO, contractor, property administrator, lawyers, 
patent office, DFAS (both accounting and payment sections), DCAA, Procuring 
Contracting Officer (PCO), the user, and the user’s comptroller.  While not every player 
is involved with every closeout action, at a minimum, the ACO, contractor, DCAA, and 
DFAS are involved with closeout of cost-type contracts.  The potential for a queue exists 
every time a request for action is passed from one individual/organization to another.  
Since closeout is usually not solely the responsibility of these individuals or 
organizations, and they have other actions competing for their resources, a queue also 
exists when an individual begins a closeout step but has to interrupt the process either due 
to a lack of information immediately available to finish the step or when another action 
with higher priority must be accomplished. 
The effects that queue variability has on closeout inventory levels can be 
illustrated by discussing the queues that result from only one of the closeout steps, e.g. 
determining final indirect cost rates, otherwise known as final overhead rates.  As shown 
in Chapter I, negotiation of final overhead rates is determined to be the number one 
                                                 
34 Evidenced by the comparison of actual labor time in the process model vice the length of time it 
takes for contracts to clear from the MOCAS database.  See Chapter I, “Current Process” of this report for a 
discussion of the existing process model. 




reason that prevents cost-type contracts from closing on time.  After examining the 
queues involved in the following example, it is easy to see why.  The example provided 
below on audits of final overhead rates was derived from interviews.  It may not occur 
universally, but is occurring in some instances.  The focus is solely on queue times.  
Chapter VI discusses other issues and our recommended solutions for determining final 
overhead rates.   
After physical completion of a cost-type contract, a contractor has six 
months after the end of their fiscal year to submit their indirect cost rates to DCAA and 
the ACO.36  For example, if a contract becomes physically complete in June 2000, and 
the contractor’s fiscal year ends on 31 December of each year, the contractor has until 
June 2001 to submit their final indirect cost rates.  Therefore, if everything is done 
according to regulation, from the Government’s perspective, a queue of one year in a 
three-year process has already occurred.   
DCAA operates on a “6/12/6” cycle for “major contractors” (over 
$80,000,000 of auditable dollar volume) and a “6/24/6” cycle for “Non-major 
contractors” (less than $80,000,000 auditable dollar volume).37  The cycle is defined as 
the number of months the contractor has to submit indirect rates, the number of months 
DCAA has to audit the rates, and the number of months the ACO has to negotiate the 
rates.38  To go back to our example, after receipt of final indirect cost rates in June of 
2001, DCAA has until June 2002 to submit the audit report to the ACO if the contractor 
is a “Major,” or June 2003 if the contractor is a “Non-Major”.  The queue now totals 
nearly two or three years in a three-year process, depending on the categorization of the 
contractor.  (It should be noted that DCAA will conduct a priority audit and issue the 
report in a reduced timeframe at the request of the ACO).39  While some of the queue 
time described is active work time used to actually conduct the audit or negotiate with the 
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contractor, the vast majority of that time is waiting, or queue time, thus two to three years 
of active closeout process time has elapsed before the next sequential action in the 
process can be taken. 
To further complicate the final indirect cost rate queue, time can be added 
if the contractor has subcontractors that require DCAA assist audits, and those 
subcontractors are considered “Non-Majors.”  An assist audit can occur for various 
reasons,40 such as when the subcontractor does not allow the prime contractor to audit 
their books; therefore a DCAA audit is required.41  In addition to the 6/24/6 cycle, DCAA 
also uses a risk approach for indirect rate audits of “Non-Majors.”  Low risk contractors 
(less than $10,000,000 auditable dollar volume per year and good past performance) are 
audited on a sample basis, with one third of the contractors in this category being selected 
for the yearly audit sample.  This procedure ensures that the contractors in this population 
are audited at least once every three years.42  However, due to this practice, if the prime 
has to rely on the assist audit before submitting their final rates, and the assist audit falls 
into the sample procedure, two to three years queue time can pass before the prime can 
even submit their final indirect rates43.  An exception to this situation occurs if quick 
closeout rates can be used for the contract being closed.  To relate this situation to our 
example, if the contract became physically complete in June 2000, and given the situation 
described above where the prime had to wait on an assist audit of a subcontractor, it may 
take until June 2003 for the prime to receive the results of the assist audit.  They must 
then include these results in their indirect rate calculation for submission to the 
Government.  Assuming the prime contractor immediately submitted its rates as soon as 
they received the assist audit results, DCAA then has another year to audit the prime – 
until June 2004.  Four years have now passed since physical completion and the contract 
has fallen into the overaged category.  Since the time to conduct the audit process takes 
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only a portion of this time, and a maximum of 12 months, queue time variability is the 
major cause for the contract to become overaged due to final indirect cost rate settlement. 
The situation described above, where the prime must wait on audit results 
of a subcontractor, and then wait for an audit of their own rates, is one of the major 
reasons provided during interviews to explain why contractors have not submitted their 
final voucher – the second highest statistical reason code cited in the MOCAS database 
explaining why cost contracts have not closed.44  
b. Summary 
The purpose of describing Little’s Law was to demonstrate the affects of 
arrival rate and turnaround time on the inventory of physically completed contracts.  
However, the equation only shows these effects on a static system.  Simulations were run 
to illustrate the effects of a dynamic system, the true state that exists in contract closeout.  
The first three Monte Carlo simulations illustrated the effects of variability on inventory 
levels, with variability in the arrival rate and turnaround time (Figure 5) producing the 
largest inventory level and largest variance.  The last three simulations demonstrated the 
affects of reducing the turnaround time mean and variability.  Using Little’s Law and 
simulated variability as tools, it was demonstrated that simultaneously reducing the 
turnaround time mean and variability has the effect of both reducing the overall inventory 
level and the variance in that inventory level (Figure 8).  Since we are assuming that DoD 
has little control over the arrival rate in the closeout system, short of awarding fewer 
contracts, lack of control in the variability in the turnaround time was assessed as being 
the source of the current undesirable inventory level.  Turnaround time has two sources 
of variability: process variability and queue variability.  Comparing the time involved 
with both sources of variability, it was determined that queue variability is the root cause 
of the problem, not process variability.  This point was illustrated using the example of 
queue variability in the indirect cost rate settlement.  
 
                                                 




The next section describes how to reduce the mean and variability in the 
turnaround time queues, which is the fundamental/long-term solution to preventing future 
backlogs.  It follows the same format as above, first generically describing the tools and 
concepts used, and then specifically applying them to the root cause of queue variability 
to arrive at a recommended course of action.   
2. Using Organizational Systems Models to Identify Solutions to Reduce 
Mean Turnaround Time and Variability 
a. Symptomatic Solutions Versus Fundamental Solutions 
In his book The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge describes systems thinking 
as, “a framework for seeing interrelationships rather than things, seeing patterns of 
change rather than static snapshots,”45 and seeing the underlying structures that control 
events rather than focusing on the events themselves.46  Senge advocates using system 
archetypes to promote systems thinking.  System archetypes are tools that can be used to 
address management challenges within organizational systems.  They are also tools to 
help tackle the problems caused by the high complexity in today’s organizational 
environment.  System archetypes promote systems thinking by helping stakeholders 
identify the underlying structures and patterns of events in the system, and identify the 
leverage within the system to effect change towards a desired outcome.47    
Senge’s “Shifting the Burden” archetype, displayed in Figure 9 can be 
used to understand the systemic problem of closing contracts and to help develop optimal 
solutions to solve the problem.  The “Shifting the Burden” archetype has a structure 
composed of two balancing, or stabilizing, processes.  The top circle represents the 
symptomatic solutions to the problem while the bottom circle represents the fundamental 
solutions.48  
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Source: Senge, Peter M., The Fifth Discipline, The Art & Practice of The  
Learning Organization, p. 106 
Figure 9.   Senge’s “Shifting the Burden” Archetype. 
 
Seen in its true form, the symptomatic solutions are only a quick fix 
(reference Figure 10), although the implementers of these solutions are often not aware of 
this fact.  Symptomatic solutions often give quick results, which further reinforces the 
behavior and thought pattern, and relieves the pressures to find the fundamental solution.  
However, in the end, these results only temporarily resolve the problem.49  The 
symptomatic solutions are often developed and implemented to address the effects of the 
problem because the focus is on the events themselves.  These effects/events are often the 
most visible and immediate issues at hand.  Therefore, it is easy to misinterpret the 
symptomatic solutions as the long-term fix.50  
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In Figure 10, the bottom circle represents a more fundamental solution to 
the problem, the solution that is ultimately the most effective.  However, due to the fact 
that the cause and effect may not be closely related in time and space (notice that these 
two elements of the problem are not on the same circle), and due to the delay in results, 
the fundamental solution takes longer to become evident.  The fundamental solution is 
more effective because it addresses the cause(s) of the problem, the underlying structures 
and patterns that control the events/effects.51 
 
 
Source:  Adaptation of Senge’s Shifting the Burden Archetype, modified by  
the authors 
Figure 10.   “Shifting the Burden” Archetype Cause and Effects. 
 
It is important to note that symptomatic solutions are not necessarily bad.  
Short-term fixes have benefits.  The danger lies in not seeing these solutions for what 
they are, merely quick fixes, or misinterpreting the short-term fix as the fundamental 
solution.  In reality, consciously implementing both symptomatic solutions and 
fundamental solutions simultaneously is a way to attack the systemic problem from both 
                                                 




directions, gaining both quick results and long-term success.  Furthermore, implementing 
the symptomatic solution offers a chance for a quick success, an element often necessary 
for a long-term successful change effort.  If the fundamental solution is implemented 
alone, this important change step may be missed.  
b. Open System Models and Multidimensional Archetypes 
Organizational theorists often use open system models to illustrate the 
dimensional elements of an organization.  An example of this type of model is illustrated 
in Figure 11.  
 
 
Source:  Modification of the McClasky-Hill model, tailored by Nancy Roberts, and the Cummings-Worely 
Models For Diagnosing Organizational Systems.  Model customized by the authors. 
Figure 11.   Open Systems Model. 
 
There are dozens of different models used to diagram organizations and 




several transformational elements commonly found in many models are illustrated, 
including subsystems, people, processes, structure, tasks, and culture.  The system 
boundary is the interface with other systems and the environment, illustrating how the 
environment affects organizational elements.   
The purpose of these organizational models is to graphically illustrate the 
interrelationship of the different organizational elements and to provide a tool to diagnose 
how these elements interact within the situation or organization being analyzed.  It is also 
a tool to demonstrate that none of the organizational elements act in a vacuum.  A change 
in one element affects other facets of the organization.  Furthermore, if any of the 
elements are incongruent, the cause of a problem, and the resulting fundamental solution, 
may be found in this problematic interaction.     
The model illustrated in Figure 12, shows a multidimensional archetype.  
It is essentially a morph of Senge’s “Shifting the Burden” archetype and the Open 
Systems Organizational Model illustrated in Figure 11.  Senge’s “Shifting the Burden” 
archetype, as illustrated in the previous sub-section, has only one dimension.  This one-
dimensional graphic may unintentionally mislead unseasoned archetype users that there is 
one element relating to the problem, one cause/effect, or one event/pattern.  However, 
there can be multiple dimensions to archetypes.52  In other words, there can be more than 
one organizational element involved in the cause and effect dynamics stemming from the 
problem, and changing one element will affect other elements.  Viewed in this light, the 
ovals in the illustrations of Senge’s “Shifting the Burden” archetype become spheres.  
The surface of the sphere is the third dimension and becomes the plain to analyze 
organizational elements.  Analyzed alone, each element exhibits the characteristics of the 
one-dimensional graphic of the archetype.  However, viewed together, as in the 
multidimensional archetype, it can be visualized that in reality, the cause/effects, 
events/patterns, and symptomatic and fundamental solutions may lie in more than one 
organizational element, or in their interaction with one another (their congruence).  
Furthermore, the model illustrates that one element may be leveraged for quick success 
                                                 




(the top sphere), while another element may need to be leveraged for the long-term 
success (bottom sphere).  The challenge then becomes not only correctly identifying 
symptomatic solutions from fundamental solutions/ events from patterns, but also 
correctly identifying which organizational element(s) are interacting in the dynamics of 
the problem, analyzing congruence, and determining which element(s) to leverage to 
achieve the desired outputs and outcomes – not an easy task.   
 
 
Source: Developed by George Holland, coauthor of this report.  
Adaptation of Senge’s “Shifting the Burden Archetype” 





For example, using the multidimensional archetype, it becomes evident 
that in one dimension, there might be task related cause and effects at play and on another 
dimension there might be a subsystem cause and effects in action.  Or, the task and 
subsystem elements may be incongruent, causing the problem.  Furthermore, analysis 
may conclude that leveraging the task element may produce one output (e.g. quick 
success – not necessarily a bad output if the implementer is consciously aware that it is 
symptomatic and will produce a reinforcing feedback), while leveraging the subsystem 
element may produce another output (e.g., fundamental solutions leading to the desired 
outcome and long-term success).  Or, analysis may reveal that both subsystems may need 
to be leveraged in conjunction with each other to produce the desired outputs/outcomes.  
During the focus task and subsystems, analysis must also be conducted to see how 
changing either will affect the other organizational elements. 
If there is more than one elemental dimension to the problem, fundamental 
solutions must be found for all of the “causes” before the long-term successes are 
realized.  Likewise, the long-term benefits will not be realized until the organizational 
elements are congruent and their interactions promote positive results in the system.   
c. “Shifting the Burden” Archetype and Contract Closeout 
There are three indications of the presence of a shifting the burden 
structure.  First, there is a problem that gets gradually worse over a long period of time – 
although every so often the problem seems to get better for a while.  Second, the overall 
health of the system gradually worsens.  Third, there is a growing feeling of helplessness 
or a feeling of being overwhelmed.53  
The contract closeout dilemma exhibits these three indicators.  First, the 
problem has gradually gotten worse over time.  A backlog of overaged physically 
completed contracts is not a new problem, however, the fundamental solution has not 
been found.  In fact, our research shows many studies being conducted on this “problem” 
throughout the decade of the 90’s.  There have been no less than ten DoD Inspector 
General studies and reports generated on the issue or related issues, two DoD level 
                                                 




Process Action Team (PAT)/Integrated Process Team (IPT) studies/reports, one Service 
level IPT study/report, one Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) 
study/report, several General Accounting Office studies/reports on related issues, and five 
masters thesis research efforts.54  Second, the overall health of the system has gradually 
worsened.  It is fair to say that a backlog of 50,000 Navy contracts is an indicator of a 
sick system.  This backlog has grown over time, despite Herculean efforts to reduce it.  In 
fact, there was a mandate to eliminate the backlog by 30 September 2002 to enable a 
transition to a new information technology (IT) based payment system (DPPS),55 a 
mandate that has not been met to date.  By implementing the solutions to the studies 
mentioned above, short-term reductions in the inventory of overaged contracts occurred 
frequently over the past years.  However, the inflow of new contracts into the inventory 
often destroyed the hard fought reductions.  This has led to frustrations and feelings that 
the problem is overwhelming, the third indication of the shifting the burden archetype.   
One hypothesis as to why the problem has not been solved is that the 
solutions suggested by the studies/reports mentioned above are symptomatic solutions; 
that the focus was on the effect – an undesirable inventory of physically completed 
contracts.  No doubt the people that participated in these studies were smart people, with 
in-depth knowledge of the problem.  Likewise, it is fair to say that at least some of the 
recommendations made by these reports were successfully implemented.  However, the 
problem still exists!   
A common theme among the studies/reports is that the solution(s) reside 
in changing/improving/streamlining the process.  Indeed this thought still prevails.  
Transforming the process is the focus of the current leadership.56  Recall that there are 
two sources of variability in the turnaround time – process variability and queue 
variability.  By focusing solely on changing the process and ignoring the other 
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organizational elements, only sources of process variability are addressed, the queue 
variability factor embedded in turnaround time variable is ignored.   
This situation is a classic example of how the symptomatic solution within 
the “Shifting the Burden” archetype works.  Since the process to close contracts is seen as 
the cause of the problem, numerous attempts have been made to improve it.  The change 
efforts resulted in a short-term reduction in the backlog, which led to an improved 
outlook for the future.  These short-term successes created a positive feedback that 
reinforced the thinking that streamlining the process is the solution to the backlog 
dilemma.  Since the process, and by association - variability in the process turnaround 
time, is seen as the cause, the cycle to fix it begins anew when the long-term benefit is 
not realized.   
A second common “cause” of the problem identified by the previously 
mentioned studies is that contract closeout is/was a low priority for both the 
Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs) and their management.57  The symptomatic 
solution to this “cause” is to increase management emphasis, which has the effect of 
decreasing queue turnaround time variability.  This again resulted in reductions in the 
backlog; however, these reductions again have proven to be short-term because no 
permanent fix to the queue variability is implemented.  This claim is supported because 
the problem still exists, as exhibited by the fact that the backlog is not being 
systematically eliminated, despite the increased emphasis on contract closeout.  Again, 
the reinforcing feedback of the symptomatic solutions is in play.  The leadership sees a 
reduction in the backlog as a result of their increased emphasis.  Other problems then 
become more pressing and their emphasis is placed on other issues.58  Time passes and 
when the backlog reduction is diminished by an inflow of new contracts into the 
inventory, the frustration level rises, more management emphasis is given, and thus the 
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cycle begins anew.  Unfortunately, pushing harder on symptomatic solutions does not 
produce the desired long-term outcomes.59  
Using the multidimensional archetype, which integrates the elements of 
the organization systems model with the “Shifting the Burden” archetype, our analysis 
concludes that by concentrating mainly on the closeout process, and by association - 
turnaround time process variability, the teams conducting the contract closeout studies 
overlooked the other organizational elements that are interacting in the closeout system 
dynamics.  Furthermore, we concluded that the solutions proposed only leveraged the 
process elements to produce a short-term success (the top sphere).  We propose that the 
root cause of the backlog, variability in the turnaround time queue, lies mainly in the 
organizational structure and culture elements, not the process element.  Certainly there 
are efficiencies to be gained by further improving the closeout process.  However, in our 
opinion, looking to process changes will not prevent future backlogs – the long-term 
outcome sought.  Therefore, if the root cause is variability in the queue, the 
organizational structure and culture elements need to be leveraged to reduce the queue 
variability and mean turnaround time.   
d. Culture 
Our belief is that the organizational culture elemental “cause” is the 
incentive system.  Our initial conclusion was that the lack of incentives for DCMA to 
close contracts was the cause.  In addition to DCMA, there are many stakeholders that 
have closeout actions within the system, however since DCMA is responsible for the vast 
majority of closeout actions, it will be the focus of this analysis.  Closing contracts costs 
DCMA resources.  Furthermore, DCMA does not appear to benefit directly by closing 
contracts quickly.  From the funding perspective, the money that is deobligated from 
these closed contracts goes back to DCMA’s customer or the treasury.  Therefore, since 
DCMA expends resources without realizing any significant benefit,60 we concluded that 
even though it is one of DCMA’s responsibilities, relevant incentives did not exist for 
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DCMA to close contracts.  Hence the resulting backlog despite the efficiencies gained by 
changing/streamlining the process throughout the 1990s.  In an attempt to “think out of 
the box” we explored ideas on how to incentivize DCMA.  These ideas included allowing 
DCMA to keep a portion of the deobligated money, penalizing DCMA for allowing funds 
to lapse by making them pay the financial liabilities on overaged contracts requiring 
current year funding, and/or funding the DCMA contract closeout effort through the use 
of a working capital fund (similar to the way the Department of Energy funds contract 
closeout).61  The first proposal would incentivize DCMA by providing a monetary 
benefit to closing contracts.  The second would provide a negative incentive to allowing 
physically completed contracts to become overaged.  The third would not necessarily 
provide incentives, but at least it would reduce the resource cost that DCMA requires to 
conduct contract closeout.  However, all of these ideas require significant changes to the 
DoD funding structure and/or current appropriation law.  Therefore, we concluded that, 
while these ideas could provide a fundamental solution, they were unrealistic in the 
current environment. 
Continuing in our efforts to find a fundamental solution to the cultural 
“cause” to the contract closeout problem, we analyzed the incentive structure within 
DCMA, at the personnel level rather than the organizational level.  We again found that 
the incentive structure was not congruent with the desired outcome of closing contracts in 
a timely manner given the current resources of time and personnel.  This is illustrated by 
the fact that contract closeout was not listed on interviewees’ performance objectives.  
ACOs at DCMA manage three populations of contracts.  In order of importance, these 
populations are (1) current active contracts, (2) contracts pending award, and (3) 
physically completed contracts.  It is natural that given limited resources and time, the 
focus of the ACOs is on active contracts first, followed by pending contracts.62  It is in 
these populations of contracts that DCMA “earns their money.”  Furthermore, it is logical 
that the ACO performance objectives (the incentive structure) are strongly tied to these 
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important populations of contracts.  In a constrained environment of limited resources 
and personnel, these priorities are justified.  Therefore, since the incentives/performance 
objectives are correctly aligned for this population, instead of changing the ACO’s 
incentives, the fundamental solution might lie in devoting permanent organizational 
resources to contract closeout.  These organizational resources (personnel) should be 
directly incentivized to close contracts by making contract closeout their top priority.  In 
other words, closing contracts is their job, and contract closeout would be first on their 
list of performance objectives.  
The possible options for realigning DCMA’s (or any contract management 
office) structure to better address contract closeout include the following five options:   
(1) Do nothing.  This option retains the status quo.  The advantage to this 
option is that it does not require the expenditure of any additional resources or any 
restructuring initiatives.  However, it offers little in the way of fundamentally improving 
the system, and does not change the incentive structure.  It is unlikely that this option will 
significantly change the rate at which contracts are closed.  Furthermore, the inventory of 
physically completed contracts will likely grow in the future after management attention 
is turned to other issues.  This would occur because of the ACO’s workload and the 
priority of actions necessary to administer a contract.   
(2) Assign a permanent contract specialist within every ACO team as the 
lead for contract closeout.  This individual would perform contract closeout functions for 
the entire team and would be able to draw on the experience and expertise of the team to 
address problems involved with the specific contracts that the team administers.  This 
concept has merit, the greatest being the fact that the personnel and the ACO most 
familiar with the specific contracts and contractors will still be responsible for closing the 
contracts.  However, there are several disadvantages.  ACO teams will be loath to lose 
one of their members to the closeout function since the remaining workload will have to 
be divided amongst the remainder of the team.  The potential also exists to divert the 
specialist away from closeout duties to perform “higher priority” administrative tasks.  




falling behind active and pre-award contracts.  In reality, the incentive structure changes 
very little under this option.  
(3) Create a “Contract Closeout Officer,” similar in concept to the 
Termination Contracting Officer (TCO).  Conceptually, these individuals would be 
assigned a team and would travel between DCMA offices within the region to complete 
contract closeout actions, similar to a permanent “tiger team.”  If this team was given the 
resources and authority to close contracts, it could be very effective, eliminating much of 
the queue time as well and reducing the mean processing time, since they are directly 
incentivized to close contracts.  Similar to the TCO team, this contract closeout team 
would also become experts in the contract closeout function.  However, since contract 
closeout occurs far more often than terminations, the number of personnel on such a 
team, or the number of teams required per region would likely be quite large, otherwise 
the workload would overwhelm the team and the rate of contract closeout might actually 
decrease.  There is also a cost to implementing this team.  Furthermore, the potential 
exists for ACOs to leave unresolved problems for the contract closeout team that they 
might otherwise resolve if responsible for closeout.  
(4) Create a permanent contract closeout team within each DCMA.  This 
is our recommended solution and will be discussed in detail in the following section titled 
“Structure.”  
(5) Outsource the majority of closeout functions to a contractor.  The main 
advantage to this option is the reduction of workload for each contract administration 
office, allowing personnel to concentrate on higher priority tasks.  Furthermore, since the 
contractor would be paid for the function, they would be incentivized.  Although this 
concept may have some merit, and is being successfully implemented by some 
organizations, there are several tasks that are inherently Governmental, such as approving 
additional funds and making final determinations.  As such, the Government must 
maintain some functions.  There are additional problems such as contractors’ willingness 




Given these options, establishing a dedicated multifunctional closeout 
team at each DCMA, discussed in the next section, seems to offer the greatest overall 
benefit to the organization because it creates greater unity of effort between the 
responsible organizations while still maintaining a meaningful incentive structure. 
e. Structure 
While culture and incentives play a role, as discussed in the previous 
paragraphs, organizational structure is the main cause of the queue variability.  Recall 
that turnaround time queues are caused by two factors: (1) the authority to accomplish all 
the closeout steps does not lie with one person, or even with one organization, and (2) 
contract closeout is usually not the key players’ only responsibility; arguably, it is low on 
their priority list compared to other contractual actions given limited time and resources.  
Since there are multiple people/organizations responsible for closeout, the potential for a 
queue exists every time a request for action is passed from one individual/organization to 
another.  Since closeout is usually not these individuals’ or organizations’ only 
responsibility, and they have other actions competing for their resources, a queue also 
exists when an individual begins a closeout step but has to interrupt the process either due 
to a lack of information immediately available to finish the step, or when another action 
with higher priority must be accomplished.    
Creating a permanent multifunctional contract closeout team (option four 
in the previous section) addresses both the organizational structure elements and culture 
elements.  By multifunctional, we mean that the team should include personnel from all 
stakeholder groups.  Furthermore, each team should be vested with the authority to 
complete the closeout process without having to go for approval outside the team.  This 
means that the team should include an ACO, a matrixed auditor from DCAA, a property 
administrator, and a matrixed DFAS representative to conduct reconciliation and 
payment functions. 
This is a viable fundamental solution because a permanent multifunctional 
team should reduce the queue variability and mean turnaround time.  Consider the two 




variability caused by the first factor because nearly all of the closeout steps will be vested 
in one person – the closeout team leader, and all of the needed resources will be in that 
person’s control for the vast majority of contracts that reside in MOCAS CAR Section 2.  
(Exceptions include process steps where a PCO must make a determination on property, 
although that could be delegated to the ACO lead in many cases.  Other exceptions would 
include a legal review for patents or royalties).  To optimize effectiveness, each team 
should have the vested authority to accomplish the majority of the closeout steps, 
including contract administration authority, property disposition authority, audit 
authority, and payment authority.  By centralizing as many of the closeout functions as 
possible into a single team, queue variability can be attacked head-on.  A multifunctional 
team also eliminates variability caused by the second factor because closeout will be the 
team’s primary responsibility.  Other contractual actions with higher priority will not 
interfere with the closeout action.  In addition to reducing variability in the queue, a 
multifunctional team will also reduce the mean turnaround time.  By having permanent 
resources devoted to the process, the average turnaround time will be lower than the 
turnaround time of a process with temporary resources.63  Recall the results illustrated in 
Figure 6.  Reduction in both the mean and variation of turnaround time has the greatest 
affect on reducing both variation in the inventory and the inventory levels.  
Unlike the funding ideas discussed above, this solution is realistic.  
Indeed, closeout teams are often temporarily formed within a DCMA location when 
management “places emphasis” on contract closeout.  These “tiger teams” have proven to 
work.  However, when the backlog is reduced to a manageable level, the effort is deemed 
successful, the team is disbanded, and the team members go back to their normal jobs 
with an emphasis on current and pending contracts.64   
Several organizations we interviewed have implemented permanent 
closeout teams, including the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), 
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) San Diego, and Science Application 
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International Corporation (SAIC).  All three of these organizations related experiences 
that demonstrated that the permanent teams result in long-term reduction in the contract 
closeout inventory level, although further strides could have been made if they had 
consistent access to auditors and payment specialists. 
During our interview with the SAIC Corporate Vice President for Contract 
Closeouts and the company’s in-plant ACO, the pair related their experience during the 
period of concentrated effort to close contracts for the pending transition to DPPS.  After 
notification of the priority on closeout and prior to the formation of a permanent closeout 
team, the contractor had only closed relatively few of several hundred eligible contracts 
in a six-month period.  However, after the team was implemented, working together, 
SAIC and the DCMA only missed the rigorous closeout goals of reducing their backlog 
by 50%, as set out by DCMA Headquarters, by one contract.  This was rightfully a source 
of pride for both interviewees.65    
FISC San Diego, an organization that administers the majority of its 
contracts outside of the purview of DCMA, detailed their experience that successes in 
contract closeout did not come until a permanent team was established.  In 1997, the 
Command assigned only one person as the Termination Contracting Officer and contract 
closeout administrator.  This lone person was not able to keep up with the workload.  
When the Command switched to the Standard Procurement System, the contract closeout 
function reverted to the FISC ACOs.  However, massive inventories of physically 
completed contracts soon developed.  In October 2002, the Command formed a seven-
person closeout team, four being support contractor personnel.  The supervisor 
responsible for this function was emphatic in her belief that they were more successful in 
closing contracts with the permanent team rather than leaving the function solely in the 
hands of the FISC ACOs.66  Their successes spanned the breadth of contracts managed 
both in-house and through DCMA. 
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SPAWAR related their experience using an “8(a)” support contractor for 
processing contract closeout actions.  The Command said they had the function 
contracted for years and that they have steadily drawn down the number of contracts in 
their backlog and noted particular success in eliminating overaged contracts.67 
DCMA Manassas, reputed as the “Contract-Closeout Capital” has also 
employed the team approach, but taking it a step further by partnering with DCAA and 
DFAS.68  Using a risk-based approach on difficult contracts, the Command “goes after 
them (the contracts) in groups, …(and) goes after them as a team.  We all come together 
with DCAA, DFAS, the contract operation folks at both District East and Headquarters, 
the legal folks, and then approach the contractor.”69  Quoting the commander, “We 
average between 700 and 1,100 contract closeouts a month (and) get from 300 to 700 
new contracts a month, so keeping a downward slope on my balance sheet is 
important.”70  DCMA Headquarters established a Contract Closeout Task Force with its 
first assignment to support DCMA Manassas.  The task force consists of seven 
individuals from CMOs across East District, assigned at Manassas for 90 days, each 
closing contracts.71  This “tiger team” approach proved to be a great success in the short-
term, although permanently assigned personnel would likely have been able to make an 
even greater impact since their time at each DCMA would not be so limited.  
The true success of these organizations is not rooted in their simultaneous 
reduction of both the mean process time and the reduction of the mean queue time.  Strict 
enforcement of established time standards and concentrated resources are proven to 
reduce turnaround times, resulting in both reduced backlogs and prevention of future 
backlogs.  
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f. Advantages and Disadvantages 
While there are advantages and disadvantages to this integrated team 
approach to contract closeout, we feel that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages 
because this solution will produce the long-term outcome of getting contracts closed in a 
timely manner.   
One of the staunchest arguments against this solution is that the ACO that 
managed the contract, the person that has the most knowledge of the contract, is the most 
logical person to close the contract.72  In fact, the ACO would have intimate knowledge 
of both the contractor’s procedures, payment terms incorporated into the contract, issues 
regarding payment reconciliation, and problem areas such as delays in property 
disposition and royalties or patents.  However, it is important to remember that after the 
contract is physically complete, the ACO’s attention is justifiably turned towards his/her 
other active contracts and the other 69 contract administration tasks assigned in the FAR.  
Closing the contract becomes an item on the ACO’s list of tasks, but it is likely far from 
the highest priority item.  This is the current thought, organizational structure, and current 
procedure, but it has not prevented or reduced the backlog.   
Another disadvantage discussed was the possibility that ACOs will not 
resolve problems in administration as they arise, that they will “throw the problem over 
the wall to the closeout team.”73  For example, complicated property disposition issues 
may not be properly addressed by the ACO, who is already time-limited due to workload, 
preferring instead to allow the contract closeout team to resolve the outstanding 
problems.  Professional courtesy and management oversight would hopefully prevent this 
from occurring.  It is critical in any management process to hold personnel accountable 
for their actions and such dereliction of duty should certainly be dealt with if it arises. 
A third disadvantage to the team concept was the idea that such positions 
would be undesirable and difficult to fill.74  Incentives tied to team production could 
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certainly address this issue.  If an organization is willing to put greater focus on closeout, 
then it must better align its reward and incentive system to do just that.  
Other disadvantages include issues such as cross-training and job rotation, 
not only for the ACOs assigned, but also for the matrixed satellite assignment of team 
members from other organizations.  In addition, the contractor and the PCO are not part 
of this cross-functional team and, as such, some of the queue variability will remain.  
Advanced delegation of authority from PCOs regarding closeout decision-making and 
close coordination with contractors will aid in mitigating some of the variability, but it 
cannot be eliminated in its entirety. 
A final disadvantage might be cost.  There is a cost to establishing 
permanent teams, taking resources from the current organizational assets and diverting 
them to the new team, or obtaining additional personnel.  
The main advantage to the team concept was already described as 
reductions in the queue variability and mean turnaround time.  Another advantage to 
having a permanent contract closeout staff is that they become in-house experts.  One of 
the complaints of an ACO that we interviewed is that the tiger team personnel loose their 
knowledge of the contract closeout process once the team is disbanded.75  Therefore, the 
command loses its corporate knowledge on the intricacies of contract closeout.  Forming 
a permanent contract closeout section can eliminate this loss of knowledge.   
Since the personnel in the contract closeout section would ideally be 
located in the same office as the ACO who administered the contract, any questions that 
arise about how the contract was administered can be easily answered by the ACO.  
Likewise, if the closeout team and the ACO teams fall under the same leadership, then 
this leader can resolve issues of “throwing problems over the wall.”  In many other 
instances, simply placing payment personnel and administrative personnel in the same 
room could lead to far greater understanding of payment problems and a clearer approach 
to resolving reconciliation issues. 
                                                 




It is common knowledge that some commands have formed both short-
term and long-term contract closeout teams.  While some of these teams have been 
successful, some have not.  The unsuccessful efforts of some commands can be traced 
back to the culture and incentives surrounding contract closeout.  Because contract 
closeout has little perceived benefit compared to other contractual actions, the lowest 
level of employee, such as interns, or the wrong type of employees are often assigned to 
the closeout section.76  If the least experienced personnel or personnel in the wrong 
specialty are given the responsibility, with little management attention, and little 
authority to actually close the contract, the section fails in their task.  Therefore, if 
commands adopt this recommendation to change their structure, they should be aware of 
this cultural phenomenon and ensure experienced personnel with the requisite skills and 
motivation are assigned to the section.  The section must also be integrated into the 
overall organization and treated as an important part of the DCMA team.  
B. DEVELOPING AN OPTIMAL SOLUTION BY INTEGRATING 
SYMPTOMATIC AND FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTIONS 
As previously mentioned, symptomatic solutions are not necessarily bad.  Short-
term fixes have benefits.  Consciously implementing both symptomatic solutions and 
fundamental solutions simultaneously are the best way to attack the systemic problem 
from both directions to create the optimal solution.  The other recommendations proposed 
by our group, batch processing, and improvements in the process are symptomatic 
solutions.  Batch processing provides a quick way to reduce the backlog.  Likewise, 
efficiencies can be gained by improving the process.  But, by integrating these two 
process solutions with the fundamental solution of organizational structure changes, the 
optimal solution - to both quickly eliminate the backlog and ensure a backlog does not 
develop in the future – is realized.  Referring back to the multidimensional archetype, this 
optimal solution is achieved by leveraging the process organizational element on the top 
sphere and the structure and culture organizational elements on the bottom sphere.  This 
optimal solution also creates the quick success needed to sustain a long-term change 
effort.   
                                                 




C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
In order to achieve the long-term outcome of eliminating future backlogs of 
overaged contracts, we recommend that contracting organizations that manage high 
volumes of contracts include multifunctional contract closeout sections in their 
organizational structure.  To optimize effectiveness, each team should have the vested 
authority to accomplish the majority of the closeout steps, including contract 
administration authority, property disposition authority, audit authority, and payment 
authority.  Organizations that manage low volumes of contracts can benefit from this 
concept by establishing the closeout team on a regional basis.  If Government personnel 
resources are unavailable, these closeout teams can be staffed with a combination of 
Government and contractor personnel, similar to the processes used by SPAWAR and 
FISC San Diego.  While we feel this is the best organizational option of the five 
discussed in this chapter, our recommendation centers on the need to devote permanent 
organizational resources to the contract closeout function.  The backlog of physically 
completed contracts can at least partially be attributed to the lack of permanent personnel 
detailed to this necessary output.  Therefore, at a minimum, we recommend that DCMA 
(and other contract management organizations) prototype the five organizational options 
presented, (1) status quo, (2) permanent specialist within each ACO team assigned to the 
contract closeout function, (3) a Contract Closeout Officer similar to the TCO concept, 
(4) create a permanent closeout team within each DCMA, and (5) contract the function to 
a commercial firm, compare the average turnaround time, and variance in TAT from each 
organizational option, and choose the best option for implementing permanent 
organizational change. 
The following quote from a DoDIG Report emphasizes the fact that the current 
contract workload requirement contributes to the variability found in the contract 
closeout turnaround time queues.  
DoD reduced its acquisition workforce from 460,516 to 230,556 
personnel, about 50 percent, from the end of FY 1990 to the end of FY 
1999; however, the workload has not been reduced proportionately.  From 
FY 1990 through FY 1999, the value of DoD procurement actions 




percent, while the number of procurement actions increased from about 
13.2 million to about 14.8 million, about 12 percent.  The greatest amount 
of work for acquisition personnel occurs on contracting actions over 
$100,000, and the annual number of those actions increased from 97,948 
to 125,692, about 28 percent, from FY 1990 to FY 1999.  The following 
impacts from acquisition workforce reductions were identified: increased 
backlog in closing out completed contracts.…77 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service accounting data showed that the 
number and obligation value of the open DoD contracts in the 
Mechanization of Contract Administration Services increased up to FY 
1998 and declined slightly in FYs 1999 and 2000, as shown in Table 8.  
As of January 31, 2000, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service had 
116,954 contracts completed, but not closed out. 
Table 8. Open Contracts 
Obligation 
Fiscal Year*  Number   Value (millions) 
1993   348,536   $489,000 
1994   378,400   490,800 
1995   376,048   667,000 
1996   387,401   810,000 
1997   395,486   855,000 
1998   384,861   894,000 
1999   339,712   833,709 
2000   329,121   844,958 
*The accounting data are as of different cutoff dates during the fiscal years78.  
 
The report cites one of the main reasons for the increase in the inventory of 
physically completed contracts not closed is that: “Contracting personnel did not 
regularly perform contract close outs because the personnel lacked time for the work.”79  
In a system where an ACO manages large volumes of active contracts as well as being 
responsible to close those contracts, it is a justifiable position that the contract closeout 
function takes a lower priority to contractual actions on active contracts.  Devoting 
permanent resources to the contract closeout function by creating permanent closeout 
teams will fix this dilemma because the team’s primary responsibility will be to close 
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contracts, thereby reducing the queue variability in the turnaround time while 
simultaneously decreasing the mean turnaround time.  
A counter argument to this recommendation is that there is a resource cost to 
establish and maintain these teams.  While it is true that there is an additional resource 
requirement, the alternative, continuing to let millions of dollars of appropriated funds 
lapse, is even more expensive.  According to the MOCAS database, the Navy has 
approximately $2,000,000,000 of obligated money sitting on physically completed 
contracts.80  The statistics show that the Navy is losing approximately $500,000,000 per 
year.81  One GAO report further illustrates this point, 
…the Navy failed to deobligate $452 million of unliquidated operating 
obligations that was no longer needed and potentially available for other 
permissible purposes, such as contract modifications….82  
Our recommendation is centered on reducing the average queue length and 
variability in the turnaround time.  Throughout the last decade, studies have primarily 
focused on reducing the process time, however, the backlog continued to grow.     
It is an improbability that the desired results will be obtained by transforming the 
closeout process by focusing on process times rather than queue times, unless there is a 
transformation of the entire contracting process.  Through analysis and interviews, we 
have not found a way to radically change the closeout process because the required 
closeout actions are a result of the way the Government funds and awards contracts.  
Each step appears to be necessary in order to eliminate future liabilities and to settle all 
costs prior to permanent closure.  For example, the requirement for determining final 
indirect cost rates is a direct result of awarding cost-type contracts.  While process 
transformational change is an improbability, incremental change can improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the process.  Improving the business processes governing 
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final audits may reduce the time needed to perform the audit.  However, the audit time is 
not the cause that creates the delay in closeout, the queue time is the cause. 
What is needed is transformation of the organizational structure, not 
transformation of the process.  The key stakeholders are stove-piped into functional areas, 
each sub-optimized for their own processes, which create interface problems and queues.  
While organizational changes are not easy, the organizational structure is under DoD 
control, and no statutory or regulatory changes need to be made to make these seemingly 
minor organizational realignments.  Although there are some portions of the contract 
closeout system that reside outside of the Government’s purview, such as contractors’ 
actions, incentive systems can be drawn up to enhance their willingness to participate or 
penalties can be applied.  Chapters V and VI of this report specifically address some 
potential means of incentivizing contractors to fully participate in accomplishing contract 
closeout. 
In conclusion, our recommendation falls in line with the DoDIG’s 
recommendation, which states, 
DoD made progress and closed about 30,393 overaged contracts from 
February 2000 to March 2001.  However, another 26,610 contracts 
became overaged during that period.  Based on the closure rate overaged 
contracts achieved during the February 2000 to March 2001 period, we 
estimate that it will take at least 6 years for DoD to close all remaining 
overaged contracts. ….We recommend that the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) determine the DoD 
acquisition staffing requirements and, based upon identified needs, seek 
additional acquisition resources to accelerate the closure of contracts.83 
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III. QUEUING DISCIPLINES 
This chapter focuses on the effects that different queuing disciplines have on 
average turnaround times and rates of change of inventory levels.  Specifically, the First-
In-First-Out (FIFO) queuing discipline will be compared to the Shortest Processing Time 
(SPT) technique in application to the inventory of physically completed contracts that 
appear in MOCAS CAR Section 2. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the Little’s Law equation (2.1) demonstrates the linear 
relationship between arrival rate, turnaround time (TAT) and inventory.  In other words, 
inventory levels increase or decrease in proportion to corresponding changes in arrival 
rate and/or TAT.  Knowledge of this phenomenon is important because inventory 
typically consumes resources, making inventory reduction a management priority.  Since 
inventory levels are linked to resources and capital, the rate at which the inventory is 
reduced can be as important as the change in the inventory level itself. 
The SPT concept can be applied to the effort to reduce any Contract Management 
Office’s (CMO) inventory of physically complete contracts.  Implementing the SPT 
concept will reduce the average turnaround time and increase the rate (the speed) at 
which the backlog is diminished.  The end result is a reduction in the average work-in-
process, in the case of contract closeout, the inventory of physically complete contracts.  
However, due to the manner in which the obligated funds on contracts expire and close (a 
risk factor), we recommend applying a hybrid queuing technique to inventory reduction 
efforts, thereby optimizing the ratio of speed to risk.   
A. FIRST-IN-FIRST-OUT VERSUS SHORTEST PROCESSING TIME 
The Little’s Law equation (2.1) expresses turnaround time as an average of the 
cumulative time to process a “job.”  Interestingly, different queuing disciplines produce 
different average TATs; yet, the cumulative turnaround time remains the same.  It is 
possible to see the effects that different queue disciplines have on TAT by comparing 




gets first priority, also referred to as first-come, first-served (FCFS).  This practice is 
almost universally accepted as a fair inventory management strategy, especially when the 
queue consists of people.84  However, when the queue is “jobs to be processed” rather 
than “customers to be serviced,” there are alternative scheduling concepts that are 
applicable.  These concepts may include: “highest priority to the hardest jobs” (greatest 
work content), “highest priority to the jobs with the nearest due date” or “highest priority 
to the jobs requiring the least time to complete” (Shortest Processing Time).85  Of these 
queuing disciplines, SPT has consistently produced smaller mean waiting times (average 
cumulative TAT) under widely varying circumstances.86  The SPT rule can be applied 
either strictly – interrupting a job being processed whenever a job that could be processed 
faster comes along, or leniently – such as separating arrivals into long and short jobs and 
then giving priority to the short ones.87   
A simple trip to the local grocery store amply demonstrates the SPT concept in 
practice.  The express checkout lane is an example of the lenient application of SPT just 
discussed.  As can be imagined, the total active time the grocery store takes to service all 
of their customers in a day would be the same regardless of the queue discipline 
employed.  However, implementing an express checkout lane reduces the average 
customer wait time because the average rate at which customers are serviced is increased.  
Queuing theory shows that employing almost any SPT technique results in surprising 
efficacy.88   
Consider a straightforward illustration of the advantage of the SPT technique 
using two customers in a single line at the grocery store.  To keep the example simple, 
the clerk waits on the second customer immediately after the first is checked out, with no 
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wait time between customers.  It takes the clerk ten minutes to checkout “customer 1” but 
only two minutes to checkout “customer 2.”   
Using the FIFO technique, “customer 1” has priority because he arrived at the 
checkout counter first.  “Customer 1” has to wait ten minutes before his checkout process 
is complete; “customer 2” must wait a total of 12 minutes (ten minutes for “customer 1” 
and two minutes for her checkout).  A total of 22 minutes of “customer time” has passed 
during the processing of these two jobs, although the clerk has only expended 12 minutes 
of “processing time” on both customers.  Using the FIFO system, the cumulative average 
turnaround time is 11 minutes (3.1).   
 
FIFO      10 + 12  = 11    (3.1) 
      2  
 
Using the SPT technique, “customer 2” is waited on first because her processing 
time is shorter than “customer 1’s.”  “Customer 2” has to wait two minutes before her 
checkout process is complete; “customer 1” must wait a total of 12 minutes (two minutes 
for “customer 2” and ten minutes for his checkout).  In this case, only 12 minutes of 
“customer time” has passed processing the two jobs, compared to 22 minutes using the 
FIFO technique.  The cumulative average turnaround time is also shorter, which equals 
six minutes (3.2).  Using SPT, the “processing time” the clerk took to service both 
customers is the same as the total “customer time.”  
 
SPT      2 + 10  = 6    (3.2) 
   2  
 
Relating this example to contract closeout in DCMA, the clerk can be likened to 
the contracting officer responsible for closure; the customers equate to the “jobs” or 
contracts to be closed.  The time required to process each “job” can be changed from 
minutes to months.  If the contracting officer uses the FIFO technique, the total time to 
close both contracts is 12 months.  However, it will take 22 months for both contracts to 
clear the MOCAS database.  Using the SPT technique, it still takes 12 months to close 




Table 3 shows a simple mathematical model comparing FIFO to SPT in a 
hypothetical contract closeout inventory scenario.  As with the grocery store example, the 
emphasis of the model is the comparison of the average cumulative turnaround times and 
the advantage of the SPT technique. 
 
First-In-First-Out (FIFO) 
Job Processing Order 1 2 3 4 5 Total Average 
Turnaround Time (months) 20 18 1 9 5 53  
Cumulative Turnaround Time (months) 20 38 39 48 53 198 39.6 
 
Shortest Processing Time (SPT) 
Job Processing Order 3 5 4 2 1 Total Average 
Turnaround Time (months) 1 5 9 18 20 53  
Cumulative Turnaround Time (months) 1 6 15 33 53 108 21.6 
Source: Developed by the authors.  Adapted from “Logistics Engineering” course material authored by 
Prof. Keebom Kang, PhD, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003 
 
Table 3. Queuing Discipline Sample Calculations. 
 
The effects of FIFO vs. SPT can also be shown graphically.  Figure 13 shows the 
graph of the data in Table 3.  As the model illustrates, the total turnaround time for the 
two techniques is the same (53 days), however, in Figure 13, it can be seen that the area 
under the SPT curve is less than the area under the FIFO curve.  The smaller area equates 




























Source: Developed by the authors 
Figure 13.   Queuing Discipline Sample Calculations (Graph) 
 
Figure 14 illustrates the same data, but reverses the axis to illustrate the 
comparison of FIFO and SPT in an inventory reduction scenario.  This graph shows that 
the rate of reduction is faster using the SPT technique, even though the total time remains 
the same. 
 





























Source: Developed by the authors 





B. APPLYING QUEUING DISCIPLINES 
In order to simply illustrate the SPT concept in the above example, we modeled a 
closed system – no new jobs were arriving.  In reality, most systems are open systems –
new jobs are continuously arriving.  It should be noted that implementing a strict SPT 
process in an open system would have one potentially serious consequence; the job(s) 
that take the longest may never get processed because shorter jobs would always pre-
empt them.  If this presents a problem, a hybrid technique could be developed.  In other 
words, SPT and another logical queuing discipline could be implemented simultaneously.  
This would have the effect of both reducing the average turnaround time (although not as 
much as strict implementation), and ensure that the oldest, most difficult, or closest due 
date jobs are not neglected.   
Applying a strict interpretation of SPT to an inventory of physically complete 
contracts would create problems.  The oldest contracts may never be closed due to a 
somewhat constant arrival rate of physically completed contracts into MOCAS CAR 
Section 2.  In this case, a priority-based queuing discipline can help reduce this risk.  The 
priority-based discipline (PBD) mirrors the FIFO concept by ensuring either the oldest or 
the highest priority contracts get processed first.  However, implementing a hybrid 
SPT/PBD technique will optimize the speed to risk ratio.   
The application of the queuing discipline should be based on a categorization of 
the contracts based on risk assessment.  PBD should be used on high-risk contracts, 
which include the contracts listed in Table 4.  By using PBD to close contracts in this 
category, the CMO can (1) reduce the chance that the funds will expire or close, (2) 
reduce the probability of using current year funds to pay for prior year obligations, or (3) 
get a better understanding of the liability incurred on these contracts.   
Whereas PBD is appropriate for the high-risk category, SPT is appropriate for 
low-risk contracts.  This category includes the contracts listed in Table 5.  By 
implementing SPT, the CMO will benefit from the increased speed, decreased TAT, and 







Contracts with obligated funds nearing the end of their active period 
Contracts with obligated funds nearing the end of their expiration period 
Contracts with obligated funds that have closed and liabilities against active funds is 
anticipated 
Contracts estimated to take longer than the FAR time standards due to high 
complexity, or expectations of high queue time89 
Contracts that require significant involvement from multiple stakeholders (e.g. DCMA, 
DCAA, DFAS, and the Procuring Activity) 
Source: Developed by the authors 
Table 4. High Risk Contract Category. 
 
Contracts estimated to close within FAR time standards90  
Contracts that have unambiguous amounts of funds available for deobligation and 
reuse, whether those funds are active or expired 
Contracts with fully liquidated funds and no further obligations are expected or 
necessary 
Contracts that can be closed by one or two of the stakeholders (e.g. only DCMA and 
DFAS involvement is necessary) 
Low dollar value contracts 
Contracts with a low level of complexity91 
Source: Developed by the authors 
Table 5. Low Risk Contract Category. 
 
 
                                                 
89 Estimates based on workload analysis, contract type, and historical knowledge of the contract and 
contractor. 
90 Ibid. 
91 The complexity level of a contract is based on the judgment of the cognizant contracting officer.  
The contracting officer’s experience, the number of contract line items (CLINS), the number of Accounting 
Classification Numbers (ACRNs), the length of the period of performance, the number of modifications, 




C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In order to optimize the speed to risk ratio, CMOs should group physically 
complete contracts into two categories, low-risk and high-risk, and use a hybrid 
SPT/PBD queuing discipline to continuously work to reduce the inventory of contracts to 
be closed.  SPT increases the rate at which the backlog is reduced.  PBD decreases the 
chance that the funds will close and incur liabilities against active funds.  Together with 
batch processing, discussed in the next chapter, this hybrid technique can facilitate 
reduction in the average turnaround time to a level that significantly exceeds the arrival 
rate of contracts into the inventory - reducing the inventory at a faster rate than the 
current rate- while minimizing the risk of fund closure.  Although our research team did 
not have access to the necessary data to group the MOCAS CAR Section 2 contracts into 
high or low risk categories using the characteristics outlined in Tables 4 and 5, interviews 
indicated that approximately 70% of the contracts are low complexity and 30% are high 
complexity.92  Furthermore, as Chapter I indicated, we estimated that the probability of 
MOCAS CAR Section 2 contracts becoming overaged was 40 percent.93  Given these 
data, we estimate that 60% to 70% of the contracts could be processed using the SPT 
technique, and 30% to 40% should be processed using PBD. 
Through analysis of the Wynn list,94 it appears that the emphasis of the leadership 
is processing the oldest contracts first, in other words using the FIFO system.  However, 
strictly following this technique may not produce the optimum results.  Leadership 
attention should be given to application of the SPT queuing disciplines as well.   
As Chapter I discussed, the purpose of contract closeout includes: (1) maximizing 
the use of current or expired funds by making final payment and deobligating excess 
funds, and (2) limiting DoD’s liability on physically completed contracts.  By processing 
contracts that are easy to close first (SPT), the maximum amount of funds might be freed, 
and/or the total liability can be significantly reduced because there are fewer contracts in 
                                                 
92 Interview (TEL) DCMA San Diego, 10 April 2003. 
93 Reference Chapter I, Section D: “Findings”. 
94 The Wynn List is a list of overaged contracts in the MOCAS database given leadership emphasis 




the inventory on average.  Coupling the SPT with the PBD method can maximize both 
the leadership’s and workforce’s endeavor to reduce the inventory of physically 




























IV. BATCH PROCESSING 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether batch processing is a viable 
means of closing physically completed contracts in MOCAS CAR Section 2.  The idea 
behind processing a batch, or a group of homogeneous contracts under the same 
contractor, is to simultaneously close more than one contract at a time, thereby 
decreasing the average turnaround time (TAT).  As discussed in Chapters II and III, 
significant reductions of the inventory of physically completed contracts will only occur 
if the average TAT or the average arrival rate is lowered.  By decreasing the average 
TAT from its current state, batch processing offers a method to increase the speed of the 
inventory reduction effort.  Analysis of MOCAS CAR Section 2, several GAO reports, 
and interviews yielded significant insight into the issue and the development of a concept 
for how this process can work.  This chapter discusses the concept of processing a batch 
of contracts, proposes a basic process to close groups of contracts including a three-
phased approach towards implementing that process, and briefly describes the financial 
impacts of batch processing.  
A. THE CONCEPT 
The primary reason for batching contracts is to eliminate the time-intensive 
process of reconciliation and administratively close the contract, regardless of the status 
of liquidations.  A negotiated settlement based the batch processing concept would 
replace reconciliation as the final action on a contract in which all other required closeout 
steps have been completed.  In order to accomplish batch processing, the Navy should 
implement a three-phased approach ranging from completely homogeneous batching 
through a transformational approach to batching multiple fiscal year, multiple 
appropriation batches.   
A study conducted by GAO in 2001 concluded that under the current system, it 
would likely take six years for DoD to eliminate the entire backlog of overaged contracts 
within MOCAS.95  A similar GAO report, also completed in 2001, cited numerous 
                                                 




contract reconciliation actions that would result in thousands of labor hours and take 
several years to complete.96  At such a rate, it is difficult to believe that tens of thousands 
of contracts in the backlog could be reconciled and closed within a six-year period.  
Additionally, contract closeout will continue to strain already tight personnel resources 
and hamper the processing of active contract actions.  The DoD must approach the issue 
of the backlog of physically completed contracts differently and batch processing offers a 
viable option to more rapidly eliminate that backlog. 
Change in the existing closeout process is required.  The additional pressure being 
applied by Service acquisition officials to reduce the backlog is having some impact, due 
to the enhanced focus on the issue,97 but improvement in the rate of closures is not of the 
necessary magnitude to eliminate the problem within the next several years.  During this 
period, hundreds of millions of dollars of current program funding will continue to be at 
risk as the appropriations originally intended for those previous year obligations close.98  
As previously mentioned in Chapter II and by various GAO reports, closing over 47,000 
individual contracts will create a massive drain on already strained resources in DCMA, 
DCAA and DFAS; a resource requirement that will last for the next several years.  Until 
additional manning or improved processes can be adopted, a means of closing contracts 
in large bunches, or batch processing, seems a viable solution to increasing the rate at 
which closeouts can occur.  In addition to reducing the number of contracts that will 
become overaged through front-end and administrative improvements, addressed in the 
next chapter, batch processing groups of contracts offers a means of working within 
current statutory and regulatory guidelines to clear the existing backlog.   
The U.S. Army’s Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) has 
recently attempted to batch process overaged physically completed contracts that were 
funded by appropriations that are now expired or closed.99  Although they have realized 
                                                 
96 GAO Report 02-747, October 2001. 
97 Interview (TEL) ACO Team Leader, DCMA Manassas, 11 April 2003. 
98 Interview ASN (RD&A) ACQ Office Personnel, 11 November 2003. 




success in negotiating administrative closeout with the contractor, they have yet to 
finalize the closeout action within the MOCAS system.  As such, DFAS considers the 
closure of these contracts pending, and they remain open in MOCAS until a final 
reconciliation judgment can be completed.  The issue of closing the contracts in MOCAS 
must still be resolved, but for all intents and purposes all Government liabilities have 
been negotiated away for those contracts in the batch.  Throughout this chapter we will 
incorporate the lessons learned from TACOM’s experience since it offers an opportunity 
to improve the existing closeout process and reduce the backlog of physically completed 
contracts.   
Initially, the contracts best suited for batch processing are those under a single 
contractor and a single buying command, and involve only closed funds in the same 
appropriation.  Although only a limited number of contracts fall under such restrictive 
bounds, the initial intent is to prove the concept prior to moving the limits.  In fact, the 
only initial requirement to prototype batch processing is identification of at least two 
contracts within the aforementioned bounds, a case that occurs seven times amongst the 
first one hundred contracts listed as overaged in the February download of MOCAS CAR 
Section 2.100   
In order to ensure the accuracy of a settlement and to mitigate any risks to the 
Government, the completion of the closeout procedures required under the FAR must be 
completed and documented.  Furthermore, a DCAA audit must be conducted prior to 
commencing negotiations to solidify the Government’s negotiating positions.  If these 
conditions are present, then the Government representative at either DCMA or a buying 
command can identify a prospective batch, and the applicable contractor can be contacted 
to commence the procedure. 
By definition, a contract is an independent agreement between the Government, 
represented by a warranted contracting officer, and a contractor.  If the contractor and the 
                                                 
100 MOCAS CAR Section 2 download, provided by DFAS Liaison Office for February 2002.  
Contracts were sorted by size of contract and batches of two or more were selected based on the 
information available in the download.  It is not possible to determine the specific appropriation involved in 




contracting officer can come to an agreement on settling the contract, then such an 
agreement should be accepted by all other stakeholders and the contract should be 
considered closed by all reviewing authorities.  The most important factor, however, is to 
have the absolute support and concurrence of the contractor for this process to be 
successful.101  The Government has an incentive to close out the contract due to the 
potential risk to current year funding, while the contractor will be able to remove 
outstanding debits or credits, depending upon the situation of each contract, and may then 
focus on current business vice past accounts.  Both parties should win in a batch process 
due to anticipated savings of both time and money and thus reducing contract closeout 
costs. 
B. THE PROCEDURE 
Figure 15 displays one possible approach that could be used to accomplish batch 
processing for contracts administered within MOCAS, although it could easily be 




















Source: Developed by the authors with advice from TACOM 
 
Figure 15.   Potential Batch Processing Procedure. 
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The initial step requires the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) at the buying 
activity, or the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) at a DCMA, to batch 
a number of contracts that are physically complete, with all FAR-required closeout 
actions completed and documented in the acquisition file through use of the DD Form 
1597.102  Although completion of all closeout actions may be a flexible requirement in 
later phases, it is essential in the first phase in order to first prove the concept.  The 
contractor must be contacted and informed of the concept and the benefits that can be 
achieved through this type of process.  It is critical for the contractor to inform their 
Board of Directors and to acknowledge their understanding that a negotiated settlement 
will result in the permanent closure of each of the contracts in question, and that no future 
claims against the Government can occur after the settlement.  A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) must be completed between the Government and the contractor 
documenting agreement to use the batch process concept to close the contracts proposed.  
The MOU must contain Chief Executive Officer (CEO) certification that the Board of 
Directors concurred with the batch action prior to embarking on the negotiated 
settlement. This is necessary in order to conform to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
which requires Boards of Directors to take a more active role in management decisions, 
as well as to protect the Government from future claims.103  The MOU must be signed by 
all participating parties, which would include the PCOs and Program Managers (PMs) for 
the contracts in the batch, DCAA, the ACO, and the contractor’s representatives.  
Although it may appear burdensome, it is critical, especially in the proving phase, to 
obtain the concurrence of all parties prior to embarking upon this batch processing action.  
Once the process is proven, it is possible for the MOU to remain in place to allow for 
further batch processing actions in any given period specified by the MOU.   
The contractor will either offer suggestions as to how to better approach the batch, 
or continue with the process by entering the negotiation with their billable amounts for 
each contract in the batch.  Once a batch is agreed to by both parties, a priority DCAA 
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103 Interview (TEL) TACOM PEO-GCS, 08 April 2003, Sarbanes-Oxley injects requirements on 




audit will be requested to review the contracts unless they fall under continuous audit 
procedures or if a DCAA audit has already been accomplished on the applicable 
contracts.  TACOM stated that priority DCAA audit requests were processed and results 
forwarded by DCAA within one month from the date of the request.  Such timely 
auditing is critical in maintaining momentum in the batch process.104  Once the incurred 
cost audit results are received from DCAA, the ACO has a basis for creating the 
Government’s negotiating position.  Final overhead rates, discussed in detail in Chapter 
VI, may either be settled prior to batch processing negotiations (through either DCAA 
audit determination or through DCMA ACO negotiation) or they may remain an open 
issue for potential settlement during batch processing negotiations. 
Both parties will enter negotiations based on the premise that an equitable 
agreement will occur in the interest of both parties.  Negotiations seek an administrative 
closure of the contracts in the most efficient manner possible and resolution is in the 
interests of both parties.  This method of batch processing should occur in three separate 
phases, with the eventual goal of completely transforming the method of reducing the 
MOCAS CAR Section 2 inventory.  Each phase will be addressed in the following 
section, but the overall premise is always based on the concept of simultaneous closure of 
numerous completed contracts.   
Once a settlement is agreed upon during negotiation, the parties will all sign a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that will guarantee no future claims on the side of 
the contractor and no recovery audit on the part of the Government.  The MOA will serve 
as a contract modification to the now-settled contracts and will include the terms of the 
final settlement, final annotation to fiscal accounts, and permits final closure of the 
contract/acquisition files.  The MOA will then be sent to DFAS to document the 
settlement between the parties and final closeout in MOCAS can be completed.  It is 
important to note that the MOA is not intended to set any precedent for any future batch 
processing negotiations, thus any determination of overhead rates, etc, should not carry 
over and thus limit or preclude negotiations for other batches. 
                                                 




Most of the personnel interviewed for this study indicated an interest in 
attempting batch processing as a means of reducing the backlog at their activities.  
Research also indicates that industry would be more than willing to write-off a significant 
portion of their billable amounts in order to clear the old contracts from their records; in 
some cases they would be willing to write-off or absorb up to 20 percent of the billable 
value on each contract.105  Contractors indicated that the costs of simply preparing a final 
invoice, and undergoing the required certification/audit, often far outweighed the 
potential income.106  Similarly, the Government should consider the time and effort 
required to complete contract closure using the traditional manner when forming a 
negotiation position.  It is significant to note that the contract closeout process must be 
unduly arduous if defense contractors are willing to forego a significant percentage of 
their anticipated billable expenses in order to abbreviate or eliminate it.  This is 
Government regulation at its worst, and such evidence points out the need to embrace a 
more radical method for affecting contract closeout, such as batch processing. 
As previously stated, avoiding detailed reconciliation could lead to thousands of 
labor hours being saved, although there are also other savings to be realized.  Buying 
commands benefit by reducing the contracts they have in their backlog as well as 
removing potential liabilities against their current programs.107  DCAA expressed interest 
in the concept due to the advantage of processing batches of contracts from buying 
activities/DCMA vice the sporadic requests for priority audits they are currently 
receiving as overaged contracts come up for closure.108  DCMA voiced their interest in 
the concept as a means of reducing the burden of reconciling many overaged contracts, 
some of which became physically complete twenty years ago.109  Interviews with DFAS 
personnel also indicated a desire to move to a form of negotiated settlement of physically 
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106 Interview (TEL) conducted with three defense contractors. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Interview with DCAA San Diego, 03 April 2003. 
109 Interview with DCMA San Diego, California, 03 April 2003 and interview (TEL) with DCMA San 




completed contracts vice the current reconciliation-driven closeout process, recognizing it 
as more advantageous and efficient given their already burdened resources110.  Since 
most stakeholders have voiced interest in the concept of batch processing, this approach 
should be attempted as a method of reducing the existing backlog in bunches vice one by 
one processing.  Indeed, the materials or services were obtained long ago, thus the intent 
of Congress was met, yet the minutia and comparably low dollar values involved 
compared to the initial obligation make the necessity of detailed closeout an absurdity.   
As previously stated, in order to implement the concept of batch processing, it is 
prudent to approach the concept in three distinct phases.  The first phase will introduce 
the concept and prove its value, the second will allow for more far-reaching efforts to 
eliminate the backlog of physically completed contracts, and the third phase will seek to 
truly transform the way contracts can be closed. 
1. Phase One:  Test the Concept 
Due to the exceptionally complex procedures to pay or collect funding from 
expired accounts,111 the initial goal should be to reach a ZERO-SUM solution where no 
money changes hands and no adjustments to prior year accounting records will be 
required.  As previously stated, such an occurrence is somewhat common within MOCAS 
CAR Section 2, thus multiple test cases could be attempted to prove the validity of this 
method of closing multiple contracts simultaneously.  The contractor’s and the 
Government’s goal is to find a homogeneous group of contracts solely involving a single 
closed appropriation.  To further reduce potential resistance, the contracts would ideally 
fall under the same budget activity or major sub-account.   
TACOM found the path of least resistance to be a settlement surrounding a single 
program, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, with hundreds of millions of dollars in 
originating obligations and contracts spanning back to the mid-1980s.112  Initial 
resistance was encountered when working within their comptroller community due to 
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concerns over mixing appropriations, or using one appropriation to pay for obligations 
originally intended to be provided by another appropriation.  However, by aligning the 
contracts within the same program and reaching a settlement condition that did not 
involve the transfer of funding to either party, resistance quickly changed to outright 
support for the method.113   
In this phase, there is very limited risk to both the contractor and the Government, 
yet incentives exist to clear the backlog of physically completed contracts in order to 
focus on new business.  Several contractors have expressed their desire to eliminate 
potential claims on current funding that may impact their accounts receivable if active 
appropriations are charged to settle expired appropriation monetary shortages.  Unlike the 
TACOM example, however, where the Army immediately moved to multiple fiscal years 
(FYs) and multiple appropriation settlements, the Navy should first attempt the 
methodology suggested in this phase to first prove the validity of the concept prior to 
moving to more complex settlements.  This is a true “WIN-WIN” situation and should be 
attempted as soon as possible.  This negotiated settlement seeks only administrative 
closure of multiple contracts with no money changing hands.  Both parties simply agree 
that the closure of the batch is in their mutual interests, and that they certify the contracts 
as closed, with no further payments or collections pending.  This method can conceivably 
progress to batching contracts under appropriations that remain active as well, due to the 
fact that there is some flexibility in reprogramming money between programs at the 
major command level.114 
2. Phase Two:  Increase the Pool 
Since money is not transferred between parties, there is little, if any risk involved 
in Phase One.  It simply offers the short-term successes required to develop and 
implement the procedures that are necessary to move into a more advanced state of batch 
processing contracts.  Once pilot programs have proven the concept, then it will be 
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possible to move into Phase Two: batch processing a negotiated settlement where money 
is exchanged after a negotiated agreement.  Like Phase One, batching contracts into 
homogeneous groups by appropriation and fiscal year would allow for easier accounting 
adjustments115 and serve as a further means to prove this more advanced concept before 
transitioning to revolutionary approaches to batching – Phase Three.   
Instead of complete focus on closed appropriations, as outlined in Phase One, 
expired and active accounts could also be considered for batch processing in Phase Two.  
DFAS representatives indicated that DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) 
provisions and previous GAO findings would likely limit their ability to process any 
other form of batch processing within the accounting system.  However, there was 
sufficient flexibility within their Vendor Pay and MOCAS systems to allow for flexibility 
in the fiscal processing of a settlement.116  Therefore, even though the current rules do 
not permit flexibility in settlement of reconciliation issues, the computer systems used by 
DCMA and DFAS to manage contracts through closure appear to be capable of 
accomplishing the transactions necessary to document batch processing settlements. 
Since there is some flexibility to move money within appropriations up to 
specified thresholds,117 this method of batching will allow for negotiated settlements that 
do not reach a ZERO-SUM result.  The contractor enters into the negotiation with 
multiple contracts and billable amounts.  The Government must consider the cost of 
individual closeout of each contract if a negotiated settlement cannot be achieved as a 
factor in its negotiating position.  Once closeout is negotiated for the batch, contracts can 
be annotated as closed within the acquisition files, all remaining active appropriations can 
be deobligated, and final notice of a negotiated settlement/final invoice notification can 
be sent to DFAS to complete closeout in the appropriate system.  In this procedure, a 
single contract modification, in the form of an MOA, citing all of the contracts closed in 
the batch and a single final voucher/collection voucher can be issued.   
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This Phase is significantly more complex, since it includes provisions for 
processing additional payments or collections.  Furthermore, this process requires the 
alignment of currently available replacement funds, since most of the appropriations for 
overaged contracts have long since closed.  Batch processing in Phase Two adds the 
ability to reach a final settlement amount that would be indicated on the settlement MOA.  
A final voucher would be forwarded to DFAS for final action once replacement funds 
were found and applied, or the contractor would forward payment if it owed the 
Government money from overpayments. 
3. Phase Three: Transformation through Batch Processing 
In the long-term, contracts involving multiple appropriations over multiple fiscal 
years could be negotiated for batch closeout.  To go even further, perhaps provision 
beyond financial reconciliation, such as outstanding property issues or patent/royalty 
issues, could also be resolved through inclusion of those contracts in a batch processing 
scheme.  As previously stated, the contractual relationship between the buying 
organization and the contractor extends, by definition, all the way through contract 
closure terms.  In negotiating the settlement of overaged contracts, both the Government 
and the contractor have an incentive to clear old business in order to concentrate on new 
services and procurements.  Due to limitations imposed by current fiscal law regarding 
appropriation purpose and period of availability, the best means of compliance with all 
applicable laws and fiscal management regulations is to arrive at a non-monetary solution 
during settlement negotiations for these complex batches.   
The Phase Three batch may involve multiple appropriations spanning multiple 
years but must be grouped in such a manner that all of the contracts involved settle with a 
ZERO-SUM solution in order to stay within statutory and regulatory guidelines.  Since 
no further disbursements or collections are necessary to achieve closure, no adjustments 
are required to cancelled, expired, or active appropriations. 
To reach true transformation, however, it should also be possible to make 
payments or collections on any negotiated settlement, regardless of whether the funding 




the Executive Branch through limitations on the period of availability, purpose, and 
amount of funding granted in an appropriation.  Since the intent of Congress has been 
fulfilled and the materials or services in question have long-since been received and paid 
for, additional flexibility in the final resolution of those appropriations should be granted.  
Several options are available to facilitate this type of payment, but these options involve 
changes to the financial management system, which is beyond the scope of this study.  
However, major commands within and outside of DoD are managing their funds in a 
manner that facilitates the availability of replacement funds.  For example, the Army 
Material Command (AMC) conducts monthly reviews of expiring funds and recoups all 
remaining balances early in the final year of their availability.118  At the Service level, the 
Army then moves to recoup all of the major commands’ balances on expiring accounts by 
mid-year, and uses them to fund Army-wide requirements and/or contracts that require 
replacement funds.  Reviews are conducted quarterly to examine all fiscal year 
obligations potentially available for recoupment.119  Using this procedure, during the last 
several years, the Army has only lost approximately $1,000,000 due to appropriation 
closure, which could have been used to pay the Service’s overaged obligations.  By 
contrast, the Navy’s figure is closer to $500,000,000 with nearly $50,000,000 in 
replacement funds required to pay for prior year obligations.120  AMC’s total was nearly 
zero.121  AMC attributes the increased visibility of expiring funds as a major reason for 
the successful effort in closing nearly 2,500 contracts during 2002.122  The Department of 
Energy has a similar system in which they constantly review contracts for available funds 
and then pool them at the agency level to be used as replacement funds.123  The Navy 
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may wish to consider a similar system in order to place additional emphasis on recouping 
funds prior to their closure, and use these pools to pay overaged obligations.124 
4. Creation of Enhanced Reprogramming and Transfer Authority 
One of the most prevalent problems in the closeout of overaged contracts is the 
lack of timely application of replacement funds to cover any remaining balances on those 
contracts.125  Since the majority of overaged accounts involve expired appropriations,126 
DoD must utilize funds currently available for new obligations, thus use current funding 
instead of the appropriations originally intended for that purpose.  Each year, the Navy 
allows nearly $500,000,000 worth of expired funds to close because it was left obligated 
on overaged contracts within MOCAS.127  Ideally, a pooled account with very limited 
purpose and scope could be created that draws from appropriations in their last year of 
availability prior to being closed.  This pool could be used to pay for overaged 
obligations for only those contracts currently residing in MOCAS CAR Section 2.  The 
alternative is to continue creating uncertainty in budget activities and procurement 
programs as more contracts are being reviewed for closure, resulting in the requirement 
for active replacement funds to make final payment to close old contracts.  Although a 
pooled account would be ideal as a means of accomplishing batch processing payments 
from expiring and closing accounts, it likely to be hotly contested by Congress due to the 
lessons learned from the closure of the “M” account in the early 1990s. 
In accordance with 31 U.S.C Section 1557, a pooled limited purpose account is 
possible under current fiscal law.  This law also provides limited reprogramming and 
transfer authority to major commands to enhance efficiency in the expenditure of funds.  
It also recognizes that some flexibility is required in executing programs, and has 
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therefore provided a limited means to move money between budget lines.128  For some 
appropriations, such as those involving expired accounts, reprogramming limits have 
likely already been reached.  As such, DoD must request extraordinary transfer and 
reprogramming authority in order to facilitate the closure of contracts within MOCAS 
CAR Section 2, and request permission to reprogram funding obligated on those 
contracts to facilitate closeout actions. 
Within current fiscal law, appropriations may be used for new obligations for a 
period of one to five years, depending upon the specific appropriation.  After that period, 
the appropriation expires and remains expired for a period of five years.  During the 
period of expiration, the appropriation may not be used for new obligations, but may be 
expended from obligations made during the initial period of availability.  After the 
expiration period, appropriations close (or lapse) and are no longer available for 
expenditures.129  All remaining balances are then cancelled and removed from DoD 
budget holders.  A provision exists, however, to allow agencies to seek Congressional 
permission to extend funds where it makes economic sense.  The statute indicates, 
Congress may, by specific legislation, exempt an appropriation from the 
above rules and may otherwise fix the period of its availability for 
expenditure under 31 USC 1551(b), 1557.  An agency should consider 
seeking an exemption if it administers a program which by its nature 
requires disbursements beyond the five-year period. One form of 
exemption simply preserves the availability for disbursement of previously 
obligated funds.130 
Consideration should be given to extending this concept to include enhanced 
reprogramming and transfer authority to move available balances from all appropriations 
nearing their expiration and use them where needed solely for the purpose of 
accomplishing closeout actions.  The availability of these funds should be extended to six 
additional years to cover the period GAO anticipates is required to eliminate the current 
                                                 
128 GAO Principle of Federal Appropriations Law, July 1991, Volume I, Ch5C. 
129 Practical Financial Management: A Handbook of Practical Financial Management Topics for the 
DoD Financial Manager, March 2003. 




backlog of overaged contracts.  As stated, the nature of the reprogramming may only be 
used for the purpose of closing out contracts in MOCAS CAR Section 2.  Such limitation 
would allay fears of misuse, as well as eliminate the potential to use to pay for programs 
not specifically authorized or fully funded by Congress.  As the above statute indicates, 
Congress may adjust appropriation rules in special cases where additional flexibility is 
necessary for more efficient expenditure of DoD funding and can make this adjustment 
by granting an exemption in the next Defense Appropriations Bill. 
DoD should apply to Congress for extraordinary transfer and reprogramming 
authority to permit DoD to combine appropriation balances in their last year of 
availability, and utilize those funds for the necessary six-year period to close all overaged 
contracts in the backlog.  However, if batch processing and other recommendations such 
as the SPT concept from this report are incorporated, this period could be significantly 
shortened.  DoD could then use that enhanced authority to accomplish the payment of all 
unliquidated claims on overaged contracts.  After a period of six years, an audit could be 
conducted to ensure the reprogrammed funds were utilized solely for the purpose of 
closing out contracts already within MOCAS CAR Section 2 on the date the exemption 
took effect.  Only contracts within the current physically complete but not yet closed 
section would fall under this provision for using that authority.  Such a rule would 
eliminate potential “gaming” of the system under a pooled account as well as what 
occurred under the pre-1991 merged-account that was closed by Congress due to severe 
mismanagement.131  With safeguards put into the language of the relief provision, this 
manner of more efficiently utilizing DoD-assigned resources would aid in the resolution 
of many of the funding issues that arise for overaged contracts.  Once overaged contracts 
have been eliminated, a focus on active appropriation contracts can occur to more 
efficiently reconcile those contracts and recoup those active funds for reuse in their 
respective programs.   
 
 
                                                 




5. Drawbacks to Batch Processing 
Batch processing is not a panacea for eliminating the backlog of physically 
completed contracts, although it does offer one method for expediting closeout efforts.  
Many contracts will not be eligible for the process due to pending FAR-required closeout 
actions, lack of a viable means of establishing a workable batch, or mixtures of active, 
expired, or closed funds on the same contract.  In some cases, the Government and the 
contractor may not agree, or one of the parties may seek to gain advantage in the batch 
negotiation vice to simply settle for an administrative closeout. 
Additional factors such as perceived forgiveness of vendor debt may also be 
raised, although a strong business case could certainly be made that the vendor’s debt is 
not being forgiven, merely balanced out by other contracts where the Government may 
owe the contractor their billable amounts plus any interest that may have accrued.  This 
concern is addressed in the different phases by recommending a ZERO-SUM result of 
any negotiation.  The Government would not forgive debt; merely balance the debt with 
payable amounts to reach an equitable aggregate solution.  Careful consideration to the 
“Bona Fide Need Rule” and the Anti-Deficiency Act132 must also be given to ensure that 
these important statutory guidelines are not violated at any stage.  Although there are 
drawbacks to the batch processing method, it provides one means to tackle the 
tremendous inventory of contracts in MOCAS CAR Section 2.  The concept adheres to 
the principles addressed in the FAR and the first two Phases remain within the bounds of 
existing statutory guidance.  As evidenced by the success TACOM has had in 
implementing a batched negotiated settlement, resulting in a solution involving no 
pecuniary consideration, the Navy could also benefit from this new approach to contract 
closeout, and take strides in reducing the backlog.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In summary, we recommend the immediate implementation of Phase One batch 
processing initiative to prove the concept and establish procedures that will aid in moving 
on to other phases.  Several contractors should be contacted to discuss the viability of this 





method of negotiated settlement.  Batch processing offers a negotiated settlement option 
to close complex contracts that would otherwise require thousands of hours in 
reconciliation efforts to reach a “to the penny” accounting of all contract transactions.  
This method takes into account the costs to the Government and to the contractor in 
affecting closeout. 
In addition, more proactive financial management reviews of unliquidated 
balances in obligated funds should be conducted.  Improved oversight will increase the 
likelihood that funds will be removed from contracts as they become available, vice 
waiting until they are nearer to expiration before being considered for deobligation.  In 
addition, the Navy should, in concert with other Services, seek exceptional 
reprogramming and transfer authority under 31 U.S.C. 1557 that is strictly limited to 
applying replacement funds to overaged contracts.  As indicated, the Department of 
Energy uses expired funds to pay obligations on physically completed contracts prior to 
the funds being closed.  This can be used as a model for developing a similar system 
within the Navy.   
Current limits placed upon reprogramming and realignment of program funding is 
necessary in the front-end and administration of program activities, but once contract 
closeout is involved, the large degree of uncertainty regarding contract reconciliation 
calls for greater flexibility in managing funds.  The goal is to close the Governments 
contracts in an efficient and cost-effective manner rather than to rely on a “to the penny” 





























V. PAYMENT ISSUES 
This chapter discusses several issues relating to contract payment including: 
Accounting Classification Reference Number (ACRN) issues, contract reconciliation, and 
payment of final invoices using the Government purchase card.  Payment related reason 
codes account for 20% of the contracts in the closeout backlog in the Navy’s February 
2003 MOCAS database.  A 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report illustrates the 
magnitude of this issue: 
...$147 million of unliquidated operating obligations was inaccurately 
recorded because of problem disbursements—payments not properly 
matched to the correct obligation. A further $330 million was inaccurately 
recorded due to unresolved errors, such as bills that were not processed 
properly.133 
Through discussion and recommendations, this chapter addresses process changes 
that could improve the efficiency of contract closeout. 
A. ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION REFERENCE NUMBER AND 
CONTRACT RECONCILIATION 
The purpose of this section is to discuss contract closeout issues relating to 
ACRNs and reconciliation.  Reconciliation is an element of the contract funds review, a 
closeout step listed in the FAR.134  Reconciliation is a Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS) requirement to compare and reconcile balances in MOCAS to the 
balances shown in the accounting records prior to pulling back any remaining funds and 
closing MOCAS.  The process of reconciling contract records includes analyzing, 
verifying, and correcting obligation and disbursement records at the payment office, 
buying activity, contract administration office, and accounting station to ensure 
concurrent accuracy.   
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The main root cause of reconciliation issues lays in the way Department of 
Defense (DoD) funds and structures contracts.  Therefore, our recommendations are 
centered on up-front actions, rather than changes to the closeout process itself.   
Analysis of the MOCAS database shows that reason code P, ‘Reconciliation with 
the paying office and contractor being accomplished,’ is the fifth largest statistical reason 
overaged contracts have not closed.  Within this population of contracts, 54.5% are Firm-
Fixed-Price (FFP) and 28.2% are Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF).  Close to thirty-eight 
percent of the contracts in this status are below $100,000, and thirty percent are above 
$5,000,000. 
While reason code P does not represent the largest percentage of the overaged 
backlog, it was one of the top reasons Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs) 
indicated that prevent timely closeout, and one of the areas of highest frustration.135  
Reconciliation is also important because it must be done before a contractor can be paid, 
and/or before funds can be deobligated from the contract.  It can also represent a large 
manpower cost.   
DoD estimates that it will take 2,300 staff hours to correct the accounting 
records for this large contract alone and over 21,000 staff hours (10 staff 
years) to correct the accounting for all of the affected fiscal year 2000 
transactions.  The substantial time and resources it takes to sort through 
DoD’s complex accounting processes to correct these types of errors is yet 
another reason why DoD has to ensure that it accurately records 
transactions the first time around.136 
After a brief background discussion, ACRN issues are discussed, followed by 
reconciliation issues.  The section concludes with our recommendations.   
1. Background 
Payment issues were identified as one of the major reasons contracts become 
overaged.137  Although DFAS is responsible for processing the contractor's final invoice 
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and issuing the check or electronic funds transfer for payment,138 changes in 
appropriation law have made payment of the final invoice a very challenging endeavor.  
Enactment of Public Law 101-510 on 5 November 1990 significantly changed DoD’s 
procedures and guidelines for access and disposition of the expired and closed 
appropriations under a new definition for expired and closed appropriation accounts.  
The legislation required the development of new management procedures to process 
upward obligation adjustments against the expired and closed appropriations and 
eliminated the notorious “Merged” or “M-Account” that was used to pool deobligated 
funds.  In its place, restrictions were placed on the period of availability for funds and set 
a definitive life for every appropriation, after which the appropriation closes, or lapses.  
The methods implemented to adhere to those appropriation requirements have led to a 
plethora of obligation adjustments that contribute to inaccurate or delayed payments and 
untimely contract closeout.139   
2. Accounting Classification Reference Number Issues 
One of the most significant payment issues arises when DFAS is unable to make a 
payment on an invoice due to insufficient funds on a particular ACRN.140  Although 
procedures were put into place following a 2001 GAO recommendation to require pre-
validation of the availability of funds prior to their release for contract payment, research 
indicates that this problem is encountered in up to one third of all payment actions being 
processed.141  Under the recommendation, DFAS requests written approval and 
certification from the Funds Manager (FM) prior to making the payment.142  This 
additional step causes a delay on the payment of the invoice that could result in interest 
payments to the contractor143 due to potential violation of the Prompt Payment Act.144  
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Per DFAS representatives, a great deal of money is lost to Prompt Payment interest due 
to the fact that funding does not lie in the account specified for payment.145 
While the appropriation is in an expired status, upward obligation adjustments 
may be made, subject to the provisions of the upward obligation adjustment approval 
process and the availability of appropriation balances to fund the adjustment.146  If the 
appropriation has been closed, however, upward obligation adjustments are charged to a 
current year appropriation available for the same purpose.147  Upward obligation 
adjustments requiring current year appropriation funding are subject to a limitation of one 
percent of the current year appropriation and a requirement not to exceed the total 
availability of the closed account.  Exceeding the above limitations is an Anti-Deficiency 
Act violation.148  
The reason ACRN issues arise is not necessarily due to carelessness on the part of 
any of the organizations involved, but it is due to the sheer method DFAS uses to affect 
payment on different ACRNs.  In the absence of payment instructions in the contract, the 
payment office makes payments on a prorated basis, which is the DFAS default method 
of payment.  Under this method there can be a number of ACRNs assigned to a specific 
Contract Line Item Number (CLIN).  If there are multiple ACRNs under a CLIN, a very 
common occurrence, DFAS will pay the invoice under that CLIN using a prorated 
amount based on the percentage of the total funding available under each ACRN.  
According to both payment office and contracting office personnel, such a method is 
exceptionally difficult to track for specific charges against each appropriation and 
frequently leaves unexpended amounts on most of the ACRNs assigned.149  In addition, a 
modification to the contract that would add or remove funding would cause a change to 
the prorated percentage for each ACRN thereby creating complex reconciliation issues.   
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A work around method adopted by many commands is the inclusion of specific 
payment instructions within the contract.  One such work around is the request to affect 
payment on the oldest available ACRN until the funds are exhausted, then to move on to 
the next until all funds are used for that CLIN.150  Quite often CLINs are modified 
throughout the life of the contract requiring an adjustment for invoice payment under the 
prorated method.  In some cases these CLIN modifications do not make it to the payment 
office resulting in disbursement mismatches between the payment office and the 
accounting office records.151  
The prorated method of payment frequently results in a particular ACRN being 
charged when it may not have applied, and once an invoice arrives with specific 
instructions to pay on that ACRN, sufficient funds are not available since it was 
previously charged under a prorated payment.  Without sufficient funds, a full 
reconciliation of the contract’s payment history is required by DFAS and additional or 
replacement funds will be requested from the buying activity.  According to DFAS152, 
requesting and receiving additional funds could be a lengthy process because of the time 
it takes the funding office to make those funds available.  This delay frequently results in 
the contractor receiving additional money on interest due to the late payment provisions 
of the Prompt Payment Act. 
A recent GAO audit found that many of the contracts containing a provision to 
pay from oldest funds first created multiple payments on ACRNs without any funds 
remaining in them, causing numerous accounting adjustments and potential problems in 
violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.153  The finding recommended that the proration 
method of payment was the best one to ensure that such over-charging of ACRNs would 
not occur.  We believe GAO should have recommended pre-validation of available funds 
to ensure adequate funding, and then billing against specific ACRNs would be far more 
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accurate.  Each ACRN could then be specifically charged up to the amount 
intended/required by the invoice, or remaining funding could be pulled back for reuse at a 
far earlier date and with far more accuracy than via the proration method.  In fact, the 
proration method almost guarantees a problem in final reconciliation due to variability of 
issues that could affect the proportion of funds being applied for the proration.   
3. Reconciliation Issues 
Prior to forwarding contracts to DFAS for final contract closeout in MOCAS, 
ACOs review all contract file documents to include items that have not been billed, 
incorrect quantities, and other matters concerning shipments and payments.154  Contract 
closeout includes the necessary actions required to permanently close contracts in both 
MOCAS and the various accounting systems in operation at DFAS and the buying 
commands.  As mentioned in the introduction, reconciliation of contracts is a DFAS 
requirement to compare and reconcile balances in MOCAS to the balances shown in the 
accounting records by each accounting line and then ensure that all billable amounts have 
been properly paid prior to pulling back any remaining funds and closing the contract file 
in MOCAS.155  
The process of reconciling contract records includes analyzing, verifying, and 
correcting obligation and disbursement records at the payment office, buying activity, 
contract administration office, and accounting station to ensure concurrent accuracy.  All 
of these systems perform related but distinct functions throughout a contract's life;156 data 
in these multiple systems are often not concurrently accurate due to the inability of many 
of the systems to communicate in real-time.157  Interviews with field personnel at the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) in San Diego and DFAS offices in 
Columbus and San Diego158 revealed that many of the problems found in contract 
reconciliation occur during contract award due to poorly worded contract terms, mixed 
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contract types (CPFF and FFP features combined), poor payment instructions to DFAS in 
conjunction with different contract payment specialists involved with one specific 
contract,159 and poorly defined payment procedures for the contractor to follow.  When 
combined with frequent modifications, dozens of CLINs, and multiple ACRNs under and 
between CLINs, it is not difficult to see how frequent errors in payment can occur and go 
undetected until final reconciliation is accomplished. 
The current method of MOCAS reconciliation utilizes an automated program, 
Contract Reconciliation System (CRS).160  This system is used to compare data from the 
accounting station and payment office to identify any discrepancies.  CRS identifies 
discrepancies in obligation and disbursing information that result in unmatched 
disbursements such as excess funds or unliquidated obligations (ULOs) and negative 
unliquidated obligations (NULOs).  When required, further manual research is conducted 
on the individual transactions to determine the nature and source of the discrepancy.  This 
research involves reviewing source documents, e.g., contracts, modifications, payment 
registers, payment vouchers, etc., to learn what should have been recorded, and then 
recommending the appropriate correction or adjustment to bring the account back into 
balance and allow closure.  As was discovered during GAO audits, reconciliation of some 
overaged contracts will likely take in excess of two years to complete given the hundreds 
of modifications and the proliferation of CLINs, sub-CLINs, ACRNs and various 
methods of payment being applied.161  
Contractors, DCMA, and buying organizations must frequently become involved 
in researching contract reconciliation issues and resolving problems between accounting 
lines.  When requested by contractors, ACOs provide them with a copy of the MOCAS 
disbursement and obligation histories to assist in the reconciliation.  Often the contractor 
does not receive any consideration for the additional research or re-work required to 
reconcile a contract to facilitate final payment or closure of a contract.  Although such 
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costs are difficult to ascertain for the contractor, our research indicates that contractors 
often spend at least as much time reconciling contracts as Government personnel do, 
therefore implying that thousands of man-hours of effort are required in some of the most 
complex contracts. 
Normally, most ULOs are resolved without causing major delays in the 
process.162  However, when remaining funds reside on the contract or ULOs exist that 
cannot be explained, full reconciliation may be required.  DFAS frequently receives an 
invoice for payment and during pre-validation discovers that there is a NULO at the 
ACRN level to pay the invoice.  Pre-validation does not validate that payment will be 
made against the correct ACRN;163 it merely ensures that adequate funds are in place 
under the ACRN being cited on the invoice.  Adjustments are usually made by the ACO 
to correct the problem by sending DFAS an explanation for the discrepancy and the 
action required to correct the discrepancy.164  It is important to remember that adjustment 
requests are handled differently than a request for a full reconciliation.  A request for a 
full reconciliation is required when the ACO cannot identify the disbursement 
problem.165  NULOs are created when canceled funds have inadvertently been applied or 
payment of invoices was made citing the incorrect ACRN, as is often the case when the 
prorated payment method is used, as discussed in the previous section.   
Full reconciliation may take from a few hours to several months to complete.166  
Our research found that full reconciliation is the third main reason code cited for 
overaged contracts in MOCAS,167 resulting in an increase in the contract closeout 
backlog and the canceling of the respective contract’s appropriated funds.  Historically, 
ACOs have deferred final contract closeout until both the procurement system and 
accounting system records were reconciled.  It is critical that the ACO work closely with 
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DFAS during contract performance and arrange quarterly reviews of payments that have 
occurred to ensure obligations were accurately processed.  Such proactive efforts would 
go a long way in precluding final payment issues that will otherwise remain undetected 
until the contract moves into MOCAS CAR Section 2 for closeout.168    
4. Recommendations and Conclusion  
The Department of Defense should relax funding rules and change invoice 
submission requirements to enable DFAS and DCMA to realign disbursements by ACRN 
to eliminate or minimize ULOs and NULOs.  Three alternatives could be: (1) to assign 
one ACRN per CLIN, (2) to allow payments from the contracts oldest ACRN first to 
avoid closing of funds, and (3) ACRN and CLIN designation on contract invoices.  
DFAS should monitor and provide monthly reports to funds managers identifying 
outstanding requests for current year funding.  Continuous communication between 
financial managers and different DFAS groups is very important throughout the entire 
life of the contract.   
Agencies should require contracting officers within buying commands to conduct 
pre-award consultation with the applicable DCMA office, funding office, and DFAS 
payment personnel to ensure that contract administrative requirements and payment terms 
are clearly laid out in the contract.  At a minimum, a pre-award consultation should be 
required on all large procurements since they are most likely to eventually flow into an 
overaged status in MOCAS.  The Integrated Product Team (IPT) process is working in all 
other elements of DoD acquisition programs, yet it has yet to be adopted at one of the 
points that can have the most impact.   
Agencies should require buying activities to initiate monthly ULO/NULO reviews 
at the buying activity level and quarterly reviews at the Service level.  Funds should be 
deobligated in the final year of availability and turned over to a Service-level Comptroller 
Office to provide replacement funding where it is most needed.  A similar Army’s 
                                                 




financial review process lost only $1,000,000 in closing funds Service-wide last year 
compared to the Navy’s potential loss of $522,800,000.169 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense- Comptroller (OSD-C) should revise its 
policy for assigning ACRNs in order to reduce their proliferation and to keep payment 
terms as simple as possible.  Also training between the contracting officers in the buying 
commands and the Comptroller’s Office or funding office personnel must address the 
importance of reducing the number of CLINs and ACRNs assigned within a contract.  
CLIN/ACRN proliferation is a major cause of final reconciliation problems and creates 
far more complexity in resolution than is necessary.  
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition (ASN (RD&A)) should draft new clauses to the FAR that require contractors 
to submit invoices annotated with billable amounts per ACRN and change the payment 
voucher format to reflect ACRN annotations. 
Agencies should require that all contracts specify payment instructions for DFAS 
in order to reduce the problems caused by the prorated method of charging ACRNs, 
which is the default method of payment when multiple ACRNs are assigned to the 
contract.  Such action would alleviate many of the reconciliation issues that arise in 
contract closeout. 
The DoD should relax funding rules and change invoice submission requirements 
to enable DFAS and DCMA to realign disbursements by ACRN to eliminate or minimize 
ULOs and NULOs.   
DFAS should change the default method of payment from a prorated method for 
multiple ACRNs to an “oldest applicable funding first” method.  This would allow DFAS 
to zero an older ACRN prior to moving on to the next available ACRN, thus eliminating 
minor balances on each ACRN in using the proration method.  This would also reduce 
the number of pull-back actions required and allow for the more efficient use of contract 
funds. 
                                                 




DFAS should assign one contract payment specialist or a specialist team to handle 
all payment issues related to a specific contract, especially for complex or mixed-type 
contracts.  This will allow the payment specialist to be completely familiar with the 
contract throughout the entire contract’s life and solve any payment issues immediately 
making reconciliation easier and shorter. 
Both obligation and disbursement information must be accurately recorded in the 
accounting system before the accounting station can retire their files.  Given the current 
backlog, cooperation between all parties is more critical than ever and will encourage 
timely dialogue and data correction in order to minimize surprises that may appear once a 
contract becomes physically complete and closeout action commences.  Beginning with 
pre-award, contracting must become a multi-functional effort to encourage 
communication between the buying office, the ACO, auditors, and DFAS payment and 
accounting representatives.  This will ensure that contract payment instructions are 
understood by everyone involved in the payment processes and that the contract terms 
and conditions are understood by everyone involved in the reconciliation as well as in the 
overall closeout process. 
B. FINAL INVOICES 
The purpose of this section is to discuss contract closeout issues relating to 
untimely submission of final invoices.  Final invoices are also called “final vouchers” or 
“completion vouchers.”  These terms will be used throughout this section, but all refer to 
the same document, the “final bill.”  The final invoice is the last invoice a contractor 
submits for payment of a contract.  For contracts that have had progress payments, 
performance based payments, or commercial item financing, the final invoice typically 
includes the total contract cost, total amount previously billed, and the balance or credit 
due.170  For contracts that have not had contract financing, the “final invoice” may be the 
only invoice submitted against the contract.  For financed contracts, the completion 
voucher must be marked accordingly, indicating that it is the last invoice.  Additionally, 
                                                 




final invoices must be accompanied by documentation that includes ACO approval, the 
contractor’s release, and the Audit Report/Closing Statements.171 
Due to the time value of money, it can be argued that delays in contractor 
submission of invoices actually benefit the Government, since the money remains in the 
Treasury.  However, this is a macro viewpoint, from the perspective of the United States 
Treasury.  On the contrary, since the Congress appropriates money by fiscal year with 
time limitations, untimely submission of invoices creates unfair risk on the requiring 
activity, especially if they must use active funds to pay for prior year obligations that 
have closed.  This could occur if the contractor does not submit the final invoice in a 
timely manner.  The risk is compounded since the FAR does not include a statute of 
limitations on submission of final invoices.  Without such a statute, requiring activities 
must keep unliquidated funds, equal to the amount of the expected final payment, 
obligated on the contract until the funds either lapse or the contractor waives the right to 
payment and the contract is closed.  Ironically, as Chapter III stated, untimely submission 
of final invoices also creates risk on the contractor community.  If active funds are used 
to pay liabilities against closed accounts, the money usually comes from current 
programs.  These programs then have fewer available funds to obligate on current or 
pending contracts.      
Figure 16 illustrates the liability risks that the Navy incurs by fiscal year (FY).  
The first column shows the amount of funds that are in the last year of their expiration 
period and will close at the end of the FY.  The second column shows the potential 
liability that could be incurred against current funds because contracts were not closed 
before funds lapsed.  In other words, there are unsettled liabilities on these open contracts 
that could result in expenditure of current year funds.  The third column shows the 
amount of active funds that were expended due to liabilities incurred on lapsed funds.  
The amounts shown in the chart are not solely caused by contractors’ failure to submit 
                                                 





final invoices.  Nevertheless, as part of the contract closeout process, contractors’ failure 
to submit final invoices contributes to the dilemma illustrated by the graph.   
FAR changes could reduce this risk as well as reduce the queue time involved in 
contract closeout.  Up-front actions, in the form of local clauses and provisions, could 
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FY99 $577,422 $394,151 $43,489
FY00 $442,339 $253,613 $42,764
FY01 $447,093 $276,605 $14,844
FY02 $522,806 $143,582 $40,585
FY03 $465,108
Dollar Figures in Thousands





Source:  ASN(RD&A), Presentation to MOCAS Closeout Executive Group 
 
Figure 16.   Liability Risks Navy Incurs by Fiscal Year (FY). 
 
1. Review of MOCAS Statistics  
Analysis of the February 2003 download of MOCAS CAR Section 2 indicates 
that approximately 16% of the contracts have not closed because the contractor has not 
submitted the final invoice (reason code A).  This percentage corresponds to 7,432 
contracts.172  The surprising statistics appear when analyzing overaged contracts.  Of the 
overaged population, 3,679 contracts, or 31.5%, have not closed because the contractor 
                                                 




has not submitted the final invoice.  For overaged contracts, submission of final invoice is 
the number one reason causing contracts to remain open in MOCAS, surpassing reason 
code M (negotiation of final overhead rates).  It should be noted that approximately 400 
of these overaged contracts in this reason code are FFP contracts, corresponding to ten 
percent of the population.  Furthermore, nearly half of the contracts are under $100,000; 
three quarters of this population are under $500,000.173  These are important facts 
because they show that significant effort must be expended for closing contracts that 
intuitively might seem easy to close.  
2. Background 
In direct response to the statistics presented in the previous section, the FAR was 
changed in February 2002 to explicitly allow contracting officers the authority to 
unilaterally modify contracts to reflect settled amounts and rates if a final invoice was not 
submitted.174  The change also outlined extenuating circumstances that may cause the 
untimely submission of the final voucher, 
(b) Within 120 days (or longer period, if approved in writing by the 
contracting officer), after settlement of the final annual indirect cost rates 
for all years of a physically complete contract, the contractor must submit 
a completion invoice or voucher reflecting the settled amounts and rates.  
To determine whether a period longer than 120 days is appropriate, the 
contracting officer should consider whether there are extenuating 
circumstances, such as the following: 
(1) Pending closeout of subcontracts awaiting Government audit. 
(2) Pending contractor, subcontractor, or Government claims. 
(3) Delays in the disposition of Government property. 
(4) Delays in contract reconciliation. 
(5) Any other pertinent factors.  
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(c) If the contractor fails to submit a completion invoice or voucher within 
the time specified in paragraph (b) of this section, the contracting officer 
may— 
(1) Determine the amounts due to the contractor under the contract;  
(2) Record this determination in a unilateral modification to the 
contract. 
(3) This contracting officer determination must be issued as a final 
decision in accordance with 33.21.175 
Through analysis of both MOCAS CAR Section 2 contracts and overaged 
contracts, it appears this change to the FAR has had little effect.  As illustrated by Figure 
17, the amount of contracts that have not closed due to final submission of invoices is 
following the same trend as the total rate of contract closure.  A correlation coefficient of 
these two data sets is .9658, showing the close relationship between the two trends.  The 
expectation is that rate of decrease of the “Reason Code A” trend line would be greater 
than the slope of the total contract closure rate, if the FAR change was widely 
implemented.  This expectation especially holds true for overaged contracts.  Figure 18 
shows MOCAS reason code A trend compared to overaged contracts.  The correlation 
coefficient of these two data sets is .9525, again indicating a strong relationship.  The 
change to the FAR has the most applicability to the overaged population of contracts.  
Since the FAR change took effect in February 2002, widespread implementation of this 
procedure should result in the reason code A trend line decreasing at a faster rate than the 
overaged contract line trend.  However, this is not the case.  Interviews with ACOs 
revealed that the use of the authority granted in the FAR is discouraged because of 
possible claims.176  Furthermore, the current practice, sending contractors notifications of 
intent to unilaterally modify the contract, and granting contractors extra time to submit 
the final voucher, has created a disincentive for the contracting community due to the 
extra work involved.   
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Total 51,722 52,541 52,359 52,382 51,117 50,737 49,787 49,188 49,026 49,384 48,285 47,984 47,786
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Total 28,176 27,577 26,533 25,317 23,807 23,068 21,857 19,073 16,592 14,986 13,157 11,616 11,673
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Feb 02 Mar 02 Apr 02 May 02 Jun 02 Jul 02 Aug 02 Sep 02 Oct 02 Nov 02 Dec 02 Jan 03 Feb 03
 
Source:  Developed by the Authors 
 
Figure 18.   Overaged Contracts – Reason Code A Trends. 
 
3. Root Causes 
Research revealed that the causes of delay in submission of final invoices were 
similar to those extenuating circumstances mentioned in the FAR: waiting for a DCAA 
assist audit of final indirect costs on subcontractors, waiting for subcontractors’ actions, 
and waiting for audit of final overhead rates.177  However, two other causes not 




                                                 




x The contractor has been sufficiently paid through contract financing and 
the cost of preparing the final invoice is more than the final payment that 
would be received, or no balance is due.178  
x The contractor owes the Government money.179 
These two situations apply to all types of contracts, not just flexibly priced 
contracts.  Since the sections of the FAR that were changed related to cost-type 
contracts,180 contracting officers may not realize their authority to determine final 
voucher payments on other contract types.  However, the ruling states: “Contracting 
officers already have the authority to determine final voucher payment amounts and issue 
final decisions…the new language in this rule makes that authority explicit.”181  Without 
explicit language applying to all types of contracts, contracting officers might not use this 
authority on other than cost-reimbursement contracts that remain open due to a 
contractor’s failure to submit a final invoice.  
Other than the 120 days stated in FAR182 relating to cost-type contracts, a review 
of the other FAR sections and clauses applicable to invoicing and payments reveal that 
there is no time standard or statute of limitations for contractors to submit invoices.  This 
may be another cause of late submission.  This lack of time standard places unfair risk on 
the requiring activity, since they must cover these “accounts payable.”  Furthermore, 
without a statute of limitations on final invoicing, the requiring activity incurs a risk of 
expenditure of current funds for obligations in prior years, or incurs a risk of missing an 
opportunity to deobligate excess active funds if obligations exceed the final contract 
amount.  
The precedent for a statute of limitations on time standards for submitting 
invoices exists.  “If there is no applicable statute of limitations, and no indication that the 
absence means that Congress doesn’t want one in that particular context, an agency may 
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include a reasonable limitation period administratively by regulation or contract…A 
statute of limitations may use varying terminology to make its point. Ideally, it will use 
language like ‘received by’ which leaves no room for interpretation.”183 
4. Recommendations and Conclusion  
We recommend that all FAR sections and clauses relating to payments and 
invoicing include a 120-day period (or longer if approved in writing by the contracting 
officer) for submission of final invoice following either (1) physical completion, or (2) 
determination of final indirect cost rates.  We further recommend including language in 
the FAR granting explicit authority for contracting officers to determine final voucher 
amounts for all contracts, not just contracts with indirect cost rates.  We recommend 
implementing a statute of limitations of four years following physical completion for 
submission of final invoices, excluding cases where the Government caused the delay.  
After this four-year period, the contract would “automatically close.”   
There is already a precedent set in the FAR placing a statute of limitations of six 
years on disputes.184  We recommend that four years be the maximum allowable time for 
a contractor to submit an invoice, short of a Government caused delay.  This allows the 
contract to close before the funds lapse.  The same effect could be achieved through an 
up-front action of including this language to this effect in local clauses and provisions to 
be included in future contract awards.   
We also recommend that timely submission of final invoices be part of the 
contractor’s past performance evaluation.  Failing to submit, or untimely submission of a 
final invoice is an indication of the contractor’s cooperation level, and this should be 
noted in their performance history.   
Finally, we recommend that contracting officers analyze their overaged contracts 
and use the authority granted by the FAR where there are no other pending actions or 
extenuating circumstances, and close the contracts.   
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While there are extraneous factors that preclude timely submission of completion 
vouchers, a universal 120-day rule would reduce contract closeout time by limiting queue 
time.  The statute of limitations would limit the requiring activity’s liability to pay 
invoices with current year funds that should have been paid with funds obligated in prior 
years.  It also provides an “automatic close” function to prevent large backlogs of 
overaged contracts. 
C. CONTRACT PAYMENTS USING THE GOVERNMENT PURCHASE 
CARD 
This section does not directly address problems associated with contract closeout.  
Instead, it outlines potential benefits of using the Government purchase card to pay 
contracts during the closeout procedure.  The objective of using the purchase card as a 
payment method is to reduce some of the payment related issues discussed earlier in this 
report.  It could also be used as the payment method for Phase Two Batch Processing, 
discussed in Chapter IV, eliminating potential problems associated with DFAS payment 
systems by using this process.  If the card was used to pay the batched negotiated 
settlement, DFAS could manually zero-out the contracts in the appropriate payment 
system rather than trying to associate payments from several contracts on one payment 
voucher, a practice that has proven to cause reconciliation problems.   
While this study generally addresses contract closeout issues relating to DCMA 
and the Navy, this section is applicable to any Contract Management Office (CMO) that 
closes contracts.  As such, we will refer to the official responsible for contract closeout as 
the Cognizant Contracting Officer (CKO) unless specifically addressing ACOs within 
DCMA.   
This section begins with a discussion of authority to use the card, followed by a 
brief case study to show the success some contracting organizations are having using this 
payment method.  Benefits, costs, and risks are then discussed.  Concluding the section, 
we recommend CMOs conduct cost-benefit analysis to determine the conditions in which 







The FAR provides the authority for contracting officers to pay contracts.  It 
outlines 70 contract administration functions, three of which are related to contract 
payments: 
x Determine the allowability of costs suspended or disapproved as required, 
direct the suspension or disapproval of costs when there is reason to 
believe they should be suspended or disapproved, and approve final 
vouchers  
x Make payments on assigned contracts when prescribed in agency 
acquisition regulations. 
x Analyze quarterly limitation on payments statements and recover 
overpayments from the contractor.185 
The FAR states that the purchase card may be used to make payments, when the 
contractor agrees to accept payment by the card.186   
The DoD uses three primary systems to pay vendors: (1) MOCAS, (2) Vendor 
Pay, and (3) Government purchase card.  The first two payment systems are managed by 
DFAS.  The purchase card is the only option that contracting officers have to exercise 
their payment authority granted by the FAR without direct DFAS support.  
2. Brief Case Study 
The Fort Hood Contracting Command, Army Contracting Agency, has been using 
the Government purchase card as method of payment for several years.  Within the last 
year and a half, the Command generated more money in rebates than the cost of the man-
hours spent on the increased workload of reconciling the monthly statements.187  The 
Command does not exclusively use this method of payment; however, in conjunction 
with the contractor, it makes the conscious effort to determine when the use of the card is 
in the best interest of both parties.   
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The Command initiated this payment method approximately five years ago, 
primarily due to the problems that some vendors experienced obtaining payment from 
DFAS.  When they initially offered to use the card as a payment method, the contractor 
community responded favorably, and a large number of the vendors requested payment 
through this method.188  Since contracting officials were approving the final vouchers 
and expending man-hours assisting DFAS with reconciling contract records to allow 
payment,189 the Command determined that it was easier, in some instances, to simply call 
the vendor and pay with the card.190  “Using the card does not significantly increase the 
labor required to administer a contract, as long as the cardholder is organized.”191  
During the interview with the Command’s supervising ACO, he stressed that the use of 
this payment method is on a decreasing trend because the DFAS level of service has 
increased.192   
While some of the buying agencies we interviewed used the card as a payment 
method, they used it in a different capacity compared to Fort Hood.  To illustrate, FISC 
San Diego stated that they were not set up to transfer funds from the users to their 
command in order to use their card as a payment method.193  The Fort Hood Contracting 
Command does not transfer funds.  Since the cards are used exclusively for payments, the 
Command’s cards are established without a line of accounting (LOA), the normal 
procedure for setting up accounts for cards to be used for purchases.  The LOA used to 
fund the contract is the LOA used to pay the credit card bill.  Furthermore, establishing 
the card without a dedicated LOA eliminates the possibility of double charging - charging 
the contract LOA and the card LOA for the same liability.  Since the card used to pay the 
contract does not have a standard LOA, during reconciliation of the credit card statement, 
the cardholder indicates the LOAs from each contract as they relate to each charge on the 
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statement.  After billing official approval, the statement is sent to the resource manager in 
the Comptroller Office.  The resource manager then synchronizes the LOAs with the 
credit card charges in the Computerized Accounts Payable System (CAPS), the Army 
financial management system, and forwards the information to DFAS for fund liquidation 
to the bank. 194   
Interviews indicate that DCMA does not use the card for payment.  Furthermore, 
as the metrics illustrated in Table 6 indicate, the Navy trails the other Services in use of 
the purchase card.195  Both agencies may benefit from increased usage of the card as a 
payment method.  The only prohibition for use of the card for payment is that the contract 
must authorize its use.196  Likewise, quantities of items paid for with the card are only 
limited by restrictions in the quantities specified within the contract.197  The single 
purchase limit on the amount that can be paid is $9,999,999.198  The next section details 
potential benefits as related to contract closeout.   
 
  Total Accounts  Fiscal Year  
Agency  No. Billing Officials 
No. Card 
Holders Total Sales No. Transactions  
Navy  9,361 22,592 $1,921,353,918 2,764,344
Army  26,884 101,398 $2,716,882,803 4,552,565
Air Force  21,148 77,580 $1,602,525,182 3,016,056
Defense Agencies  4,282 12,527 $562,468,500 647,474
       
Totals  61,675 214,099 $6,803,230,403 10,980,439
Source:  DoD Purchase Card Program Office199 
 
Table 6. FY02 DoD Purchase Card Usage, US Bank and Citibank. 
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Using the purchase card as a contract payment method has seven potential 
benefits relating to contract closeout: (1) it eliminates the queue formed when the 
contracting officer must wait for evidence of final payment from DFAS,200 (2) in some 
circumstances, it can reduce the administrative cost of closeout,201 (3) it provides the 
contractor with greater cash flow through more rapid payments, (4) it eliminates 
duplication of effort reconciling contract payments and supporting documentation,202 (5) 
it reduces the potential for incurring prompt payment charges,203 (6) it lowers the 
instances of unmatched disbursements,204 and (7) quarterly rebates are provided to the 
cardholder’s organization that can be used as operations and maintenance funds.205   
Once the CKO approves the contractor’s final voucher, it is sent to DFAS 
for payment.  The CKO must then wait for evidence of final payment before the contract 
can be closed.  This queue time may be critical in two circumstances: (1) on overaged 
contracts where funds are near closure, and (2) on contracts that have funds that can still 
be used for current obligations.  This queue time can have a large variance.  The ACOs 
interviewed stated that many of the problems they experienced closing contracts relate to 
DFAS functions.206  Statistical summaries of the MOCAS database shows that reason 
codes Y (awaiting final notice of payment) and P (reconciliation with paying office) 
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account for four percent of the contracts in MOCAS CAR Section 2, or approximately 
2,000 contracts in February 2003.  Using the purchase card as a payment method could 
potentially reduce the number of contracts in this status.  If the CKO pays the contract, 
evidence of final payment is received immediately.  Therefore, the other steps in the 
closeout process are not held up by the queue formed while waiting for evidence of 
another agency’s actions.   
Using the card as a payment method can reduce the administrative cost of 
closing contracts and reduce the duplication of effort reconciling contracts for payment.  
DFAS charges a transaction cost of $100 per transaction on payments from the MOCAS 
system, $20 per transaction using the vendor pay system, but only $6 for Electronic Data 
Interface (EDI) transactions.207  The capability now exists to submit the purchase card 
statement of account through EDI.  Therefore, agencies could realize a $94 decrease in 
cost per transaction.  Eliminating duplication of effort and lowering unmatched 
disbursements can achieve further administrative cost reductions.  
Interviews with ACOs indicate that there is duplication of effort during the 
contract reconciliation step of contract closeout.  The ACO often reconciles the contract 
and provides evidence of the reconciliation to DFAS; however DFAS conducts their own 
reconciliation to verify the ACO’s figures because they are the authorizing officials.208  
Eliminating duplication of effort reduces administrative costs of closing contracts by 
reducing the total man-hours spent on this step.  Payment by the purchase card would 
reduce the manpower costs because the CKO would pay the contract following their 
reconciliation, eliminating DFAS reconciliation, and allowing the rest of the closeout 
actions to continue.   
Using the purchase card during contract closeout can also provide benefits 
for the contractor.  Because electronic payment is issued within 72 hours,209 the 
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contractor can benefit from increased cash flow.  By contrast, a payment through DFAS 
can take up to 30 days, unless there is a cost justified discount offered and earned.210   
Use of the purchase card as a payment method reduces the potential for 
incurring prompt payment charges.  “The purchase card contractor, as part of the services 
it performs under the GSA contract, provides the vendor payment function.  The 
Department, in turn, pays the purchase card contractor on a disbursement voucher that 
reflects all pertinent LOAs and liquidates the underlying obligation(s).” 211  Therefore, 
“no reference to the Prompt Payment Act will be made in a contract or purchase order 
written for payment by the purchase card.  Vendor payment is effected between the 
vendor’s bank and the VISA network, not by the purchasing DoD activities.”212  Prompt 
payment charges would only occur when the purchase card vendor, the issuing bank, is 
not paid within statutory timelines and the terms and conditions of the contract.  This 
payment method can potentially reduce the total liability. 
The final benefit is a direct cash benefit.  In just one quarter of FY96, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs earned approximately $1,900,000 in purchase card 
rebates.213  CMOs can earn rebates through their use of the purchase card as a payment 
method.  Rebates are earned based on sales volume and how fast the purchase card 
vendor is paid.214  Maximum rebates can be earned at a rate of $6.60 for each $1,000 of 
sales volume by paying daily through electronic commerce.215  These rebates are credited 
as operations and maintenance accounts in the year in which they are received.216 
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The preceding paragraphs outlined the benefits of using the purchase card 
as a payment method; however there are costs that must be considered.  The following 
subsection briefly outlines these costs.  
b. Costs 
The use of the purchase card as a payment method has associated costs 
and risks for the contracting agency.  These costs and risks include: 
x Manpower costs involved with training cardholders and billing officials. 
x Manpower costs associated with administering the program. 
x Manpower costs associated with audit and internal control review 
inspections. 
x Manpower costs associated with cardholder and billing official 
reconciliation of monthly statements of account.  This cost is a direct shift 
in workload from DFAS to the contracting organization. 
x Manpower costs associated with resource manager and DFAS 
reconciliation and payment responsibilities. 
x Bank interchange fee charged to the vendor. 
x The risk of fraudulent use of the card. 
It should be noted that there are initiatives that can be used to mitigate 
costs.  The GSA SmartPay program has programs to fully automate invoice and payment 
processing,217 and Prime Vendor programs to provide lower interchange fees compared 
to traditional merchant arrangements.218  These programs are designed to mitigate the 
hesitancy of contractors to accept payment via the card for large dollar transactions.219  
3. Recommendations and Conclusion 
CMOs responsible for contract closeout should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine the conditions in which using the purchase card as a contract payment method 
offers the optimum cost-benefit ratio.  Circumstances do occur when use of the card may 
be more beneficial than the traditional payment system.  The purpose of this 
                                                 
217 [http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/content/offerings_content.jsp?channelId=-






recommendation is to raise CMOs’ awareness of the benefits available, in the hope they 
will consciously decide on scenarios warranting its use.     
Current developmental initiatives involving EDI based payment systems, such as 
the Wide Area Workflow – Receipt and Acceptance (WAWF-RA), offer the potential to 
reduce payment issues related to contract closeout without shifting workload 
requirements.  However, there are also current initiatives underway to create efficiencies 
in the purchase card program.  Web based applications are being implemented to: 
x Reduce administrative efforts to manage the purchase card program. 
x Reduce Administrative Efforts in Allocation/Re-allocation of Accounting. 
x Reduce payment processing costs and prompt payment interest costs to the 
purchase card vendor. 
x Implement real time account input and review capabilities.  
x Use of the certifying official’s certification to initiate the EDI 
transmission.220    
There are circumstances where use of the card may provide an optimum cost-
benefit ratio.  Contracts with high dollar value and few LOAs offer the greatest potential 
for rebates exceeding manpower costs.  Likewise simple contracts and delivery orders 
offer the opportunity to gain rebates without excessive reconciliation requirements.  
Furthermore, using the card can decrease the time needed to close contracts by reducing 
the total queue time.  This payment method is not a cure-all for every payment related 
closeout problem; however by consciously considering the conditions where the purchase 
card offers the greatest cost-benefit ratio, CMOs can reduce some of the payment issues 
related to contract closeout.  
                                                 




VI. FINAL OVERHEAD RATES 
Final overhead rate determination plays a pivotal role in the contract closeout 
process.  If the closeout process is to be transformed and improved, then the entire 
process for determining the final overhead rates after a contract is physically complete 
must be reviewed.  Data obtained from MOCAS CAR Section 2221 show that the number 
one reason for contracts not closing within time standards is that the negotiation of final 
overhead rates is pending; “Reason Code M.”222  Included within reason code M are the 
following actions: “awaiting contractor’s final indirect cost proposal,” “audit of indirect 
costs,” and “negotiations of the final overhead rates.”  Agencies responsible for these 
actions include: the contactor, DCAA and DCMA (or the CMO).223  As previously stated 
in Chapter I, the February 2003 MOCAS CAR Section 2 consisted of 47,786 contracts 
that were physically completed but not closed out.  Of those contracts, 26,224 had reason 
codes indicating closeout status.  Within this population, 12,765 showed a status of 
reason code M.  In other words, over 48 % of the contracts with a reason code are not 
closed because negotiation of final overhead rates is pending.  During interviews with 
representatives of all stakeholder groups,224 all agreed that the audit portion of final 
overhead determination was the number one cause that prevents timely contract 
closure.225  The bucket plan matrix further demonstrates the fact that the audit is the most 
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A. FINAL OVERHEAD RATE DETERMINATION PROCESS 
In order to understand how the negotiation of final overhead rates can slow down 
contract closeout, an examination of the process, the organizations involved, and the 
affect these organizations have on each other and on contract closeout is necessary.  
“Final overhead rates” is a term used to describe the settlement of prior year indirect cost 
rates, one of the 15 procedures listed in the FAR section governing contract closeout.227  
The term “prior year” can be misleading.  It actually refers to all indirect costs incurred 
since the last determination was made, which could be anywhere from a year to several 
years prior to physical completion.  Final overhead rates are required in order to 
determine the actual costs incurred by a contractor on flexibly priced contracts including: 
cost-type contracts, incentive contracts, and time and material contracts.228  The term 
“final overhead rates” is commonly misused.  Since the word “final” is in the phrase, it is 
often assumed to mean the last overhead rate for a contract.  In reality, it is the final rate 
established for a contractor’s fiscal period.229  Therefore, on flexibly priced, multiyear 
contracts, there are several “final overhead rate” determinations, one for each of the 
contractor’s fiscal years.  Final rates are used to determine the actual allocation of direct 
costs to a cost objective.  Furthermore, the data used to determine the final rates are used 
to support forward pricing and billing rate estimates.230  “Forward pricing rates, billing 
rates, and final rates are all part of a continuing indirect cost allocation cycle.”231  As 
stated, the rate determination process affects contract closeout because the prior year(s) 
indirect rates preceding physical completion must be settled. 
At least 90 days before the end of the contractor’s accounting period, the ACO 
must decide if the final overhead rates should be contracting officer negotiated or auditor 
determined,232 using the criteria outlined in the FAR.233  The final overhead rates should 
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be contracting officer determined if: (1) the business units of a multidivisional 
corporation are under a Corporate Administrative Contracting Officer (CACO), where 
the CACO is responsible for the determination, (2) business units that are not under a 
CACO, but there is a resident ACO who is responsible for the determination, or (3) for 
the business units that do not fit in the preceding two categories, the ACO will decide if 
the rates will be ACO or audit determined.234  
The contractor has 180 days after the end of their fiscal year to submit their 
indirect cost proposal to the Government.235  These indirect cost proposals are forwarded 
to the responsible DCAA field office, and the audit is programmed into the organization’s 
work schedule system.236  After completion of the audit, the auditor either issues the 
audit report to the CKO for contracting officer negotiated rates, or uses the audit report as 
a basis for determination with the contractor for auditor determined rates.237  There is no 
difference in the audit report, regardless of the determination procedure used.238 
From a macro perspective, DCAA uses three approaches to scheduling annual 
audits of incurred costs, the audit that supports the final overhead rate determination.  
DCAA audits are scheduled using a “6-12-6” schedule for “major contractors,” those 
exceeding $80,000,000 of audible dollar volume (ADV).239  Under the 6-12-6 program, 
the first “6” refers to the 180 days allotted to the contractor to submit their final indirect 
cost proposal to the Government.  The “12” refers to the twelve months the auditor has to 
conduct the “audit of incurred costs” and issue the audit report.  The last “6” refers to the 
six months allowed to negotiate and issue the final determination, regardless if it is 
contracting officer negotiated or auditor determined.240  During this process, all interim 
                                                 
233 FAR 42.705 
234 FAR 42.705-1. 
235 FAR 42.705-1 (b). 
236 Interview with DCAA West Region Branch Manager, 03 April 2003. 
237 Interview with DCAA West Region Manager, 25 April 2003. 
238 Ibid. 
239 DCMA One Book Chapter Seven. 




or disallowed costs are settled; which is another of the 15 closeout procedures listed in 
the FAR that apply to both contract closeout, and to contract administration.241 
DCAA uses a “6-24-6” program schedule for “non-major contractors,” those with 
less than $ 80,000,000 of ADV.242  The difference from the program schedule listed 
above is the allotted time to conduct the audit and issue the audit report; 24 months are 
permitted vice the 12 months required for major contractors.  As illustrated in the 
discussion of Little’s Law in Chapter II, this scheduling practice is the reason why 
DCMA is always “two years in arrears,”243 in costing and closing flexibly priced 
contracts.  It should be noted that DCAA will deviate from this scheduling system if 
asked to perform a priority audit.  
DCAA also uses a combination of “desk reviews” and random sampling for 
auditing low risk contractors.  Low risk contractors are those that have less than 
$10,000,000 ADV and a good prior history of low risk cost proposals.244  Desk reviews 
are a procedure performed on cost proposals that essentially entails scanning the proposal 
for unusual items, significant changes from previous proposals, mathematical accuracy, 
and significant corporate home office allocations.  After the review, if the auditor 
determines that the proposal continues to represent low risk to the Government, a report 
is issued and an appropriate adjustment of the contractor’s provisional billing rates is 
made.245  Using these procedures, an actual audit of incurred costs is performed on the 
contractor at least once every three years.246   
The lengthy and difficult process to determine final overhead rates is the 
fundamental cause for reason code M.  As discussed before, the top two reason codes in 
the February 2003 MOCAS CAR Section 2 overaged contracts are: (1) A, Submission of 
                                                 
241 FAR 4.804-5 (a) (7). 
242 DCMA One Book Chapter 7. 
243 Interview (TEL) Regional DCMA Sunnyvale ACO, 11 April 2003. 
244 CAM 6-104. 
245 CAM 6-104.5. 




Final Invoice, and (2) M, Negotiation of Final Overhead Rates.  With few exceptions, 
such as use of quick-closeout rates, contractors cannot submit a final invoice until the 
final indirect cost rates for the years preceding physical completion are settled.  
Therefore, the time required to process the rates often pushes the contract into overaged 
status. 
The preceding paragraphs discussed the nuances of the final overhead rate 
determination procedure.  The following sections will discuss ideas that will help reduce 
the overall time needed for overhead rate determination after a contract is physically 
complete; thereby increasing the rate at which contracts are closed.  
B. SYNCHRONIZING AUDITS  
Subcontractor related issues are a common cause preventing contract closure in a 
timely manner.  Flexibly priced contracts often include significant work efforts by 
subcontractors.  Henceforth, a significant amount of the costs incurred on the contract are 
those generated by subcontractors.  Privity of contract with a subcontractor belongs to the 
prime contractor, which among other responsibilities should have adequate internal 
controls to ensure subcontractor costs are audited.247  Through flowdown clauses, the 
subcontractor must grant access to its books and records to either the Government or the 
Prime contractor for the purpose of performing annual incurred cost audits.248  Under 
certain circumstances, it is desirable for DCAA to audit the subcontractor, called an 
“assist audit.”  Examples of these conditions include instances when the subcontractor 
objects, due to competitive reasons, to an upper tier contractor auditing its records, and 
when the contractor and subcontractor have substantial financial interest in each other.249  
Due to ADVs, contractors and their subcontractors often fall into different 
categories, e.g. one may be categorized a major and the other a non-major.  When DCAA 
programs an assist audit for the subcontractor into their workload schedule, the audit may 
follow the 6-24-6 cycle, while the 6-12-6 program may be used for the contractor’s 
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annual audit.  This causes delays in the contractor’s settlement of the final rates, and 
subsequent closure of the contract if it is physically complete.  Research uncovered a 
delay in excess of three years can and often occurs.250  
To prevent this, we recommend aligning the audit of the subcontractors with the 
audit of their associated prime contractors, so that the prime and subcontractors’ final 
overhead rates are determined on the same schedule, especially during the last year of a 
contract.  This synchronization will shorten the time needed to determine final rates and 
allow contracts to close at a faster rate.  In addition, we recommend that the use of quick-
closeout rates, discussed in the next section, be used to the maximum extent possible in 
order to determine subcontractor final rates. 
1. Quick-Closeout Procedures 
Quick-closeout procedures were developed in order to require251 the contracting 
officer to negotiate the settlement of indirect costs for a specific contract in advance of 
determining the final indirect cost rates under the following specified circumstances: 
x The contract is physically complete. 
x The total unsettled indirect cost to be allocated to any one contract does 
not exceed $1,000,000. 
x The cumulative unsettled indirect costs to be allocated to one or more 
contracts in a single fiscal year do not exceed 15 percent of the estimated, 
total unsettled indirect costs allocable to cost-type contracts for that fiscal 
year.  The contracting officer may waive this requirement based on risk 
assessment.  
x Agreement can be reached on a reasonable estimate of allocable dollars.252  
The February 2003 breakdown of all MOCAS CAR Section 2 contracts reveals 
that approximately 91 percent of all the contracts listed with a reason code M are below 
$1,000,000.  This does not mean that all of these contracts meet the criteria listed above.  
However, the question is raised as to whether quick-closeout procedures are used when 
the circumstances are present.  It is important to note that FAR 42.708 states that the 
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contracting officer shall negotiate the settlement of indirect costs when the conditions are 
met.  The FAR does not give the contracting officer leeway; otherwise it would have 
stated the contracting officer may negotiate.   
We recommend that immediate steps be taken to identify contracts that are 
eligible for quick-closeout procedures, and enforce the FAR requirement that states the 
contracting officer shall negotiate settlement of indirect cost for a specific contract in 
advance of determining the final rates.  Based on the data from MOCAS CAR Section 2, 
it is conceivable that there is a large population of contracts that could be closed if these 
required procedures were used. 
Furthermore, due to the significant number of contracts below $1,000,000, we 
further recommend steps be taken to identify the contracts that may be eligible for desk 
reviews, rather than full audits.  
2. Blue Ribbon Contractor 
Both DCMA and DCAA use risk-based procedures to identify low and high-risk 
contractors, and take the appropriate steps necessary to protect the Government’s interest 
and program audits accordingly.  There is a current FAR case in the final review stage 
that can help reduce the Government’s risk and permit the expanded use of the concepts 
behind quick-closeout procedures and desk reviews.  If approved, language in the FAR 
would be included to require the contractor to notify the Government of contract 
financing or invoice overpayments.  In December 2001, the FAR was amended to require 
contractors to notify the Government of overpayments; however, the financing payments 
were not explicitly included in the ruling.253    
As discussed earlier, forward pricing, billing, and final rates are a continuous 
cycle used to estimate indirect costs, allocate indirect costs for financing payments and 
cost reimbursements, and adjust the allocations based on actual incurred costs.254  Billing 
rates are established on the basis of recent reviews, previous rate audits, or similar 
reliable data or experience, and are used to establish financing payment amounts on cost-
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type contracts.255  The CKO or auditor responsible for establishing the final indirect cost 
rates is also responsible for determining billing rates.256  Billing rates that are too high 
result in financing payments and cost reimbursements that exceed actual costs.  
Conversely, low billing rates result in decreased progress payments and cost 
reimbursements and may not provide a bases to cover actual allowable, allocable, and 
reasonable incurred costs that are in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
contract.  Therefore, the billing rate should be as close to the actual projected final rate as 
possible to maintain fairness to both the Government and the contractor.257  Once 
established, the billing rate may be prospectively or retroactively revised by mutual 
agreement between the Government and contractor to prevent over/underpayments.  If 
agreement cannot be reached, the CKO or auditor may unilaterally determine the billing 
rates.258  If necessary, billing rates are adjusted after the final rate for the contractor’s FY 
is determined.  If the contractor and the Government make necessary adjustments 
throughout the allocation cycle, billing rates near the end of the accounting period should 
be close to the actual rates experienced for the period.259  Furthermore, as the contractor 
gains experience on the contract, it is conceivable that the billing rates continuously move 
closer to actual rates for contractors with stable and mature indirect cost pools.  
DCAA conducts many different types of audits, including reviews of Accounting 
and Management systems to ensure the contractor meets or exceeds all of the 
requirements set forth in Section 5-102 in the DCAA Contract Audit Manual.  
Specifically, the following ten areas of Accounting and Management systems internal 
controls are certified by DCAA; (1) Environmental and Overall Accounting controls, (2) 
General Information Technology Systems, (3) Budget and Planning Systems, (4) 
Purchasing Systems, (5) Material Systems, (6) Compensation Systems, (7) Labor 
Systems, (8) Indirect and Other Direct Cost (ODC) systems, (9) Billing Systems, and (10) 
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Estimating Systems.260  DCAA’s present risk assessment calls for an audit of these ten 
systems every two to four years because they have a significant impact on Government 
contract costs.261 
Contractors with accurate rate development processes, certified accounting and 
management systems, a consistent history of billing rates coming close to final rates, and 
a history of charging only allowable, allocable, and reasonable costs should be considered 
low risk, regardless of the ADV generated.  We name these contractors “Blue Ribbon 
Contractors.”  The concepts and procedures set forth for quick-closeout rates and desk 
reviews should be used for determining Blue Ribbon Contractor final rates on contracts 
that are physically complete.  Coupled with the pending FAR case that would require 
contractors to notify the Government of overpayments on progress payments, the risk to 
the Government is low, and the effort to derive the final rates for the year(s) prior to 
physical completion should reflect that risk level; a full audit should not be necessary.  
Therefore, we recommend that Blue Ribbon Contractors be identified in the inventory of 
contractors listed in MOCAS CAR Section 2, and immediate steps be taken to determine 
the final rates using the procedures outlined for quick-closeout and desk reviews.   
The desk review procedure can be used to check the contractor’s proposal, and 
negotiation can be conducted to establish the final rate for that contract.  The limitations 
placed on the application of quick-closeout procedures should not apply to Blue Ribbon 
Contractors.  However, we recommend that the final rate determination be applied only 
to the contract it covers, unless the cognizant Government official believes that the risk is 
low enough to apply the rate to all contracts.    
The time, effort, and risk of fund expiration or closure do not warrant the use of 
full audit procedures for Blue Ribbon Contractors.  By implementing these 
recommendations, the level of contracts in MOCAS CAR Section 2 can be reduced.  
Furthermore, by establishing a standard or precedent for becoming a Blue Ribbon 
Contractor, some companies interested in conducting business with the Government will 
                                                 





strive to meet this high standard, which could reflect positively on their past performance 
evaluations.  The end result could be lower risk to the Government, because a large 
population of contractors striving for this high standard would have effective cost 
estimating systems. 
3. Independent Audits and Audit Assurance 
The precedent has already been set to allow an audit of incurred costs be 
conducted by an independent commercial auditor.  For example, prime contractors are 
responsible for auditing, or ensuring an audit of incurred costs is conducted on 
subcontractors.  The Government accepts these audit results, even if DCAA did not 
conduct the audit.  Since this precedent has already been set, the concept of allowing 
commercial accounting firms to audit annual incurred costs should be expanded in order 
to reduce the backlog indicated by reason code M in MOCAS CAR Section 2.  
During the conduct of our research, interviewees stated that there is nothing 
inherently Governmental about the process DCAA uses to conduct audits.262  Therefore, 
a commercial accounting firm could conduct the annual audit of incurred cost required to 
support the determination of final rates necessary to settle the prior year(s) indirect costs 
preceding physical completion of a contract.  Currently, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) requires an annual audit of financial statements on publicly traded 
companies.263  The commercial accounting firm responsible for this audit examines the 
company to see if they have adequate internal controls, as well as check the accuracy of 
the company’s financial transactions under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP).  In contrast, the DCAA audit checks to see if a company is following the Cost 
Accounting Standards (CAS) and cost principles outlined in the FAR.  Although these are 
two very different types of audits, interviews indicate that the established accounting 
firms, e.g. Price Waterhouse Cooper and KPMG, have the capability to conduct audits to 
                                                 
262 Interview with SAIC,DCMA San Diego, FISC San Diego, SUPSHIP San Diego, California, 01-02 
April 2003. 




support the determination of final indirect cost rates, and could possibly do it at a lower 
cost.264   
Both the Government and the contractor could benefit from an independent 
commercial accounting firm auditing a contractor’s annual incurred costs.  The 
Government could benefit by having a quicker turnaround time on the audit, which would 
decrease the cycle time to determine the final rates and close contracts.  The contractor 
could benefit from a reduced disruption and cost by having one audit firm conduct both 
the SEC required audit and the audit of incurred costs simultaneously.    
Conceivably, an audit program using a commercial accounting firm could include 
the following procedures.   
x The contractor would submit the proposed final rates to the cognizant 
Government official within 180 days after the end of its fiscal year, in 
accordance with established procedures.  
x The contractor would hire an approved accounting firm to conduct the 
annual audit of incurred costs using DCAA procedures and regulations 
within 90 days after the submission of the final indirect cost rate proposal.  
The cost of this audit would be considered allowable and allocable to the 
contract(s) covered. 
x The accounting firm would submit an audit report within 30 days to the 
cognizant Government official, the CKO if contracting officer determined 
rates are used, or the auditor, if auditor determined procedures are used.  
x The auditor within the responsible DCAA field office could review the 
audit report and issue an opinion within 30 days.  In this role, DCAA 
would provide “Audit Assurance,” the concept being derived from the 
current Government practice of quality assurance.  
x Negotiations would then determine the final rate no later than the time 
frame established by current practice of six months. 
If this procedure were implemented, a 6-12-6 or a 6-24-6 scheduling cycle is 
reduced to a 6-5-6 program cycle.  This would allow an increased rate of contract closure 
and a reduction of the risk of fund closure.   
                                                 





The DoD currently accepts a commercial firm’s audit of incurred costs on 
subcontractors, even if it was only performed by the prime, which is not an independent 
accounting firm.  Likewise, the SEC accepts a commercial firm’s audit of financial 
statements of publicly traded company.  Furthermore, standard industry practice is to 
accept these independent audits, and billions of dollars worth of investment decisions are 
made with the assumption that the independence of the auditing firm provides a sufficient 
check and balance.  
We recommend that a pilot program be developed to test the concept of using 
commercial accounting firms to conduct annual audit of incurred costs.  Conceivably, this 
procedure could be used for contractors with ADV less that $80,000,000, allowing 
DCAA to concentrate on the population of higher-risk contractors, those with ADV 
greater than $80,000,000, or on other audits to reduce the overall risk to the Government.  
The reduction in time to determine the final overhead rates using this procedure could 
reduce the time to close contracts as well as reduce the costs.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In summary, we recommend aligning the audit of the subcontractors with the 
audit of their associated prime contractors, so that the prime and subcontractors’ final 
overhead rates are determined on the same schedule, especially during the last year of a 
contract.  This synchronization will shorten the time needed to determine final rates and 
allow contracts to close at a faster rate.  We recommend that immediate steps be taken to 
identify contracts that are eligible for quick-closeout procedures, and enforce the FAR 
requirement that states the contracting officer shall negotiate settlement of indirect cost 
for a specific contract in advance of determining the final rates.  We recommend that 
Blue Ribbon Contractors be identified in the inventory of contractors listed in MOCAS 
CAR Section 2, and immediate steps be taken to determine the final rates using the 
procedures outlined for quick-closeout and desk reviews.  Finally, we recommend that a 
pilot program be developed to test the concept of using commercial accounting firms to 




The final rate determination procedure and current scheduling practices have a big 
impact on the contract closeout process.  In our research, we found that the negotiation of 
final overhead rates was the leading reason contracts were physically completed but not 
closed.  By implementing the recommendations above, cycle time as well as cost 
reduction could be achieved without significantly increasing the Government’s risk.  A 
reduced cycle time for determining the final overhead rates will reduce the overall 































VII. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Each chapter in this report discussed recommendations to improve contract 
closeout within the DoD.  This chapter summarizes and restates the recommendations 
from the previous chapters and groups them into three categories: (1) recommendations 
to be implemented in the near term and thus do not require any regulatory changes, (2) 
recommendations that can occur in the intermediate term and thus may require some 
changes to the FAR or other regulatory and policy guidance, and (3) transformational 
recommendations that will require significant modification to the existing regulations and 
may require statutory relief for changes.  
1. Near-Term 
MOCAS Accuracy:  Acquisition personnel should be trained about the 
importance of completing all of the information in the MOCAS system.  The missing 
data fields in metric reports would therefore be alleviated, thus making analyses more 
reliable.  In addition, DCMA personnel should be instructed to use “Overaged Reason 
Codes” for all contracts contained in MOCAS CAR Section 2 if upper management will 
continue to use that field as the primary means of collecting data on the status of contract 
closeout. 
Queuing Disciplines:   In order to optimize the speed to risk ratio CMOs should 
group physically complete contracts into two categories, low-risk and high-risk, and use a 
hybrid Shortest Processing Time (SPT)/Priority-Based Discipline (PBD) queuing 
discipline to continuously work to reduce the inventory of contracts to be closed. 
Phase One Batch Processing:  Immediate implementation of Phase One batch 
processing initiative to prove the concept and establish procedures that will aid in moving 
on to other phases.  Several contractors should be contacted to discuss the viability of this 
method of negotiated settlement.  Batch processing offers a negotiated settlement option 
to close complex contracts that would otherwise require thousands of hours in 




This method takes into account the costs to the Government and to the contractor in 
affecting closeout. 
Pre-Award Consultations:  Require pre-award consultation by the PCO with the 
applicable DCMA office, local comptroller, and DFAS payment personnel to ensure that 
contract administrative requirements and payment terms are clearly laid out in the 
contract.  At a minimum, a pre-award consultation should be required on all large 
procurements since they are most likely to eventually flow into an overaged status in 
MOCAS. The Integrated Product Team (IPT) process is working in all other elements of 
DoD acquisition programs; however, it has yet to be adopted at one of the points that can 
have the most impact.   
Enhanced Funding Reviews:  Initiate monthly ULO/NULO reviews at buying 
activities and quarterly reviews at the Service-level.  Funds should be deobligated in the 
final year of availability and turned over to a Service-level comptroller office to provide 
replacement funding where it is most needed.  The Army’s financial review process lost 
only $1,000,000 in closing funds Service-wide last year compared to the Navy’s potential 
loss of $ 522,800,000 in FY03. 
Training:  Conduct training between the contracting officers in the buying 
commands and the comptroller office or funding office personnel to stress the importance 
of reducing the number of CLINs and ACRNs assigned within a contract.  CLIN/ACRN 
proliferation is a major cause of final reconciliation problems and creates far more 
complexity in resolution than is necessary. 
DFAS Assignment of Contract Payment Specialist:  DFAS should assign only 
one contract payment specialist to handle all payment issues related to a specific contract, 
especially for complex or mixed type contracts.  This will allow the payment specialist to 
be completely familiar with the contract throughout the entire life of the contract and 





Invoice Submission Part of Past Performance Evaluation:  Include timely 
submission of final invoices as a part of the contractor’s past performance evaluation.  
Failing to submit, or untimely submission of final invoice is an indication of the 
contractor’s cooperation level, and thus should be noted in their past performance history.   
Purchase Card Payments:  Contracting organizations should conduct a cost-
benefit analysis to determine the conditions in which using the purchase card as a 
contract payment method offers the optimum cost-benefit ratio.   
Audit Synchronization:  Align the audit of subcontractors with the audit of their 
associated Prime contractors.  This would ensure the prime and subcontractors’ final 
overhead rates are determined at the same time and thus reduce queue times.   
Quick-Closeout Rates:  Take immediate steps to identify contracts that are 
eligible for quick-closeout procedures, and enforce the FAR requirement that states that 
the contracting officer shall negotiate settlement of indirect cost for a specific contract in 
advance of determining final rates.  Based on the data from MOCAS CAR Section 2, it is 
conceivable that there is a large population of contracts that could be closed if these 
required procedures were used.   
2. Intermediate 
Phase Two Batch Processing:  Implement more proactive financial management 
reviews of unliquidated balances in obligated funds should be conducted.  Improved 
oversight will increase the likelihood that funds will be removed from contracts as they 
become available, vice waiting until they are nearer to expiration before being considered 
for deobligation.   
Invoicing by ACRN:  ASN(RD&A) should draft new clauses to the FAR that 
require contractors to submit invoices annotated with billable amounts by ACRN and 
change the payment voucher format to reflect ACRN annotations.   
Contract Payment Instructions:  Require all contracts to specify payment 
instructions for DFAS in order to reduce the problems caused by the prorated method of 




assigned to the contract.  Such action would alleviate many of the reconciliation issues 
that arise in contract closeout. 
FAR Change – Invoicing and Payment Terms:  Change FAR sections and 
clauses relating to payments and invoicing to include a 120-day period (or longer if 
approved in writing by the contracting officer) for submission of final invoice following 
either (1) physical completion, or (2) determination of final indirect cost rates.  
Furthermore, language in the FAR should be added granting explicit authority for 
contracting officers to determine final voucher amounts for all contracts, not just 
contracts with indirect cost rates.   
FAR Change – Statute of Limitations:  Recommend that four years be the 
maximum allowable time for a contractor to submit an invoice, short of Government 
caused delay.  After this four year period, the contract would “automatically close”, thus 
allowing the contract to close before the funds lapse.  This will be a change to the 
existing policy established in FAR 52.233-1, which only places a statute of limitations of 
six years on disputes.   
3. Transformational 
Transforming the Organizational Structure.  In order to achieve the long-term 
outcome of eliminating future backlogs of overaged contracts, contracting organizations 
that manage high volumes of contracts should add multifunctional contract closeout 
sections in their organizational structure.  To optimize effectiveness, each team should 
have the vested authority to accomplish all the closeout steps, including contract 
administration authority, property disposition authority, audit authority, and payment 
authority.  Organizations that manage low volumes of contracts can benefit from this 
concept by establishing the closeout team on a regional basis.  If Government personnel 
resources are unavailable, then these closeout teams can be staffed with a combination of 
Government and contractor personnel.   
Phase Three Batch Processing:  The Navy should, in concert with other 
Services, seek enhanced reprogramming and transfer authority that is strictly limited to 




limits placed upon reprogramming and realignment of program funding are necessary in 
the front-end and administration of program activities, but once contract closeout is 
involved, the large degree of uncertainty regarding contract reconciliation calls for 
greater flexibility in managing funds.  The goal is to close the Government’s contracts in 
an efficient and cost-effective manner rather than to rely on a “to the penny” method of 
expenditure reconciliation. 
Oldest Available Funding First:  Change the default DFAS method of payment 
from a prorated method for multiple ACRNs to an “oldest applicable and available 
funding first” method.  This would allow DFAS to zero an older ACRN provided for the 
same purpose prior to moving on to the next available ACRN, thus eliminating minor 
balances on each ACRN in using the proration method.  This would also reduce the 
number of pull-back actions required and allow for the more efficient use of contract 
funds. 
Flexible Reprogramming Authority:  Relax funding rules to enable DFAS and 
DCMA to realign disbursements by ACRN to eliminate or minimize negative ULOs up 
to a threshold of $10,000.  This reprogramming would allow for more efficient payment 
on contracts and eliminate dozens of contract modification to move small amounts of 
funding between ACRNs. 
Blue Ribbon Contractor Program:  Blue Ribbon Contractors who have accurate 
rate development processes, certified accounting and management systems, a consistent 
history of billing rates coming close to final rates and a history of charging only 
allowable, allocable, and reasonable costs should be considered low risk, regardless of 
ADV generated.  These contractors should be identified in the inventory of contractors 
listed in MOCAS CAR Section 2, and immediate steps should be taken to determine their 
final rates using the procedures outlined for quick-closeout and desk reviews.  
Commercial Audit Firm:  Recommend that a pilot program be developed to test 
the concept of using commercial accounting firms to conduct annual audit of incurred 
costs.  Conceivably, this program could be used for contractors with Audible Dollar 




higher-risk contractors, those with ADV greater than $ 80,000,000, or on other audits to 
reduce the overall risk to the Government.  
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this report we attempted to study the areas within the contract closeout that we 
identified as the leading cause for contracts being physically complete and not closed out.  
In the course of our research we found several additional areas in contract closeout that 
were interesting, but beyond the scope of our report.  This section addresses some of the 
areas that we thought were worthy of consideration for further research. 
Development of the Cost Model:  Our project group listed the tasks associated 
with contract closeout involving the key stakeholders, but it does not go into sufficient 
detail to estimate the total cost of contract closeout.  A further study is required to refine 
the existing model to make it a more useful estimating tool for both cost data and 
workload data for organizational management. 
Ratio of Permanent Contract Closeout Personnel:  Separate research is needed 
to determine the optimal ratio of permanent contract closeout personnel to contracts 
needed to ensure contracts are closed within the prescribed time frame.  The personnel 
ratio will allow for forecasts to adequately anticipate the funding required for these 
closeout teams. 
Adequacy of MOCAS Replacement IT Systems:  Conduct in-depth analysis as 
to the adequacy of the IT systems proposed to replace the aging MOCAS system.  
Particular attention should be placed on determining whether replacement systems can 
better align DoD contract award, contract administration, accounting, and payment 
systems. 
Cost–Benefit Analysis for Closing Contracts Under $100,000:  Research 
conducting a cost-benefit analysis as to whether or not contracts under $ 100,000 in value 
should be audited at all.  Our research indicated that this audit is a significant delay in 
closing contracts under $ 100,000.  Is the small dollar value at risk significant enough to 




Outsourcing Contract Closeout Function DoD-Wide:  Study the feasibility of a 
permanent DoD-wide decision on outsourcing the contract closeout function.  Many 
activities have commenced hiring contractor personnel to conduct the research and 
follow-up required for contract closeout.  Many issues arise such as whether this is an 
inherently Governmental function or whether the Government may allow access to 
contractor proprietary information without written consent.  An option, of course, is to 
implement a clause stating that a third party, non-Governmental organization may be 
used to review contracts in a closed status. 
Facilities-Type Contracts for Contracts with Government Property:  Review 
the property procedures to determine if a facilities-type contract should be established for 
major contracts that involve Government property.  In this case, all property issues are 
transferred to the facility contract vice each individual contract with property provisions.  
This will streamline the closeout of each individual contract by removing the property 
delay.  The facilities-type contract would absorb all property issues and eliminate 
property as a cause for delays in closing contracts. 
Direct-Charge Buying Commands for Administrative Services:  Research the 
possibility of direct-charging buying activities for administrative, audit and payment 
services for the hours expended by DCMA, DCAA, and DFAS, respectively.  The 
estimation model from this report could be used to establish more accurate costs 
associated with contract closeout.  
C. CONCLUSION   
Although contract closeout is frequently viewed as a process independent from 
contract award and administration, it is actually a normal part of the contract life cycle.  
Every contract will eventually require some form of action to affect closeout and the 
actions that occur during the pre-award and administration phases have a profound 
impact on the likelihood that any given contract will close in accordance with the FAR 
timelines.  Unfortunately, DoD stakeholders are aligned to optimize their own process 




closeout and the elimination of overaged contracts.  Such sub-optimization is a 
significant cause of the backlog. 
The most important recommendation forwarded in this report is the necessity to 
better train the acquisition workforce and cross train them with the comptroller 
community and personnel engaged in contract payment.  Better understanding between 
the DCAA, DCMA, DFAS, buying organization contracting personnel, and buying 
organization comptroller organizations would likely eliminate many of the problems we 
observed.  There is a marked lack of incentives present for the contractor and the 
Government agencies involved in closeout and there are few, if any, performance 
measures in place to grade employees on their efficiency in managing contracts through 
administration to closure.  
This report addressed only a few of the hundreds of issues that arise in looking at 
the overall contracting process and attempts to recommend a few courses of action that 
can impact the overall efficiency of the process.  In order to affect true transformation, 
however, the entire spectrum of DoD business practices should be reviewed.  During our 
research, we determined that a significant portion of the problems discovered in contract 
closeout is the result of poor coordination and sub-optimization of processes.  The actions 
of one organization may seem efficient and effective in that organization’s eyes, but may 
have a significant and unintended adverse impact on the actions of another organization.  
Given the state of the current contract closeout system in DoD, true transformational 
efforts are necessary to integrate the contracting and contract payment/accounting 
functions. 
In the near-term, the recommendations forwarded in this report are viable 
methods of tackling both the in-flow of physically completed contracts while 
simultaneously offering methods of reducing the backlog.  It is also essential for DoD to 
conduct a detailed review of its information technology requirements and personnel 
requirements in order to request the resources necessary to solve the contract closeout 








































APPENDIX B.  STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
A. KEY PLAYERS 
In order to address the issues affecting an efficient and timely contract closeout, 
the Department of Defense (DoD) must plan a strategy resulting in part from an 
assessment of its external environment.  This strategy must draw support from all the 
organizations, groups, or individuals involved in the contract closeout process if changes 
are going to be implemented successfully.  A stakeholder analysis is an effective tool to 
accomplish this.   
B. WHY A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS?   
A stakeholder analysis is the initial step in building the relationships needed for 
the success of a participatory change, initiative or policy.  It could provide DoD with a 
starting point by establishing which groups to work with and setting out an approach to 
achieving change in the contract closeout process.  A stakeholder analysis also aids in 
assessing the external environment in which the implementation of those changes, 
initiatives, or policies will take place.  This analysis will, at a minimum:  
x Identify and define the characteristics of key stakeholders  
x Draw out the interests of the key stakeholders in relation to the issue   
x Identify conflicts of interests between stakeholders, to help manage such 
relationships during the course of the change initiative  
x Help to identify relations between stakeholders that may enable 
“coalitions” of initiative sponsorship, ownership, and cooperation  
x Assess the capacity of different stakeholders and stakeholder groups to 
participate  
x Help to assess the appropriate type of participation by different 
stakeholders, at successive stages of the change initiative cycle, e.g. 
inform, consult, partnership -- all of these have different possible 
outcomes. 
Our analysis centered on the potential desire of each stakeholder organization to 
actively participate in transforming the contract closeout process.  We used the following 





x Identification of the major stakeholder groups 
x Determination of interests, importance and influence 
x Establishment of strategies for involvement 
 
Stakeholder Interests on the Initiative
Influence on the 
Initiative Strategy for Obtaining Support 
 Military Services ++ M Partnership 
 DCMA + M Partnership 
 DCAA o M Partnership 
 DFAS + M Partnership 
USD (C) o H Partnership 
 USD (AT & L) ++ H Consultation 
 Congress + H Consultation 
 Contractors/Industry  o/- L Partnership 
 
Legend: 
Interest in the Issue Influence on the Transformation of CCO 
++   Strongly in favor H   High; has power to influence or create 
change, formally or informally 
+    In favor  
o    Indifferent or undecided M   Medium; could achieve change with 
level of influence 
 
-    Opposed  
--    Strongly opposed L   Low; little influence to create change 
Source:  Developed by the Authors  
 
Table 7. Stakeholder Analysis 
 
C. THE MILITARY SERVICES 
The Military Services themselves may have a great desire to transform the 
contract closeout process, although this group can also be broken down into two distinct 
sub-groups:  the requesting command organization, and the buying/contracting 




of potential benefits of transforming the contract closeout process since they are most 
directly impacted if they are able to more effectively recoup funding from contracts in 
MOCAS CAR Section 2.  In fact, they could potentially benefit in terms of up to 
$500,000,000 per year if they are able to reutilize appropriations that would otherwise 
close each fiscal year.265  In addition, they would also benefit in terms of not having to 
provide up to $50,000,000 per year in replacement funds266 to pay for expenditures on 
older contracts where the appropriations that funded those contracts has closed and is no 
longer available.  Unfortunately, the requiring commands have the least amount of 
influence in affecting more efficient contract closeout.  Even the contracting offices 
within the requirements commands have minimal action they can complete without 
having to interface with other stakeholders in the process, possessing less than five 
percent of the total actions required in the closeout process for overaged contracts.267 
The second Services group consists of the buying/contracting side of the 
organization.  There is minimal incentive to ensure that overaged contracts are effectively 
closed out and funding is returned, since most contracting offices are separated from the 
requirements side of the organization and would not directly benefit from any funding 
that is returned.  In addition, closeout is far from being a priority at most buying 
commands due to the pressures involved in procuring active requirements and 
administering current contracts.268  Although there is a great desire to ensure the 
Government’s funds are spent wisely, that concern does not extend to ensuring funds are 
returned to requirement offices in a timely manner so they can be expended or obligated 
on other needs.  Focus is not on contract closeout.  Indeed, several systems commands 
have completely contracted out the contract closeout function due to a desire to ensure 
that such a time-intensive process does not impact current workload.  Other systems 
commands have devoted significant resources towards solving the problems in overaged 
contracts due to their concern for being able to return as much funding as possible to their 
                                                 
265 ASN(RD&A) Brief to the MOCAS Closeout Executive Steering Group in April 2003. 
266 Ibid. 
267 MOCAS OPR Matrix, “Buckets of Responsibility,” for February 2002 through March 2003. 




buying offices.  Such an organizational focus vice a single office myopic view of the 
benefits of recouping funding prior to its closure is what is required in addressing the 
transformation of the closeout process. 
D. DCMA 
DCMA has a major stake in any actions that are taken to modify the contract 
closeout process, since the vast majority of the actions required to affect closeout are 
owned by this stakeholder, as identified by the existing process chart in Appendix A.  
Even though DCMA is the organization that expends the greatest amount of effort, in 
terms of workload, in order to close physically completed contracts, they also have the 
least incentive to do so.  As previously stated throughout this report, contract closeout 
receives the least amount of emphasis of the three priorities for each DCMA office.  As 
we determined through multiple interviews, the priorities are; 1) active contract 
administration, 2) pre-award work in preparation for new contracts for existing customer 
requirements, and 3) contract closeout actions.  With an incredible workload given their 
available personnel resources, it is easy to see how contract closeout quickly falls out of 
the list of priorities.  As stated in multiple GAO reports, DCMA is under-staffed and 
under-funded for the task at hand.  Care must be taken that the first two priority issues for 
DCMA do not suffer when additional resources are poured into contract closeout due to 
increased pressure from DoD leadership to eliminate overaged contracts.  DCMA does 
have a great deal to gain, however, from transformation in the contract closeout process.  
For example, far fewer personnel hours will be required to address the closeout issue, 
permitting more time to focus on the other two DCMA priorities. 
E. DCAA 
DCAA is an interesting case as a stakeholder.  DCAA’s only benefit in CCO 
transformation would be their ability to focus more resources on their current contractor 
audit program.  Recent realignments within DCAA have already bundled periodic 
auditing of incurred cost audits along with other audits, thus making changes nearly 
transparent in terms of the time required for affecting final audits (which are rarely done 
any more).  DCAA also does not report to USD (AT&L), making them a completely 




Any changes that impact DCAA will have to come from the USD (C) Office or higher.  
For several of the recommendations presented in this report, there will likely be a great 
deal of resistance encountered from DCAA due to the impact on their workforce.  Indeed, 
if commercial auditing or self-certification becomes reality, many audit requirements will 
quickly disappear, leaving doubt as to the necessity for such a large audit organization. 
F. DFAS 
DFAS is another organization that falls outside of the control of USD (AT&L).  
DFAS-Columbus’ primary metric for measuring organizational effectiveness is the 
timeliness and accuracy of payments being made.269  Contract closeout is not an 
organization-wide priority, even though an enormous amount of resources appear to be 
dedicated to reconciliation of payment issues on overaged contracts.  Multiple GAO 
reports cite the need to allocate thousands of personnel hours into reconciliation of 
several complex contracts that require adjustments to closed accounts and potential 
replacement fund requirements.  The complexity of payments made by the Government 
have had a tremendous impact on DFAS and they stand to benefit the most from 
transformation of the existing reconciliation process through batch processing, addressed 
in Chapter IV or changes in the way final invoices are paid, addressed in Chapter V.  One 
motivation for DFAS to get involved in transforming the process is their desire to 
eliminate payment reconciliation issues and to improve the accuracy of the entire 
payment system through modernization of their IT systems.   
G. CONTRACTORS 
Government contractors also have a tremendous stake in terms of being able to 
save significant amounts of money through many of the initiatives forwarded in this 
report, such as reduced audit requirements, batch processing old contracts in order to 
focus on newer contract actions, more user-friendly invoicing and reduced payment 
delays and payment reconciliation, and lower expenses due to a reduction in the 
personnel hours required to conduct closeouts. 
 
                                                 




H. ROOT CAUSES 
In identifying the stakeholders’ interests and motivations, we determined several 
of the root causes to the problem of timely contract closeout and the elimination of the 
backlog of overaged physically completed contracts.  One major finding determined that 
closeout is every stakeholder’s last priority.  Another important finding is the inaction for 
different reasons by some of the key players on the Government side like DCMA, 
DCAA, DFAS, and Contracting Agencies.  Contractors’ inaction is mainly due to the fact 
that they may owe money to the Government from overpayments, may possess 
Government equipment used during contract performance, or simply, that the closeout 
process is too expensive with no benefits. 
Next, we assessed the influence and importance of each stakeholder on the change 
initiative.  Influence refers to how powerful the stakeholder is; importance refers to those 
stakeholders whose problems, needs and interests coincide with the aims of the initiative.  
It is important to choose the right strategy to obtain support from these “influential” and 
“important” stakeholders.  This strategy will facilitate their involvement or will place 
them in the best position to assist.  Not addressing each stakeholder’s driving factors and 
motivations to embrace transformation or initiatives of the closeout process, will not earn 
the allies that are necessary to effect the organizational changes required.   
The bottom line is that the DoD’s contract closeout process requires a great deal 
of coordination between various organizations or groups.  Currently each organization is 
aligned to best meet its individual interests, goals and results, thus sub-optimizing the 
entire process.  The failure to see the common good in eliminating common problems is 
an issue that DoD faces in nearly every DoDIG and GAO report we reviewed.  The 
payment system is set up to achieve fast-pay goals of DFAS, not the goals of the entire 
organization.  Contracts are written by buying commands to make the most of innovative 
clauses and payment terms in order to achieve the best result for the requesting activity, 
not to ensure the simplicity in bill paying or ease in reconciliation for DFAS or contract 
administration for DCMA.  Buying command requirements to track specific funding 




payment and reconciliation for DFAS far more difficult that it needs to be.  The method 
of affecting periodic audits from DCAA is based on that organization’s metric for time 
per dollar of contract value, thus creating a system where many contracts will become 
overaged and will delay settlement of final rates for contractors simply due to DCAA’s 
audit procedures.  Each organization is set up to succeed in meeting their own 
organizational goals, not for ensuring an effective and efficient closeout process that will 
benefit the tax payers and the DoD as a whole.  Poor communications between activities 
and sub-optimization at nearly every level of the acquisition process has created 
significant problems in eliminating overaged contracts.  It is only through cooperative 
efforts, collaboration between the stakeholders, and the alignment of organizational needs 



























APPENDIX C.  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS DOCUMENTATION AND 
MOCAS REASON CODE SUMMARY  
 
RSN CODES Feb 02 Feb O_age Mar 02 Mar O_age Apr 02 Apr O_age May 02 May O_age Jun 02 Jun O_age Jul 02 Jul O_age
M 15,290 6,873 15,161 6,680 15,165 6,307 14,101 5,022 13,600 4,452 12,985 4,022
A 13,365 9,390 13,110 9,108 12,521 8,600 12,166 7,810 11,307 7,106 10,627 6,029
H 1,332 983 1,396 894 1,577 1,025 2,173 1,078 2,424 1,223 3,427 1,991
Y 959 828 1,045 889 947 759 1,450 1,078 1,279 958 1,153 873
P 834 756 828 756 830 750 755 672 786 697 778 690
N 502 441 497 435 359 318 1,354 1,309 1,307 1,253 1,282 1,224
G 350 253 343 243 332 245 261 178 296 216 292 211
W 240 176 300 238 318 246 279 237 277 203 266 191
V 121 99 132 110 123 101 139 114 157 125 164 131
E 68 26 68 27 104 25 100 22 94 21 91 20
D 115 82 127 95 115 79 118 81 115 77 112 75
B 61 34 53 42 58 47 49 39 46 36 41 32
C 76 59 89 73 83 73 98 87 94 83 70 59
7 119 85 109 86 96 74 90 67 97 77 81 59
J 7 7 8 7 15 7 20 9 18 7 22 9
X 38 27 34 21 20 8 18 7 17 7 16 7
F 34 27 37 30 41 34 78 52 73 46 67 40
S 101 89 89 77 90 76 93 79 39 25 61 47
T 14 10 11 7 10 6 11 7 10 7 12 9
U 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5
Z 11 8 15 10 13 12 8 6 5 3 6 2
6 17 17 22 22 22 22 1 1 1 1 1 1
K 66 56 45 32 55 40 40 29 26 17 26 16
L 127 14 122 11 118 9 114 6 112 4 112 4
Q 4 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 19 19 19 19
R 2 2
1 160 149 164 151 206 182 196 170 156 133 153 131
2 3 2 2 1 4 3 2 1 2 1 2 1
3
4 4 1 3 3 6 3 6 3 6 5
5 1 1 1 1
8
9 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2
No Reason 17,696 7,672 18,719 7,520 19,125 7,476 18,656 7,147 18,749 7,002 18,858 7,163
TOTAL 51,722 28,176 52,541 27,577 52,359 26,533 52,382 25,317 51,117 23,807 50,737 23,068
No RSN Ratio 34% 27% 36% 27% 37% 28% 36% 28% 37% 29% 37% 31%
RSN CODES Aug 02 Aug O_age Sep O2 Sep O_age Oct 02 Oct O_age Nov 02 Nov O_age Dec 02 DecO_age Jan 03 Jan O_age Feb 03 Feb O_age
M 12,595 3,728 12,547 3,557 12,785 3,490 12,519 3,398 12,959 3,301 12,827 3,127 12,765 3,306
A 9,868 5,351 8,864 4,682 8,416 4,198 8,246 3,801 8,254 3,869 7,839 3,623 7,432 3,679
H 2,994 1,623 3,005 1,546 2,742 1,446 2,482 1,225 2,403 1,140 2,314 1,039 2,455 1,074
Y 1,548 1,187 1,598 1,232 1,254 847 1,349 897 1,364 914 1,266 777 1,270 696
P 787 695 795 684 823 722 766 670 724 622 748 655 693 600
N 1,300 1,240 1,148 1,091 945 888 798 730 440 374 441 358 454 371
G 286 205 285 204 272 176 255 169 245 159 220 174 218 150
W 267 193 290 215 281 208 257 185 243 174 264 168 198 141
V 162 130 182 139 184 132 190 140 189 138 198 142 196 141
E 91 17 94 19 88 19 93 18 93 18 97 19 94 16
D 98 65 97 65 103 69 101 68 101 66 97 60 90 55
B 36 27 32 23 39 27 52 39 52 41 79 60 82 65
C 64 55 69 59 65 53 67 55 63 49 63 46 66 45
7 112 88 88 69 76 56 74 57 71 52 71 49 59 36
J 32 13 32 12 31 13 46 27 47 28 47 28 47 28
X 16 7 19 8 16 5 30 19 25 22 47 37 44 40
F 65 38 31 21 27 21 28 21 28 21 28 21 25 18
S 40 26 38 25 32 19 31 18 30 17 34 20 24 20
T 9 6 11 7 9 5 8 4 7 2 7 3 7 3
U 5 5 6 5 6 5 4 3 4 3 3 2 2 2
Z 6 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
6 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
K 24 15 23 14
L 112 4 111 4
Q 19 19 19 19
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 98 81 107 89 100 85
2 3 2 4 3
3 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 4 3 5 4
5
8
9 3 3 1 1
No Reason 19,141 7,026 19,681 5,272 20,727 4,103 20,983 3,437 20,943 2,143 21,294 1,205 21,562 1,184
TOTAL 49,787 21,857 49,188 19,073 49,026 16,592 49,384 14,986 48,285 13,157 47,984 11,616 47,786 11,673
No RSN Ratio 38% 32% 40% 28% 42% 25% 42% 23% 43% 16% 44% 10% 45% 10%  
























# of contracts Ratio # of contracts Ratio
Total CPFF contracts 29,505 61.7% 6,794 23.0%
Kind of contract
Supply Ks & Price orders 522 1.8% 135 2.0%
R&D Conracts 3,821 13.0% 694 10.2%
System acq. contracts 181 0.6% 22 0.3%
Maintenance contracts 152 0.5% 28 0.4%
Service contracts 24,699 83.7% 5,903 86.9%
Facilities contracts 6 0.0%
Undefinitized letter Ks 5 0.0% 3 0.0%
Unpriced orders 94 0.3% 8 0.1%
Other 25 0.1% 1 0.0%
Dollar value
<= $ 100,000 15,002 50.8% 3,210 47.2%
100,001 - 500,000 9,063 30.7% 2,098 30.9%
500,001 - 1,000,000 2,382 8.1% 591 8.7%
1,000,001 - 5,000,000 2,156 7.3% 562 8.3%
>= 5,000,001 902 3.1% 333 4.9%
All contracts Overaged contracts
 
Table 13. Details of Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Navy Contracts in the February 2003 Report. 
 
# of contracts Ratio # of contracts Ratio
Total FFP contracts 6,809 14.2% 2,215 32.5%
Kind of contract
Supply Ks & Price orders 4,201 61.7% 1,272 57.4%
R&D Conracts 196 2.9% 94 4.2%
System acq. contracts 89 1.3% 51 2.3%
Maintenance contracts 1,019 15.0% 296 13.4%
Service contracts 883 13.0% 393 17.7%
Facilities contracts 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
Undefinitized letter Ks 10 0.1% 8 0.4%
Unpriced orders 409 6.0% 100 4.5%
Other 1 0.0%
Dollar value
<= $ 100,000 4,948 72.7% 1,464 66.1%
100,001 - 500,000 1,029 15.1% 302 13.6%
500,001 - 1,000,000 250 3.7% 96 4.3%
1,000,001 - 5,000,000 272 4.0% 118 5.3%
>= 5,000,001 310 4.6% 235 10.6%
All contracts Overaged contracts
 




# of contracts Ratio # of contracts Ratio
Total # of Service contracts 35,050 73.3% 8,478 24.2%
Contract types
Fixed price redet. Type A 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
Firm fixed-price 883 2.5% 393 4.6%
Fixed-price with EPA
FPI with Per. Inc. 16 0.0% 10 0.1%
Cost-plus-award-fee 1,093 3.1% 143 1.7%
Cost contract 220 0.6% 155 1.8%
Cost sharing 30 0.1% 12 0.1%
Cost-plus-fixed-fee 24,699 70.5% 5,903 69.6%
CPIF with Per. Inc. 12 0.0% 6 0.1%
Time and materials 7,110 20.3% 1,644 19.4%
Labor hour 929 2.7% 190 2.2%
No type shown 57 0.2% 21 0.2%
Dollar value
<= $ 100,000 19,419 55.4% 4,176 49.3%
100,001 - 500,000 10,398 29.7% 2,685 31.7%
500,001 - 1,000,000 2,440 7.0% 694 8.2%
1,000,001 - 5,000,000 2,026 5.8% 628 7.4%
>= 5,000,001 767 2.2% 295 3.5%
All contracts Overaged contracts
 







# of contracts Ratio # of contracts Ratio
Total # of contracts 161 0.3% 86 53.4%
Department 
Navy 159 98.8% All Navy
Marine Corps 2 1.2%
Contract types
Fixed price redet. Type A
Firm fixed-price 46 28.6% 40 46.5%
Fixed-price with EPA 2 1.2% 1 1.2%
FPI with Per. Inc. 28 17.4% 18 20.9% A 7 A 7
Cost-plus-award-fee 18 11.2% 5 5.8% B 1 H 1
Cost contract 1 0.6% D 1 M 2
Cost sharing P 20 P 2
Cost-plus-fixed-fee 52 32.3% 16 18.6% S 1 S 1
CPIF with Per. Inc. 11 6.8% 6 7.0% V 8 V 1
Time and materials 2 1.2% W 1 W 1
Labor hour 1 0.6% Blank 1 Y 1
No type shown
Kind of contract
Supply Ks & Price orders 40 24.8% 25 29.1%
R&D Conracts 27 16.8% 11 12.8%
System acq. contracts 49 30.4% 33 38.4%
Maintenance contracts 5 3.1% 2 2.3%
Service contracts 36 22.4% 13 15.1%
Facilities contracts
Undefinitized letter Ks 1 0.6% 1 1.2%
Unpriced orders 1 0.6% 1 1.2%
Other 1 0.6%
Reason Code
Negotiation of ovhd rates 7 4.3% 2 2.3%
Not submitted final invoice 35 21.7% 21 24.4%
Final audit in process 4 2.5% 2 2.3%
Notice of final payment 4 2.5% 2 2.3%
Reconciliation 37 23.0% 31 36.0%
Disposition of GP 13 8.1% 12 14.0%
Contract modification 5 3.1% 4 4.7%
OTHER 22 13.7% 11 12.8%
NO RSN 34 21.1% 1 1.2%
Reason codes for 
Overaged CPFF
All contracts Overaged contracts
Reason codes for 
Overaged FFP
Total obligation amount for these 20 
contracts is $6,405,712,001 with 
unliquidated amount of  $75,911,112.
 





# of contracts Ratio # of contracts Ratio
Total # of contracts 210 0.4% 90 42.9%
Department 
Navy 209 99.5% All Navy
Marine Corps 1 0.5%
Contract types
Fixed price redet. Type A
Firm fixed-price 61 29.0% 40 44.4%
Fixed-price with EPA 1 0.5% 1 1.1%
FPI with Per. Inc. 22 10.5% 17 18.9%
Cost-plus-award-fee 13 6.2% 3 3.3%
Cost contract 5 2.4% 1 1.1%
Cost sharing
Cost-plus-fixed-fee 77 36.7% 16 17.8%
CPIF with Per. Inc. 9 4.3% 6 6.7%
Time and materials 16 7.6% 5 5.6%
Labor hour 5 2.4% 1 1.1%
No type shown 1 0.5%
Kind of contract
Supply Ks & Price orders 57 27.1% 40 44.4%
R&D Conracts 35 16.7% 11 12.2%
System acq. contracts 27 12.9% 15 16.7%
Maintenance contracts 9 4.3% 3 3.3%
Service contracts 78 37.1% 19 21.1%
Facilities contracts
Undefinitized letter Ks
Unpriced orders 2 1.0% 2 2.2%
Other 2 1.0%
Reason Code
Negotiation of ovhd rates 19 9.0% 6 6.7%
Not submitted final invoice 35 16.7% 16 17.8%
Final audit in process 9 4.3% 6 6.7%
Notice of final payment 2 1.0% 1 1.1%
Reconciliation 39 18.6% 34 37.8%
Disposition of GP 5 2.4% 3 3.3%
Contract modification 10 4.8% 9 10.0%
OTHER 21 10.0% 14 15.6%
NO RSN 70 33.3% 0.0%
All contracts Overaged contracts
 








A Contractor has not submitted final invoice/voucher
Contractor has not submitted a final bill for 
payment. For cost contracts, final indirect rates 
have been established.
Contractor 
B Final acceptance not received Awaiting destination acceptance from the Buying or Receiving Activity. Services
C Contractor has not submitted patent/royalty report
For Patents, DD Form 882, or equivalent has not 
been received from the contractorper applicable 
FAR clauses.
Contractor 
D Patent/royalty clearance required
Contractor has not submitted the final DD Form 
882, or equivalent. The form has been forwarded 
to the Buying Activity for approval.
Services
E
Contractor has not submitted 
proposal for final price 
redetermination
Use this code until th contracting officer receives 
an adequate final price redetermination proposal. Contractor 
F
Supplemental agreement 
covering final price 
redetermination required
Use this code while the fina price redermination 
proposal is being reviewed or negotiated. An 
OPR code is required to signify which party's 




G Settlement of subcontractors pending
Pending settlement of subcontract(s); may 
impact final voucher submission. Contractor 
H Final audit in process
DCAA performing final Contract Audit Closing 
Statement on final voucher or DCMA using 
Cumulative Allowable Cost W orksheet (CACW S) 




J Disallowed cost pending ACO in process of resolving DCAA Form 1 issue or similar disallowed cost issue. DCMA
K Final audit of Government property pending
DO NOT USE: Use Reason Code "V" for 
Property issues. N/A
L Independent research & development rates pending
DO NOT USE: The Reason Code is obsolete for 
contracts after October 1992. Use Reason Code 
"M" for rates.
N/A
M Negotiation of overhead rates pending
Identification of OPR combined with "M" code will 
provide visibility of the current O/H action (e.g. 




N Additional funds are requested but not yet received
The PCO has been requested to provide 
additional funds for various reasons (e.g. cost 
overruns). W en contract is awaiting replacement 




Reconciliation with paying 
office and contractor being 
accomplished
Provide visibility as to the basis for the 
reconciliation delay (e.g. disbursement audit in 
process (DFAS), obligation audit in process 




Q Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals case
Contract should be moved to Section 3 once the 
ASBCA docket number is assigned. The docket 
number should be entered in the R3 Remarks.
DCMA
R Public Law 85-804 case 50 USC [Chapter 29] 1431 - P.L. 85-804 applies to Extraordinary Contractual Actions. DCMA
S Litigation/investigation pending
Either fraud investigation activity is in process, or 
contractual issue is not resolved or claim has 
been received by contracting officer. Contract 
should be moved to Section 3 (BCA/CIL/CLL) 
once contracts is in Federal Courts and/or DOJ 
opens a case.
DCMA
T Termination in process
Use for Terminations. Move Termination for 
Convenience to Section 3. Termination for 
Default stay in Section 2.
DCMA
U W arranty clause action pending Open warranty action(s) currently being processed IAW  FAR 46.709 and -10. DCMA
V Disposition of Government property pending
Identification of OPR combined with "V" will 
provide visibility into delay (e.g. awaiting PCO 
disposition instructions (Services), or contractor 













W Contract modification pending
Contract modification awaiting contractor 





X Contract release and assignment pending
Awaiting contractor's submission of the release 
and assignment. Contractor
Y Awaiting notice of final payment Proper final invoce/voucher forwarded to DFAS for payment, awaiting payment. DFAS
Z Disposition of classified material pending
Awaiting disposition of instructions on classified 
materials from the Buying Activity. The ACO is 
responsible for notifying DIS that the contract is 
complete and classified material should be 
dispositioned.
Services
1 Canceled funds Voucher/invoice has been submitted to DFAS for D-MACT action to funding station. Services
2 Appropriations in Red DO NOT USE N/A
3 Prevalidation Action Pending Voucher/invoice at DFAS pending prevalidation process before payment. DFAS
4 Reserved Reserved N/A
5 Reserved Reserved N/A
6 Fee withheld Fee withheld awaiting resolution of issue before fial payment can be made. DCMA
7 Awaiting removal from Excess Funds The ACO has deobligation authority. DCMA
8 Reserved Reserved N/A
9 Reserved Reserved N/A  
 


































1. Lack of personnel training on contract closeout procedures. 
2. Lack of internal controls requiring funds review. 
3. Lack of communication/coordination between key personnel. 
4. Inaccuracy of database and/or financial reports. 
5. Mismanagement of expiring and closing funds. 
6. Ineffective contract payment systems lead to excessive interest payments 
to contractors and untimely contract closeout. 
7. Minimal use of Quick-Closeout Procedures. 
8. Ineffective systems for collecting, reporting, and monitoring data on the 
contract closeout process. 
9. The most problematic include settling all interim or disallowed costs, 
completing all price revisions, settling prior year indirect cost rates, and 
completing contract audits 
10. Inefficient closeout procedures cause the excessive use of resources at the 
DFAS-Columbus, the MOCAS payment center, and throughout the other 
agencies and organizations associated with contract closeout. 
 
 
Summary of Reports 
 
1. General Accounting Office (GAO), Report No. 03-275- Improved 
Reviews Needed to Ensure Better Management of Obligated Funds, 
January 2003. 
 
a. Background: This report outlines how the Department of Defense 
(DoD) confronts pervasive and complex financial management 
problems that can seriously diminish the efficiency of the military 
Services’ support operations.  Recent audits of DoD’s financial 
statements highlight ongoing financial management challenges that 
affect the development of accurate and complete financial 
information.  Among the challenges facing DoD is the lack of 
accurate obligation data needed for effective budget management 
and reliable financial reporting.  As of September 30, 2001, the 
Navy’s operating appropriations had $2,100,000,000 in 
unliquidated funds that were obligated during fiscal years 1997-99, 
of which $1,400,000,000 (67 percent) represented unliquidated 
operating obligations of $50,000 or more.  Also, in 1999 and 2000, 




and found that fund managers were not fully complying with DoD 
review regulations.   
 
b. Findings: Two-thirds of the unliquidated operating obligations 
over $50,000 were not properly accounted for as a result of the 
Navy’s failure to review such obligations three times each year as 
required by DoD regulations.  The Navy did not fully adhere to the 
regulation that unliquidated operating obligations of any value be 
reviewed at least once each year.  The Navy did not know how 
much money was tied up in unliquidated operating obligations that 
could potentially be used for other appropriate needs and its 
budgetary reports to Congress and financial statements were 
inaccurate.  The Navy did not apply existing internal control 
activities to ensure that fund managers did not perform obligation 
reviews in accordance with DoD regulations, nor did it hold fund 
managers accountable for the accuracy and completeness of the 
reviews. 
 
c. Recommendations:  That the Secretary of Defense must direct the 
Secretary of Navy to adhere to DoD unliquidated operating 
obligation review regulations and better apply existing internal 
control activities to ensure adherence to these regulations, and to 
hold fund managers accountable for the accuracy and completeness 
of their reviews. 
 
2. General Accounting Office (GAO), Report No. 02-747- Canceled DoD 
Appropriations, July 2002. 
 
a. Background:  In 1990, the Congress changed the law governing the 
use of appropriation accounts because it determined that controls 
over them were not working.  In particular, the Congress found 
that (DoD) may have spent hundreds of millions of dollars for 
purposes that the Congress had not approved.  The 1990 law was 
intended to improve congressional control by providing that, five 
years after the expiration of the period of availability of a fixed-
term appropriation, the appropriation account be closed and all 
remaining balances canceled.  After closing, the appropriation 
account could no longer be used for obligations or expenditures for 
any purpose.  
 
b. Findings: DoD has started the process of correcting the illegal or 
otherwise improper closed account adjustments made during fiscal 
year 2000.  However, this will require substantial effort and, 




fiscal year 2002.  DoD estimates that it will take 2,300 staff hours 
to correct the accounting records for this large contract alone and 
over 21,000 staff hours (10 staff years) to correct the accounting 
for all of the affected fiscal year 2000 transactions.  The lack of 
fundamental controls and management oversight had fostered the 
idea among DoD contracting and accounting personnel that it was 
acceptable to maximize the use of available funds by adjusting the 
accounting records to use up unspent funds in the closed accounts, 
regardless of the propriety of doing so. 
 
c. Recommendations:  That the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to direct the Director of the 
DFAS to ensure that DFAS- Columbus completes its review and 
correction of the remaining fiscal year 2000 illegal and otherwise 
improper adjustments, reverse closed account adjustments made 
during fiscal year 2001 identified in this report as illegal or 
otherwise improper, determine the entries necessary to correct the 
accounting for reversed fiscal year 2001 transactions, help ensure 
that DFAS Columbus completes the review and correction of the 
additional $1,100,000,000 of fiscal year 2001 adjustments it has 
scheduled for detailed review, and continue with DFAS’s top-level 
management attention and monitoring of the program for future 
adjustments to closed appropriation accounts.  The report also 
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to continue to monitor these 
adjustments so that any potential Anti-Deficiency Act violations 
that may occur are promptly investigated and reported as required 
by the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1351, and implementing 
guidance. 
 
3. Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Report No. 
D-2003-048- Reopening of Contracts in the Mechanization of Contract 
Administration Services (MOCAS) System, 16 January 2003. 
 
a. Background: The Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
planned to replace the payment and entitlement function performed 
by the MOCAS system with a new or modified system.  In 
anticipation of transitioning to the new contract payment system, 
DFAS and DCMA were attempting to close out as many contracts 
as possible. 
 
b. Findings: DFAS-Columbus and DCMA closed a substantial 
number of contracts prematurely and had to subsequently reopen 




contracts that had been closed out and later reopened.  Although 
the DFAS-Columbus identified their errors that resulted in 
premature contract closure, additional improvements were needed 
to proactively prevent errors before they occurred.  Likewise, 
DCMA needed to do a better job assisting the DFAS-Columbus in 
the closure process on contracts for which it has primary 
responsibility.  Contracts closed out in error cause the unnecessary 
use of resources at DFAS-Columbus and throughout the 
contracting community.  
 
c. Recommendations:  This report recommended that the Director of 
DFAS-Columbus require that adequate research be performed to 
ensure proper coding of invoices to prevent premature closure of 
contracts.  Another recommendation was that the Director of 
DCMA revise current procedures to require periodic obligation 
reviews at accounting classification reference number (ACRN) 
level during the life cycle of a contract and at contract closeout to 
aid DFAS-Columbus in validating the accuracy of obligation 
balances. 
 
4. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report No. D-
2002-027- Closing Overaged Contracts Prior to Fielding a New DoD 
Contractor Payment System, December 19, 2001. 
 
a. Background: DoD plans to transition from its present contract 
payment system, MOCAS, to a new payment system, the Defense 
Procurement Payment System (DPPS), by October 2002.  As of the 
end of April 2001, there were about 324,000 contracts valued at 
$844,000,000,000 administered using MOCAS.  Of those 
contracts, 116,563 were open in MOCAS but eligible for closure 
(that is, work was completed because goods and services were 
delivered and accepted, defined by the FAR as “physically 
complete”).  The FAR permits contracts to be eligible for closure 
from 6 to 36 months after work is completed, depending on the 
type of contract, before categorizing them as overaged.  Of the 
contracts eligible for closure in MOCAS at the end of March 2001, 
DoD classified 22,628 as overaged (that is, beyond the maximum 
time allotted to close a contract).  The contracts became overaged 
over a period of 20 years, between March 1981 and March 2001.  
The overall audit objective was to evaluate actions to close out 
completed contracts and transition from the MOCAS system to 






b. Findings: DoD made progress and closed about 30,393 overaged 
contracts from February 2000 to March 2001.  However, another 
26,610 contracts became overaged during that period.  Based on 
the closure rate overaged contracts achieved during the February 
2000 to March 2001 period, DODIG estimate that it will take at 
least 6 years for DoD to close all remaining overaged contracts.  
To accelerate the closure of contracts, additional actions were 
needed.  DODIG’s judgmental sample of 80 contracts showed that 
there were weaknesses in the closure process, including inadequate 
monitoring of contracts that could be closed, inattention to closure 
requirements, erroneous data about contracts available for closure, 
lack of coordination, lack of sufficient funding, a shortage of 
personnel, and untimely contractor input.  Unless improvements 
are made and additional resources applied, DoD will have a 
significant number of overaged contracts when it begins the new 
payment system, which could adversely affect its orderly 
transition.  
 
c. Recommendations:  That the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) determine the DoD 
acquisition staffing requirements and, based upon identified needs; 
seek additional acquisition resources to accelerate the closure of 
contracts.  It also recommends that the Director of DCMA reiterate 
the policy that administrative contracting officers must exercise 
their authority for unilateral rate determination to encourage 
vendors to fulfill their responsibilities to submit timely final 
vouchers for payment. 
 
5. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report No. D–
2002-076- Funding Invoices to Expedite the Closure of Contracts before 
Transitioning to a New DoD Payment System, March 29, 2002. 
 
a. Background: DFAS plans to replace the payment and entitlement 
function performed by MOCAS with DPPS.  To facilitate this 
transition, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Military 
Departments and DCMA to develop comprehensive plans for 
closing out all completed contracts.  Plans for the orderly transition 
from MOCAS to the DPPS for contracts with continuing 
requirements were also to be developed.  DFAS was to assist in 
reengineering the reconciliation process and developing procedures 
to support the retirement of MOCAS.  Also, DFAS was to assist in 
the close out process for all completed contracts.  At the time of 
audit, 116,563 contracts were pending closure.  Of the 116,563 




payment can be made.  The overall audit objective was to evaluate 
actions to close out completed contracts and transition them from 
MOCAS to DPPS.  The report focused on the policy and 
procedures for closing out contracts that require current-year funds 
because the original funding appropriation had been closed. 
 
b. Findings: DFAS and DoD Components did not take sufficient 
actions to fund payments on outstanding contract invoices that 
would permit closing contracts.  DFAS-Columbus did not notify 
DoD Components timely that funding was needed to close 
contracts where original funding had been closed.  Also, DoD 
Components were not providing timely current-year funding to 
DFAS. MOCAS records showed that 3,954 contracts could require 
as much as $97 million in current-year funding to pay invoices and 
close the contracts.  Two of the invoices have required funding 
since 1993.  Unless improvements are made, DoD will have a large 
number of contracts requiring current-year funds when it begins 
the transfer of MOCAS data to the new payment system.  This 
could adversely affect its orderly transition.  Additionally, the DoD 
incurred unnecessary costs because of the untimely payments for 
those invoices awaiting funds, to include approximately $215,429 
in prompt payment interest penalties on invoices we reviewed.  
 
c. Recommendations: That the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) revise DoD Regulation 7000.14-R “Financial 
Management Regulation,” Volume 3, Chapter 10, “Accounting 
Requirements for Expired and Closed Accounts,” updated January 
31, 2001, to require that the gaining DoD activity of a program be 
responsible for providing the appropriate fund sites for invoices 
that would otherwise require disbursement from canceled 
appropriations.  It also recommended that the Director, DFAS 
develop new policy and procedures to require that fund holders are 
notified promptly whenever invoices that could need current-year 
funding are received.  Other recommendation was that the Director 
of DFAS monitor and provides monthly reports to the DoD 
Components’ financial management and comptroller offices 
identifying outstanding requests for current-year funding. 
 
6. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report No. 93-
058- Report on Audits of the Contract Closeout Process, February 23, 
1993. 
 
a. Background:  The FAR establishes guidance for Executive agency 




objective of this report was to determine whether the contract 
closeout process was accomplished in an efficient and effective 
manner. 
 
b. Findings: The audit generally concludes that the contract closeout 
process needs improvement.  The backlog of DCAA audits of 
overhead rates impacted contract closeout in some agencies.  The 
DCAA backlog could be reduced because of a change in DCAA 
audit priorities caused by a change in Public Law.  Internal 
controls needed improvement because contracting officers were 
not properly trained in the contract closeout process and were not 
held accountable for the closeout process.    
 
c. Recommendations:  Contract Administration has a need for higher 
priority and timelier contract closeout, improved contract 
information tracking systems.  During the audit DCAA recognized 
that under the new funds availability rules, continued delays in 
overhead rates audits could result in the use of current monies to 
pay for old obligations.  As a consequence, DCAA will adjust the 
overhead rates audit priorities to accomplish overhead rates audits 
before contract funds are canceled.  This could result in a reduction 
in the backlog of overhead audits.   
 
7. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report No. D-92-
076- Administration of the Contract Closeout Process within DoD, April 
15, 1992. 
 
a. Background: The overall objective of this report was to determine 
whether the contract closeout process within DoD was 
accomplished in an efficient and effective manner.  This report 
addressed the objectives related to the delivery of goods and 
services, payments by the Government, the accuracy of the 
MOCAS system, and applicable internal controls. 
 
b. Findings: Contract data in the MOCAS system were inaccurate and 
contributed to delays in closing contracts.  Although delivery of 
goods and services was not a problem, DoDIG identified incorrect 
delivery information in MOCAS.  Incomplete and missing ACO 
and finance documentation also caused database problems.  As a 
result, inaccurate payments were made, discounts were lost, 
payments were delayed, and contracts were not closed in a timely 





c. Recommendations:  That DLA emphasize the need to properly 
maintain and control ACO file documentation.  It also 
recommended that the DFAS-Columbus Center develop and 
implement procedures to better control and maintain complete and 
accurate finance files, train the appropriate personnel to properly 
input contract data into MOCAS in order to make accurate 
payments in a timely manner.  
 
8. Report of the Process Action Team (PAT) on Contract Administration, 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology, 
February 1995. 
 
a. Background: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology (USD A&T) directed that a cross functional process 
action team (PAT) be formed to address the reengineering of 
specific contract administration processes. The PAT included 
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 
the Military Departments and the Defense Agencies.  The PAT 
was directed to develop, within a period of 90 days, a 
comprehensive plan to reengineer contract administration within 
DoD to make specific processes more efficient and effective.   
 
b. Findings: The PAT firmly agrees with the notion that the world in 
which DoD must operate has changed beyond the limits of the 
existing acquisition system's ability to adjust or evolve.  It is 
simply not enough to improve the existing system.  There must be 
carefully planned, fundamental reengineering of specific segments 
of the acquisition system so we can respond to the current realities 
of our times and the demands we will encounter in the future.  The 
execution and operational problems that encumber today's 
acquisition system are often the result of yesterday's failures of 
foresight and implementation.  The report also found that the 
current defense acquisition process tends to divide roles and 
responsibilities among requiring organizations, support 
organizations, acquiring activities, contract administration offices, 
and contractors.  This process often results in solicitations where a 
contractor's performance risk is not fully identified prior to award 
or in a contract that cannot be properly executed without 
modification immediately after award.  
 
c. Recommendations: The PAT recommends determination on how 
to best bring the expertise of the individuals responsible for 
ensuring satisfactory contract performance closer to the front-end 




budget constraints call for measures to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of DoD's acquisition oversight of defense 
contractors.  It is essential to formulate a process that (1) identifies 
those contractors where the risk associated with reducing, 
disengaging or redesigning Government oversight is low, and (2) 
identifies a methodology for adjusting current levels of oversight 
based upon contractor performance. 
 
9. The Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA) 
comments on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (ANPR) on 
contract closeout published in the Federal Register on 24 September 2002.   
 
a. Background: On 24 September 2002, the Federal Register 
published a request for comments on whether any changes should 
be considered to the FAR, Defense Supplement to FAR (DFARS), 
or the General Services Acquisition Regulation (SAR) to facilitate 
timely contract closeouts. 
 
b. Comments: The council agrees with the ANPR that there are a 
number of process-related reasons that contribute to the inability to 
closeout contracts in a timely manner. One of the areas the council 
believes contribute to the delays is that Government contracting 
officers appear to lack the flexibility to use sound business 
judgment to closeout contracts.  Currently the FAR does not 
clearly spell out contracting officer responsibilities with respect to 
reconciliation of contract costs.  Although internal agency policies 
may address this issue.  The current guidance on use of “quick 
close-outs” found in FAR Part 42.7 is overly restrictive.  Although 
the language provides for a contracting officer waiver of the limits 
“based on a risk assessment,” in our experience contracting 
officers are reluctant to exercise such discretion.  Current FAR 
language does not address how a contracting officer should handle 
a contractor's failure to submit its final indirect cost rate 
submission.  Our member companies have experienced delays in 
obtaining required assist audit reports for subcontractors' portions 
of contract costs.  It is virtually impossible to closeout a prime 
contract until the subcontracts under it are closed.  Government 
audit agencies must be responsive to the needs of prime contractors 
if the contract closeout deadline is to be achieved.  CODSIA 
believes time frames for Government actions should be 
established.  Currently the FAR discusses time frames for the 
contractor to fulfill, such as submission of a final indirect cost rate 




a final voucher within 120 days of settlement of indirect cost rates.  
The FAR is silent regarding timing of the Government's actions.  
 
c. Recommendations:  The council made the following 
recommendations: 
i. The use of provisional indirect rates along with negotiation 
of costs. 
ii. Allowing streamlined contract closeout where warranted 
based on contract type and dollar value.  
iii. That language be added (perhaps to FAR Part 42) to clarify 
that contracting officers periodically must reconcile 
contracts financially to ensure that all numbers in the 
contract are correct, consistent, and complete, including all 
modifications.  
iv. That the indirect dollar limitation be increased to $10 
million.  
v. That the percentage limitation is increased to 50 percent, 
and administrative agencies develop policies and 
procedures to guide contracting officers through the waiver 
risk assessment process. 
vi. That a policy statement be added to FAR 42.708 requiring 
the use of quick closeout for subcontracts to the maximum 
extent possible. 
vii. That a clause permits a 20 percent payment withhold 
against current contractor payment requests, up to the 
general dollar magnitude of the Government's financial 
exposure, when a contractor does not submit its required 
CAS cost impact proposal.  A 10 percent payment withhold 
is more equitable than the current DCAA/DCMA 
imposition of a 20 percent decrement to a contractor's total 
costs for the year in which it does not submit its final 
indirect cost rate proposal. 
viii. That part of the solution may be to create a new provision 
to require a contract closeout plan in the subcontract plan.  
Consideration should be given to deleting the requirement 
to closeout subcontracts as part of the prime contract 
closeout process. If subcontractor costs change subsequent 
to closure of the prime contract, then such cost reductions 
can be handled in a manner similar to the way other 
adjustments (such as income tax refunds or pension plan 





10. The Office of Acquisition and Grants, Social Security Administration 
comments on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (ANPR) on 
contract closeout published in the Federal Register on 24 September 2002.   
 
a. Background:  On 24 September 2002 the Federal Register 
published a request for comments on whether any changes should 
be considered to the FAR, DDFARS, or the SAR to facilitate 
timely contract closeouts. 
 
b. Comments: This office’s experience with the contract closeout 
process associated with cost-type contracts is typically a delay due 
to either late submission of contract incurred cost proposals or 
delays associated with receipt of final contract audits.   
 
c. Recommendations:  This office recommends several options that 
encourage timely submittal of incurred costs proposals; one option 
is to increase the amount of fee that can be held in reserve by the 
contracting officer per FAR Clause 52.216-8 Fixed-Fee.  This 
increase could encourage the contractor to be timely with regard to 
meeting its closeout obligations.  Another option to speed up the 
process is to eliminate the requirement to use final indirect costs 
rates for contract closeout in combination with eliminating the 
final field audit.  Although eliminating these steps would 
significantly increase the costs risk to the Government, this office 
believes that a business case could be made for different 
contractors on a case-by-case basis. 
 
11. Thesis- “The Contract Closeout Process at DCMC Lockheed Martin,” 
Leigh Bandy, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1998. 
 
a. Background:  The primary purpose of this thesis is to provide a 
case analysis of the contract closeout process at DCMC Lockheed 
Martin (LM).  The contract closeout policies and procedures will 
be analyzed to develop a basis of comparison for DCMC LM.  The 
analysis includes factors affecting timely contract closeout. 
 
b. Findings: There are no penalties for contractors who submit late 
final invoices or late submission of final overhead proposals.  
Quick closeout procedures contain limitations, which are too 
restrictive to provide adequate use by large cost centers such as 
DCMC-LM.  The inability of prime contractors to settle contracts 
with subcontractors if often the sole reason for overaged contracts 





c. Recommendations:  The thesis recommended the following 
actions: 
 
i. Develop pre-award agreements or contract clauses, which 
will allow contracts to close in a timely manner. 
ii. Establish strict penalties for late submission of contractor 
final invoices and overhead proposals. 
iii. Develop initiatives, which allow the contractor and DCAA 
to become more involved in contract closeout. 
iv. Relax the restrictions in the Quick-Closeout Procedure to 
allow more widespread use. 
v. Allow DCMC organizations to close contracts using 
interim rates when warranted. 
 
12. Thesis- “Streamlining the Contract Closeout Process,” James Valovcin, 
Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995. 
 
a. Background:  The primary purpose of this thesis is to review the 
management of the contract closeout process within DCMC and 
selected Department of the Navy contracting activities to 
determine if it is performed in an effective and efficient manner.  
Analysis includes the identification of the areas that impedes the 
process or is neglected throughout the process. 
 
b. Findings: Priority of contract closeout improved but still 
roadblocks – lack of personnel and coordination problems. 
Contract closeout requires a great deal of coordination.  The most 
problematic areas are the settling of all interim or disallowed costs, 
completing all price revisions, settling prior year indirect cost 
rates, and completing contract audits. 
 
c. Recommendations:  The thesis recommended the following 
actions: 
i. Create a team including contractor to facilitate closeout 
procedures. 
ii. Perform all actions possible, which can be accomplished 
during contract performance, in order to facilitate the 
closeout process once the contract has become physically 
completed. 
iii. Accept the contractor's independently audited and certified 





iv. Incentivize the contractor (list the steps required from 
contractor for closing out the contract in the contract and 
then penalize the contractor if he fails). 
v. Establish specific time frames separately for each step of 
the process. 
 
13. Thesis- “Applying Continuous Process Improvement to the Contract 
Closeout Process,” Daniel J. Motherway, Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 1993. 
 
a. Background: The primary purpose of this thesis is to identify how 
the contract closeout process within DoD might be streamlined and 
what a model of the process would look like.  Analysis includes 
the identification of the critical factors or steps of the closeout 
process and which ones could be consolidated or eliminated. 
 
b. Findings: There is no a single DoD wide contract closeout process.  
Communication and coordination between DoD activities are poor 
or adversarial.  Use of inexperienced personnel (DCAA & DFAS) 
slows process, TQM can be applied to closeout process, but works 
best with uniform repetitive processes (CCO is not); a better 
automated system is needed. 
 
c. Recommendations:  The thesis recommended the following 
actions: 
 
i. Develop an automated system for the administration of 
contracts, including a uniform process for CCO.   
ii. Develop a training program for the CCO process or cover 
the process in more detail in contract administration 
courses.  Current training is not adequate.   
iii. Improve communications between Government 
organizations and commercial organizations involved in the 
process.   
iv. Use more experienced personnel in performing CCO 
actions.   
v. Apply TQM procedures to reduce the time required.  
 
14. Thesis- “The Contract Closeout Process,” Janet Johnson Patton, Naval 
Postgraduate School, June 1992. 
 
a. Background: This thesis’ main objective is to review the closeout 
process within DoD to determine how to make it more efficient.  




and to determine the impact of failure to close out contracts in the 
time frame stated in the FAR.   
 
b. Findings:  Training in the contract closeout process is almost non-
existence.  The amount of funds that are unliquidated and could be 
deobligated is significant.  Coordination is necessary between the 
various activities to efficiently close out contracts.  There is no 
uniform system for tracking or reporting the closeout process.  
Cost-reimbursement contracts rarely meet the FAR timeline for 
contract closeout.  Generally there is a lack of management 
commitment in contract closeout activities.  Lack of incentives, or 
the existence of disincentives, is a major reason contractors do not 
submit the final invoice in a timely manner.  Coordination is 
necessary between the various activities to efficiently close out 
contracts.  Alternate contract closeout methods such as quick- 
closeout procedures are not being utilized to their fullest potential.  
Cost-reimbursement contracts rarely meet the FAR timeline for 
contract closeout. 
 
c. Recommendations:  The thesis recommended the following 
actions: 
i. Increase contract closeout training. 
ii. More emphasis should be put on the initial contract funds 
status review. 
iii. Increase coordination by increasing communications 
between the many activities involved in the closeout 
process. 
iv. Establish a DoD-wide system for collecting, reporting, and 
monitoring data on the contract closeout process. 
v. Management needs to increase the priority of contract 
closeout. 
vi. Contracts should include clauses that provide incentives to 
contracts to achieve timely closeout. 






APPENDIX E.  COST MODELS 
As stated in Chapter I, this appendix presents two models to capture costs 
associated with contract closure within the Department of Defense.  The first model 
presents a top-level collection of costs for each of the major stakeholders in the closeout 
process.  It uses the stakeholders’ own accounting reports to present a rough order of 
magnitude estimate of their organization-wide costs for closeout.  The second model 
presents a framework for building a complex activity-based costing model made up of all 
of the tasks associated with contract closeout.  This model presents only the tasks 
themselves and leaves the work hours required to accomplish them, along with the 
associated cost of that labor and queue/delay times, for later research efforts. 
A. MODEL 1 
This cost model seeks to capture only the top-level quantifiable costs of contract 
closeout for each of the major stakeholders involved in the closeout process.  Our team 
obtained cost data from each of the stakeholders and attempted to adjust the costs to 
account solely for closeout costs.  Due to the varying nature of the cost and process data 
collected by each of the stakeholders, some of the costs presented are a rough order of 
magnitude estimate based on assumptions from the available information.  We attempted 
to capture as many of the direct and indirect costs as possible from the data provided by 
each stakeholder.  Indeed, these overall cost estimates likely understate the actual cost of 
contract closeout since they do not capture oversight costs incurred by organizations such 
as USD(AT&L) or ASN(RD&A).  We included information from interviews and studies 
to shape our assumptions to present the best possible estimate we could create within the 
available timeframe.  We estimate that contract closeout actions performed by all of the 
major stakeholders costs DoD approximately $525,238,000 per year, or $6,272 per 
contract. 
1. Most Significant Players 
a. DCMA 
Of the stakeholders, DCMA is the most active in tracking the costs of 




administration tasks, including several cost elements specifically identified as closeout-
oriented.  Our group collected those closeout-specific cost elements for Fiscal Year 2002 
and adjusted them as necessary to best reflect the actions accomplished by DCMA.  The 
following spreadsheet contains the Top-Level costs of DCMA, totaling approximately 
$101,600,000 per year, or $1,213 per contract for the nearly 84,000 contracts closed by 
DCMA. 
b. DCAA 
DCAA does not pool closeout-specific costs associated with the audits 
they conduct or the audit of final invoices.  DCAA tracks the number of cost-incurred 
audits at an Agency level, but does not consider any of them as closeout specific.  Some 
audits may serve as the final audit for dozens of contracts for any given contractor, while 
another cost-incurred audit may not be used for the closeout of any contracts for another 
contractor.  As such, a major assumption was made that only 10% of all of the cost-
incurred audits are closeout-related.  This assumption was based on interviews with 
DCAA personnel.  The following spreadsheet contains the Top-Level costs of DCAA, 
totaling approximately $71,080,000 per year, or $848 per contract for the nearly 84,000 
contracts closed by DCMA. 
c. DFAS 
DFAS is another organization that does not specifically track closeout 
costs.  DFAS completes two major functions associated with closeout, one is closeout 
processing and the other is reconciliation.  Numerous assumptions were made based on 
the top-level costs provided by DFAS based on interviews we conducted.  The following 
spreadsheet contains the Top-Level costs of DFAS, totaling approximately $191,416,000 
per year, or $2,286 per contract for the nearly 84,000 contracts closed by DCMA. 
d. Buying Commands 
Interviews with personnel at several buying commands indicated that there 
are no measures for the specific number of labor hours necessary to conduct closeout-
specific actions.  Three buying commands, however, were identified as having awarded 
contracts for a contractor to conduct actions associated with closeout.  As such, those 




conducting closeout.  Each buying command contracted for closeout-related services as 
an associated task along with multiple other tasks.  Closeout was not identified as a 
Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) within the respective Service’s contracts.  As such, 
specific costs associated with closeout were not available from the contractor, although 
estimates could be made based on the experience of those involved in closeout actions 
under the contract.  We had to make a significant assumption based on the overall 
number of contracts, since it would be impossible for our group to assemble the estimated 
closeout costs for each of the buying commands listed in MOCAS.  The following 
spreadsheet contains the Top-Level costs of DoD-wide buying activities, totaling 
approximately $61,129,000 per year, or $730 per contract for the nearly 84,000 contracts 
closed by DCMA. 
e. Contractor 
Of the contractors we contacted to obtain closeout costs, only one had any 
kind of estimate of costs associated with their closeout efforts, although all of them noted 
the burden closeout can impose.  That contractor stated a cost of approximately 10% of 
the total value of the contract as a cost estimate for their closeout costs.  This estimate is 
based on their assumption that larger dollar value contracts normally contain more 
complex terms, require more coordination with the Government to resolve reconciliation 
issues such as property and payment resolution, and are far more likely to encounter 
problems during closeout actions.  Other contractors estimated far lower values as the 
cost of closeout, although an average of approximately 2.5% of the total value of the 
contract was given on several occasions.  This percentage takes into account the varying 
complexities of contracts and assumes that the higher dollar contracts would require 
additional costs to close due to the complex nature of administrative actions associated 
with higher dollar value contracts.  The following spreadsheet contains the Top-Level 
costs for contractors, totaling approximately $100,000,000 per year, or $1,194 per 
contract for the nearly 84,000 contracts closed by DCMA. 






Table 19. Top-Level Organization Costs of Contract Closeout. 
 
Assumptions: 
1.  Total contracts closed per DCMA was 334,953, of which 83,739 were complex enough to require notable labor hrs 
2.  DCMA PV processing, 10% is for closeout
4.  DFAS/DCMA Estimate of 25% of contracts require complex reconciliation (see assumption 1)
5.  Replacement funding is taking average of 90 to 120 days
DCMA 
Cost Code 
181 749,049     Contract Closeout44 99,041     Final OVHD Rates105 141,578     Plant Clearance/Property Clearance141 126,953     Public Voucher Processing
TOTAL 1,116,621     hours
times $91 (burdened labor rate)
101,612,511$    for closeout actions, or $1213.03 per contract
DCAA 
1,716,751 total incurred cost audits
171,675      Assumption that 10% of total audits are closeout-related686,700      Total Hours in auditing for closeout (Estimate of 4 hours per audit)times $ 103.51 (benchmark hourly audit rate of actual expenses)
71,080,358$    for closeout actions, or $848.83 per contract
DFAS 
Closeout Process 
8 Hours to complete average closeout process
15.49 Hourly average rate (based on GS-5/GS-6)
83,739 Number of Contract Closeouts in FY2002
10,376,937 $    COST of DFAS Closeout ProcessReconciliation Process 
83,739 Contracts Requiring Complex Reconciliation
20 AVG number of hours to complete Complex Reconciliation
251,214.00      Contracts Requiring Simple Reconciliation3 AVG number of hours to complete Simple Reconciliation
181,038,860 $    times $74.55 (fully burdened billing rate for reconciliation)
191,415,797$    for closeout actions, or $2285.86 per contract
Contractor 
83,739 Number of Contracts closed
4,000,000,000 Approximate obligated dollar value remaining on DoD contracts entering MOCAS CAR Section 2
100,000,000      2.5% of total dollar value (estimate of contractor cost for each contract)
100,000,000$    for closeout actions, or $1,194.19 per contract
Buying Activity 
83,739 Number of Contracts closed in FY2002
730 Average Estimated cost to close each contract
61,129,470$    for closeout actions, or $730 per contract
SUMMARY OF COSTS 
525,238,136 $    for closeout actions
6,272.00$    Cost per contract
note, this cost is in line with approximate costs charged by DOE per their CCO Business Line Report dated 29 March 2001
They charge $4960 for routine cost-type and $11,160 for non-routine cost-type closeout or 
they charge $240 for routine FFP-type and $540 non-routine FFP-type closeout 




B. MODEL 2 
This model utilizes Microsoft EXCEL© to identify all of the tasks associated with 
contract closeout.  Every major stakeholder’s tasks are identified, as are the differences in 
closeout that occur between fixed-price and cost-type contracts.  This model is only the 
first step in the creation of a cost tracking and cost estimation model that will eventually 
included cost data for each task, such as the length of time (labor hours) required to 
complete each task as well as the appropriate pay level of the person completing the task.  
The model is useful in not only determining the overall cost, but in identifying potential 
mis-matches of tasks to the seniority of the personnel assigned to complete that task.  For 
example, if a GS-12 is completing many of the simple-repetitive tasks that would be 
more suited to the GS-7 level, then there is a mis-match in labor mix that must be 
resolved by management.  Similarly, there may be many hidden costs of closeout that are 
identified in this model that are not captured in any of the individual organizations’ cost 
accounting systems, such as queue delays or FEDEX costs for shipping closeout 
paperwork, etc.  The following list of tasks is our estimation of all of the actions required 
to accomplish contract closeout.  Once the listing of tasks was assembled, we created a 
cost estimation model based on the specific cost elements identified in the listing of tasks.  
We assigned a column for labor hours, a rate based on the likely pay level of personnel 
completing each task, and an extended total for each cost element.  This model can be 
populated by follow-on studies to obtain a far more detailed level of accounting for costs 
across the various stakeholders involved in contract closeout. 
Table 20 lists the tasks associated with contract closeout, while Table 21 provides 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cost Elements: Labor Hours Hourly Rate
Extended 
Cost
Final Acceptance Document Received (Final DD 250)
Enter acceptance document information into MOCAS
Move contract file to MOCAS Section 2
Send interim PK9 report or DD 1594 to buying activity
Review contract file for closeout requirements
Commence specialized closeout activities (DD 1597) 
Determine if contractor has submitted final invoice
Notify contractor of need to submit final invoice
If no response, unilaterally determine invoice
Contractor submit final invoice
Identify and Deobligate Excess Funds
Review funds status
Review of obligations/posting of disbursements at ACRN
Notify PCO of any excess available
(If any excess funds):
Issue a modification to release excess funds
Process modification to release excess funds
Process modification to release excess funds
(If a NULO exists):
Conduct review at ACRN level to determine the cause
Send adjustment request to DFAS (DD 1797)
(If unable to determine cause):
Initiate full reconciliation (ACO, DFAS, Contractor) 
Disposition of Government Property and Plant Clearance
Accept/reject inventory schedules
Open plant clearance case
Process referral to cognizant PLCO
Verify inventory and determine allocability
Submit property for reutilization screeening
Request disposition instructions from PCO
PCO contact other interested programs for use
Issue disposition instructions
Process transfer/donation of Government property
Control demilitarization and trade security
Close plant clearance case/ annotate closure file
Disposition of Classified Material
Notify DIS of contract completion (DD 1593)
Ensure prime contractor clears all sub-contractors 
Contact all sub-contractors to complete disposition
Anotate DD Form 1597 with notification date
Provides disposition instructions
Notifies PCO after completion
Final Patent and Royalty Report
Process contractor/sub-contractor submissions (DD 882)
Provide instructions to contractor
Exercise withholding of payments
Investigate notices of infringement
MODEL 2 - COST OF TASKS PERFORMED DURING CONTRACT CLOSEOUT
 




Cost Elements: Labor Hours Hourly Rate
Extended 
Cost
Administer reporting or refund of royalties
Complete DD 882 after clearance is received
Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECP) Completed
Submit all pending VECPs
Review contract/VECP evaluation
Submit cost proposal
Negotiate value of savings
Issue contract modification
Termination Docket Complete (Contract Termination)
Establish termination docket
Termination for Default
Ensure completion of all legal actions 
Termination for Convenience
Review termination for convenience notice
Forward termination notice and contract documents
Conduct post-termination conference






Issue bilateral contract modification
Ensure completion of termination docket 
Subcontracts Settled by Prime Contractor
Perform audit of subcontractors
Conduct negotiations with subs, as necessary
Settle with all subcontractors
Calculate final rates
Submit final rate determinations to DCMA/DCAA
Desk Review
Review Certificate of Indirect Costs
Scan proposal for unusual items
Scan proposal to determine siginficant changes from prior year proposal
Verify mathematical accuracy
Incorporate Corp/Home Audit results if significant allocation
Execute a rate agreement letter
Contracting officer negotiate rates (optional)
Issue review report, include CACWS
Direct contractor to adjust provisional billing rate
Audit of Incurred Costs
Review Proposal
Determine ADV
Classify proposal as low risk or high risk
Review prior year(s) cost audits 
Conduct comparative analysis
Determine low risk sample pool  




Cost Elements: Labor Hours Hourly Rate
Extended 
Cost
Identify contractor's status with respect to CAS
Determine if there is a mixture of DoD and Non DoD contracts
Identify special contract terms
Obtain and review contract briefs
Determine if it will be a multiyear audit
Perform transaction testing Mandatory Annual Audit Requirements 
Evaluate the internal Control Audit Summary, Disclosure Statements
Complete DMIS CAS compliance audits and CAS tracking non-compliances
Evaluate changes in procedures and practices for charging direct or indirect costs
Review Corporate minutes
Conduct Discussions with personnel and plant observations 
Report changed conditions
Evaluate reasons for using voluntary management reductions
Prepare appropriate CAS Noncompliance  and Internal Control Deficiency Reports
Test methods of allocation
Evaluate distro of home office expenses/corporate office expenses
Select Accounts




Comparitivce analysis of accounts
Graphic and computational analysis of accounts
Analysis of specific accounts
Analysis of Contigent expenses
Determine Allowability, allocability, reasonableness
Compute and Assess Penalties
Reconcile costs to records
Verify the base
Compare interim billings to final rate
Issue Audit Report
Issue notices of costs suspended 
Hold exit conference
Review Cumulative Allowable cost Worksheet
Select base period
Determin indirect cost pools
Compute Cost of Money
Determine direct costs




Develop and Certify indirect rate cost proposal
Settle Interim or Disallowed Costs
Submit incurred cost proposal
Audit incurred cost proposal
Negotiate interim or disallowed costs 
Complete documentation for Interim or Disallowed Costs
Complete Price Revisions
Review Price adjustment clauses  




Cost Elements: Labor Hours Hourly Rate
Extended 
Cost
Settle final price adjustments
Indirect Costs are Settled
Determine status of contractor
Provide monthly status reports
Hold conference with team
Review real-time of incurred costs
Determine supporting costs/pricing data
Review certified proposal
Negotiate Quick-closeout rates
Forward proposal for DCAA/Contractor agreement
Process DCAA/Contractor agreement
Review DCAA Form 1 and advisory report
Negotiate final indirect rates
Issue final determination
Prepare/execute settlement agreement
Submission of Final Invoice/Closing Statement
Submit final invoice/closing statement
Review final invoice/closing statement
Audit final invoice/Issue CACWS
Approve final invoice for payment
Administer Final Payment
Review final invoice (pre-validation)
Conduct full reconciliation (if needed)
Request replacements funds (if funds canceled)
Letter to buying command to request funds
Determine if funds available
Obtain fuding approval from Comptroller
Transfer funding to requiring account
Forward replacement funding to DFAS
Receive notice of replacement funds
Issue final payment
Forward notice of availability of funds for de-obligation
Notify PCO of any excess available
Issue a modification to release excess funds
Process modification to release excess funds
Final Closeout Actions
Issue final NLA
Notify buying activity (PK9 or DD Form 1594)
Move contract file to MOCAS Section 5
Close the Contract File
Total Costs: $  



























Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), AFMC Contract Closeout Guide, November 
1997, Online Resource:  [http://www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/PK].  22 November 
2002. 
Anupindi, Ravi, et al., Managing Business Process Flows 1st Ed, Prentice Hall, Upper 
Saddle River, New Jersey, 1999. 
Army Materiel Command (AMC), Department of the Army, Telephone Interview of 
Contracting Office Personnel, 10 April 2003.  
Ayers, Stephen R., Senior VP for Contracts and Procurement at Major Department of 
Defense Contractor, Interview, 02 April 2003. 
Bandy, Leigh, “Thesis: Contract Closeout Process at DCMC Lockheed Martin,” Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1998. 
Carnell, C. A., Managing Change in Organizations, 2nd ed., Prentice Hall International 
(UK) Ltd., Hertfordshire, UK, 1995. 
Castillo, Stephen, Program Manager for a DoD Contractor Engaged in Contract Closeout 
Operations, Telephone Interview, 01 April 2003. 
Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA) Comments on the 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (ANPR) on Contract Closeout That Was 
Published in the 24 September 2002 Edition of the Federal Register. 
Daft, R. L., Management, 3rd ed., The Dryden Press, Fort Worth, USA, 1993.  
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), Defense Acquisition Deskbook (DAD), of June 
2001, Online Resource:  [http://deskbook.dau.mil/jsp/default.jsp].  04 December 2002. 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) San Diego, Department of Defense, Interview 
of Contract Audit Office Personnel, 03 April 2003. 
Defense Contract Audit Agency, Contract Audit Manual (CAM) 7640.1, January 2003, 
Online Resource:  [http://www.dcaa.mil/cam.htm].  14 March 2003. 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Atlanta, Department of Defense, 
Telephone Interview with Technical Assistance Group, 01-10 April 2003. 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Contract Closeout Guidebook, October 




Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Headquarters, Department of Defense, 
Phone Interview with Contract Business Operations Personnel and MOCAS Transition 
Office Personnel, 09 April 2003. 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Manassas, Virginia, Department of 
Defense, Phone Interview with Administrative Contracting Office Personnel, 11 April 
2003.  
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) San Diego, Department of Defense, 
Interviews with Administrative Contracting Office Personnel, 03 April 2003 and 
Telephone Interview with Plant Representative Personnel, 11 April 2003.  
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) San Francisco, Phone Interviews with 
Technical Analysis Group (TAG) Personnel and Business Operations Personnel, 11 April 
2003 and with Administrative Contracting Personnel, 12 April 2003. 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Sunnyvale, California, Department of 
Defense, Interview with Administrative Contracting Office for Lockheed Martin 
Personnel, 30 January 2003.  Telephone Interviews Conducted with Property 
Administration Personnel, 16 April 2003 and with Administrative Contracting Office 
Personnel, 09-11 April 2003. 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), DCMA News, “DCMA Manassas 
Reputed as the ‘Contract Close-Out Capital,’ This CMO Is So Much More,” Edition of 
04 February 2003. 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), One Book, Chapter 10, 2001 and 
Chapter 9 “Contract Closeout,” Revision of October 2002, Online Resource:  
[http://www.dcma.mil/onebook/9.0/9.9/Closeout.htm].  14 November 2002 – 10 April 
2003. 
Defense Contract Management Agency, Department of Defense, DCMA Memorandum, 
“Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) System Contract 
Closeout Initiative,” Dated 25 April 2000. 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Columbus, MOCAS Database, 
Downloads of the DoD-Wide and Navy-Wide MOCAS CAR Section 2 were Provided by 
the DFAS MOCAS Transition Assist Team. 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) San Diego, Department of Defense, 
interview with Commercial Payments Section Personnel, 03 April 2003. 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Columbus, Contractor Payment 




Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Columbus, Department of Defense, 
survey results from Commercial Pay Business Line Personnel, 14 April 2003.   
Egan, Maria, Senior Contract Specialist for a DoD Contractor Engaged in Contract 
Closeout Operations, Interview 01 April 2003. 
Federal Register, “FAR Council Requests Comment to Facilitate Contract Closeout,” 
Volume 67, Number 185, Government Printing Office, 24 September 2002. 
Federal Register, “Final Rules,” Volume 67, No. 27/Part III, Government Printing Office, 
February 2002. 
Federal Register, Vol. 67, No 185/September 24, 2002/Proposed Rules, Department of 
Defense General Services Administration National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 48 CFR Chapters 1, 2, and 5, Federal Acquisition Regulation; Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplements; Contract Closeout, Action: Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making, p. 59799. 
Federal Register, Vol. 67, No. 27/Friday, February 8, 2002/Rules and Regulations, 
Department of Defense General Services Administration National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 48 CFR Parts 42 and 52, pp. 6118-6119.  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) San Diego, Department of the Navy, Interview 
of Contracting Office Personnel, 02 April 2003. 
General Accounting Office, “Principals of Federal Appropriations Law, Second Edition” 
July 1991 Version, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 
General Accounting Office, Report D-2002-027, “Closing Overaged Contracts,” 19 
December 2001. 
General Accounting Office, Report D-2002-747, “Cancelled DoD Appropriations,” July 
2002. 
General Accounting Office, Report D-2003-275, “Defense Budget – Improved Reviews 
Needed to Ensure Better Management of Obligated Funds,” January 2003. 
General Accounting Office, Report D-2003-574T, “Sourcing and Acquisition: Challenges 
Facing the Department of Defense,” 19 March 2003. 
George Washington University, Prometheus Web Contract Closeout Resources for MGT 
69.10 Managing Contract Closeouts, Instructed by Professor Mamoon Hammad, Online 




III Corps and Fort Hood Contracting Command, Army Contracting Agency, Department 
of the Army, Phone Interview with Business Systems Division Personnel, 08 April 2003 
and with Contract Administration Division Personnel, 11 April 2003. 
Jarilyn Gibbs, Contracts Manager & Corporate Closeout Coordinator for Government 
Contractor, Telephone Interview, 13 February 2003. 
Joint Report of the Purchase Card Financial Management Team and the Purchase Card 
Integrated Product Team to Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) 
and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 26 February 1997.  
Kotter, John P., “Leading Change, Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” Harvard Business 
Review on Change, Harvard Business School Press, Harvard Massachusetts, March/April 
1995. 
McPherson, John and Russell, Marolyn, Johnson, Kathyrn Lt. Col, “Real-Time Rates 
Integrated Product Team Reduces Final Overhead Rate Backlog,” July 1998. 
Moran, Michael, Corporate VP for Contract Closeout for Major Contractor for the 
Department of Defense, Interview, 01 April 2003. 
Motherway, Daniel J., “Thesis: Applying Continuous Process Improvement to the 
Contract Closeout Process,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 
1993. 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Patuxent River, Maryland, Department of the 
Navy, Phone Interview with Contracting Office Personnel, 10 April 2003. 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Washington, D.C., Department of the Navy, 
PEO-RBS Contract Closeout Metrics Website, Online Resource: 
[http://www.peoarbs.navy.mil/ccm/default.asp].  08 November 2002 – 20 April 2003. 
Navy Comptroller, “Practical Financial Management: A Handbook of Practical Financial 
Management Topics for the DoD Financial Manager,” March 2003. 
Office of Acquisition and Grants, Social Security Administration Comments on the 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (ANPR) on Contract Closeout That Was 
Published in the 24 September 2002 Edition of the Federal Register.   
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller 
(ASN FM&C), Washington D.C., Department of the Army, Telephone Interview with 
Financial Management Personnel, 11 April 2003. 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 




Navy, Interviews and Telephone Interviews with Contract Closeout Office and DFAS-
MOCAS Liaison Personnel, November 2002 through March 2003. 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition, Acquisition Business Management, Washington, D.C., Department of the 
Navy, Contracting for the Rest of Us, NAVSO-P-3689, October 2000. 
Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Report of the Working Integrated Process 
Team on Contract Closeout,” April 1999. 
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report 93-058, “Audits of the 
Contract Closeout Process,” 23 February 1993. 
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report D-2002-027 (Project No. 
D2000FJ-0268), “Closing Overaged Contracts Prior to Fielding a New DoD Contractor 
Payment System,” 19 December 2001. 
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report D-2003-048 (Project No. 
D2000FJ-0268.003), “Reopening of Contracts in the Mechanization of Contract 
Administration Services System,” 16 January 2003. 
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report D-92-076 (Project No. 
OCF-0045), “Administration of the Contract Closeout Process Within DoD,” 15 April 
1992. 
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report D-2000-088, “DoD 
Acquisition Workforce Trends and Impacts,” 29 February 2000. 
Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report D–2002-076 (Project No. 
D2000FJ-0268.001), “Funding Invoices to Expedite the Closure of Contracts Before 
Transitioning to a New DoD Payment System,” 29 March 2002. 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology, Report of the 
Process Action Team (PAT) on Contract Administration, February 1995. 
Patton, Janet Johnson, “Thesis: Contract Closeout Process,” Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, June 1992. 
Schwemmer, Daniel J., DoD Joint Purchase Card Program Management Office, Power 
Point Briefing, “Department of Defense Purchase Card Program, Implementation of 
Transaction Management and Electronic Data Interchange, 
[http://purchasecard.saalt.army.mil].  24 April 2003. 
Senge, Peter M., The Fifth Discipline:  The Art & Practice of Learning Organizations.  




Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) San Diego, Department of the 
Navy, Interview with Contracting Office Personnel, 01 April 2003. 
Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) San Diego, Department of the Navy Interview 
with Contracts Management Office Personnel, 02 April 2003. 
Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), Department of the Army, 
Telephone Interview with Program Executive Office for Ground Combat Systems (PEO-
GCS) Financial Management Personnel, 11 April 2003. 
Valovcin, James, “Thesis: Streamlining the Contract Closeout Process,” Naval 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
2. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, VA 
 
3. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (RD&A) 
DASN for Acquisition (E-Business Policy and Oversight) 
 Arlington, VA 
 
4. Dr David V. Lamm 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
5. CDR Phil Candreva 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
6. Professor Brad Naegle 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
7. CDR Cory Yoder 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
8. LCDR Christopher Parker 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
9. LCDR Ricardo Byrdsong 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
10. CPT Luis Crespo 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 




 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
12. 1st LT Emine Torunoglu 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
 
